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'Māori Orality and Extended Cognition: a cognitive approach to memory and oral 
tradition in the Pacific' - By David James Murphy 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Though philosophers have long held that interpretive anthropology and the cognitive science 
of religion (CSR) are opposed, this thesis offers an extended empirical assessment of the 
issues surrounding the implications of utilizing ethnographic material within a cognitive 
study of religious transmission. Using case studies from the Pacific, I consider a core 
question arising in both interpretative and cognitive disciplines, namely: how have oral 
cultures been able to preserve and transmit bodies of sacred knowledge cross-generationally 
without any external administrative tools (i.e. text)? First, I focus on the historical and 
ethnographic details of traditional Māori orality. I look at how orally transmitted knowledge 
was managed through the external cognitive resources associated with religious ritual. Here I 
find evidence within Pacific oral traditions that the problem of managing knowledge was 
overcome through tools and strategies that augmented memory and oral skill. I give special 
attention to the traditional Māori structuring of learning environments. Next I consider how 
macro-spatial tools – such as landmarks, and place names - helped support working memory 
and information management, and show that orientations to landscape are vital to ensuring 
collective memory. This thesis also demonstrates how culturally learned tools and strategies 
support the stability of religious cultural transmission. The use of external cognitive resources 
implies the complexity of managing and organizing sacred knowledge. Put simply, focusing 
on the historical accounts from the Pacific reveals a rich suite of culturally evolved tools and 
strategies for the transmission of religious knowledge. I show that tools such as ritual, myth, 
mnemonic techniques, and artifacts enable and stabilise such transmission. I hold, that 
such cultural environments constitute cognitive tools that are meaningfully described as 
cultural cognitive systems. Thus, combining descriptive accounts with the theoretical 
orientations of the cognitive sciences motivates what I call a ‘cognitive ecological’ model of 
mind. I argue that the cognitive ecological model is important because it orients 
researchers to the role that culturally evolved tools play in: (1) dramatically extending the 
human brain’s power to reckon with its surroundings and: (2) coordinating such knowledge 
across social groups and over time. The cognitive ecological model of mind I propose in this 
study is important for three reasons: First, it challenges the received view within the CSR – 
what I call the ‘Standard Internal Model’ (SiM) – which holds that the transmission of 
religious representations carries low cognitive demands (i.e. it is cognitively optimal). In 
contrast to SiM, the Pacific materials discussed here suggest that the oral transmission of 
sacred knowledge is cognitively demanding, culturally costly, and locally contingent. 
Second, my thesis demonstrates that historical and ethnographic evidence contains 
information that is vital for progress in the CSR since qualitative resources document how 
niche specific cultural practices often facilitate the acquisition and coordination of the 
complex knowledge resources over time. The ethnographic data supports the local optimality 
contention. Third, my thesis reveals that formulating tractable models for cultural 
transmission within the CSR is benefitted by an interdisciplinary approach. Such a prospect, I 
urge, is vital for intellectual progress between the humanities and the CSR. As such, and 
contrary to received opinion, my thesis shows how the CSR and the cultural anthropology of 
religion share a common intellectual fate.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
0.1 The Aim of the Thesis. 
 
 
Many authors within the cognitive science of religion claim that the frequency and content 
of religious representations are causally related to innate features of our evolved cognitive 
architecture (Barrett 2000; Boyer 1994b; 2001; Boyer and Ramble 2001; McCauley 2000; 
Pyysiäinen 2001; Sperber 1996). Within the received view of religious cognition, non-
religious features of our cognitive architecture determine the prevalence and type of religious 
representations within cultures. Attributes that are causally related to religious behavior are 
similar cross-culturally because of the way in which our cognitive hardware biases 
information processing. What I will call the ‘Standard Internal Model’ (SiM) of religious 
cognition claims that the fidelity and shape of religious representations is connected to 
content–rich features of our cognitive architecture (Barrett 2007; Jensen 2009; Whitehouse 
2004). SiM purports that religion is a naturally occurring phenomenon, derived from intuitive 
information processing constraints. The observation that there are noticeable likenesses in the 
way in which religious activity is expressed across various traditions subsequently leads to 
the assumption that the uniformity of religious expression is correlated to fixed and universal 
psychological traits (Powell and Clarke 2012).  
 
In regards to cultural transmission, SiM purports that our cognitive architecture functions 
as a natural stabilizing mechanism for the spread of religious representations. Religiosity is 
therefore conceived to be an emergent probabilistic byproduct of our innate psychological 
systems, as these systems encounter certain types of socially transmitted information. It is 
assumed that because cognition functions predictably across cultural contexts, it is possible to 
explain the abundance of religious representations across cultures by understanding why 
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universal features of the human mind find religious concepts compelling (Boyer 2001; Boyer 
and Ramble 2001). SiM relies on the assumption that how people think about religion is 
subject to inferential constraints generated by innate cognitive algorithms (Boyer 2001). Put 
simply, our cognitive architecture influences the way in which data is received and 
transmitted. SiM holds that the invariant human predisposition to receive and transmit 
cognitively optimal information determines the spread and popularity of religious 
representations. Optimality describes our propensity to be attracted to cultural 
representations, while the ease by which religious themes are learned ensures tractable 
comprehension. The cognitive optimum predicts that religious representations will be exciting 
without putting too much computational burden on our cognitive systems. On this view, 
religious explanations for natural phenomena are plausibly a default response to 
environmental cues, derived from cognitive constraints (McCauley 2000.) The proliferation 
of religious traits across cultures (their ubiquity and similarity) is due primarily to our natural 
tendency to find religious representations both exciting and easy to acquire.  
 
I will argue in later chapters that there are many related casual connections between 
regional diversity within oral traditions and the variables that comprise the informational 
character of these environments. Cultural niches are often the consequence of unpredictable 
variables, while any data that clarifies the conditions of certain stable forces – such as socio-
ecological influences – can give us some inferential reliability for an examination of cultural 
patterns (e.g. resource acquisition activities relative to a local ecology). However, religious 
traditions are noticeably diverse, and any causal explanation for these differences cross-
culturally is not always evident. I argue that this is an important problem for the CSR, since 
the primary focus of its research has been motivated by the scope of universal trends in 
religiosity. This thesis does sympathize with this position: cognitive regularities are a 
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determining factor in influencing religious-cultural patterns. Nevertheless, I contend that 
important connections can be made between the cognitive functionality of external cultural 
properties and their significance in religious traditions. I argue that an important dimensional 
quality that can be at least moderately associated with external religious properties – e.g. 
artifacts, ritual and other symbolic tools – is their potential to support memory and 
information fidelity. The functional purposes of external religious properties are not always 
obvious, but this is plausibly due to the multivalent qualities associated with religious things: 
a religious artifact can be both the focus of worship and commitment, while being an 
orienting device for theological recollection (i.e. a tool for communication and memory).  
 
My aim in this thesis is to evaluate, and challenge, the proposition that SiM is adequate 
for explaining the spread and transmission of religious concepts. The literature on religious 
cognition and memory will also be the primary foundation for orienting my own 
investigation into Pacific orality. I will look specifically at memory and speech within early 
Māori oral tradition in order to test the optimal relationships between cultural learning 
environments and cognitive expertise. I claim that the stability and fidelity of religious 
representations relies less upon innate features of our cognitive architecture, and more upon 
cultural-externally developed technologies for information management. My main job, then, 
will be to evaluate - on balance - those theories, concepts and methodologies that are applied 
within the CSR. I argue that the external-ecological cultural modes by which oral cultures 
preserve and transmit their religious corpus remains poorly described by SiM.  The 
preservation and stability of sacred knowledge within many Pacific cultures would have 
depended more upon the access and nurtured capability to employ tools and strategies for 
enhancing transmission (Day 2004a, 2004b; Geertz 2010a).  
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This claim comes from the observation that the means by which sacred knowledge is 
transmitted is more cognitively demanding than is assumed by SiM. Information sharing 
within a religious context is not cheap. For example, oral cultures have utilized methods for 
learning that amplify transmission fidelity, and I argue that there has been a rational course 
for information management within oral cultures that has led to the development of specific 
cognitive devices (e.g. such as the logical structure of mythic narratives, as well as the 
purposeful use of geographical markers [e.g. landmarks, and place names] within 
storytelling). These anchors serve a purpose for enhancing memory, and transmission 
fidelity.  
 
In light of the of the costs associated with information management – relative to the 
proximate demands of religious activity - we should be able to some predictions regarding 
the optimality of religious transmission. I argue here, however, that the modes of religious 
transmission are locally contingent, and this includes the determinants of optimality. In the 
chapters on Pacific oral traditions discussed below, I will look specifically at how these 
contingencies are relatively sensitive to engineered niche conditions. In particular, I argue 
that the burden of memory within oral traditions is relieved through certain tools and 
strategies employed for information storage and retrieval.  
 
To clarify this idea better, I will put the problem of information management into a 
historical context, by looking at methods used in Māori oral tradition for memory and 
transmission. I will look closely at the cognitive function of geographical locations within 
traditional Māori myth, and the impact of sacred conventions on the modes of transmission. 
Mnemonic devices, such as geographic landmarks, constitute features of a cognitive map for 
organizing information. However, social learning constrains the channels of information 
  
  5 
through controlled mediums, while subsequently supporting the fidelity of oral transmission. 
The descriptive material on Māori oral culture discussed in the chapters below will illustrate 
how certain social and technological methods – such as mnemonic devices - were causally 
relevant in the transmission of a mythic corpus.  
 
Something that is also overlooked by SiM is the level of complexity and costs involved in 
the intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs and practices. The educational 
methods that are used within religious traditions, for instance, to enhance both the stability 
and fidelity of information transmission, often demands an accepted standard of dedication 
to a craft, coordination within a socially complex environment, and the necessary 
expenditure of resources. The descriptive material on Māori oral tradition discussed here 
will look at how the stability and fidelity of religious-cultural transmission greatly depended 
upon skills associated with memory retention and the verbal arts. However, I will also look 
at the various methods my which individual memory constraints may have been eased 
through the use of material anchors, such as landmarks and place naming. The conceptual 
organization of the landscape through myth and place naming further supports the 
coordination of knowledge into an accessible epistemic framework within Māori oral 
tradition. Physical structures function as mental anchors for memory. As shall be argued 
further, SiM’s assumptions regarding the optimality of religious motivations are insufficient 
to explain these investments in transmitting religious knowledge.  
 
Before proceeding, it is important that I first explain what is meant by the terms ‘stability’ 
and ‘fidelity’: 
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1) Stability: the preservation and maintenance of informational resources is 
critical for effective cultural transmission. The cross-generational transmission of 
cultural beliefs and practices is dependent upon the stable reproduction of these 
properties over space and time. Memory constraints impose limitations upon how 
this stability is maintained, and information is prone to distortion and alteration. 
The conservative and static features of religious traditions require explanation, 
and this can be better described by examining the various tools and strategies that 
are employed by cultures to preserve (i.e. stabilize) their traditions.  
 
2) Fidelity: cultural stability requires the faithful reproduction of cultural 
beliefs and practices across individuals. Cultural inheritance is therefore 
dependent upon a ‘copying’ process, of sorts (to the extent that any cultural 
information can be replicated). Individuals and groups must be able to duplicate 
the content of information from one generation to the next. Fidelity is of 
significant interest to cognitivist theories of mind since information processing 
constraints determine the frequency and content of cultural transmission (more on 
this in Chapter 1). However, I argue here that fidelity can be augmented through 
the use of external cognitive resources. Cultural tools and strategies enhance 
fidelity by supporting key cognitive functions when the complexity and volume of 
information increases (and this is best characterised by the use of symbolic 
technologies, such as writing and literacy).  
 
In contrast to SiM, I argue that the stability and fidelity of transmitting religious 
representations is expensive and costly, mainly because many features of religious 
information sharing are informationally complex and broad. This problem of managing 
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information necessitates culturally evolved tools and strategies in order to support memory 
and transmission.  
 
0.2 Cognitive Ecology and Māori Oral Tradition. 
 
My thesis focuses on the work into extended or distributed theories of cognition. The 
literature on externalist models of cognition suggests that certain mental burdens are eased 
through an interface between agents and their cultural environments (Clark 1998; Clark and 
Chalmers 1998; Cole and Engeström1993; Hutchins 1991, 1995; Kaptelinin et al 2003; Nardi 
1996; Sutton 2006). Authors who endorse extended-distributed cognition argue that internal 
cognitive theories are not sufficient to describe how information is managed through external 
cultural properties and processes (Hutchins 2006; Sutton 2006; Wilson 2005). External-
distributed cognitive models typically attempt to describe the functional interactions between 
cultural actors, and those specific features of the environment that enhance mental processes.  
 
Andy Clark (1997), for instance, points out that a large proportion of cognitive processes 
and properties exist outside the skull, with culturally evolved tools functioning as essential 
tools for cognitive expertise. Writing tools, computers and calendars can therefore be viewed 
as cognitive tools that are in concert with the computational constraints of our basic brain. 
Since our everyday intelligence is enhanced through the use of external tools and strategies, 
external cognitive resources can be classed as epistemic devices that support mental 
processes (Dennett 2000; Sterelny 2004).  
 
Similarly to Clark, Edwin Hutchins (1995a) also observes that a large portion of our 
cognitive functioning is supported through external artifacts and social networking. For 
  
  8 
instance, Hutchins in his book, Cognition In The Wild (1995) explores the operational 
features of a naval vessel in order to show how the burden of epistemic complexity is 
unloaded on to the various tools and specialized crewmen upon the vessel (more on this in 
Chapter 5). A naval vessel is run by a divisible number of individuals, but its operation is also 
the sum of a cooperating collective – in conjunction with the learned strategies and tools 
necessary for navigation. It could be argued, then, that this organized conglomerate of 
hardware and division of labor constitutes a cognitive system. Within a distributed cognition 
model, all interfacing properties and processes matter to a study of cognition ‘at work’ in a 
structured environment.  
 
External-distributed cognition models also emphasize the role that agents play in the 
shaping of their environments for cognitive purposes, and the impact these engineered 
environments have on cognition and behavior (Clark 1997; Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Donald 1991; Hutchins 1995a, 1995b). The capacity to engineer our environments is critical 
to the externalist models of cognition, since it is assumed that the relationship between agents 
and their environments are the result of unique adaptive strategies. Technological innovation 
and the manufacturing of tools has been a salient feature in the evolutionary story of 
hominins. Humans have managed to establish ecological niches in a wide range of conditions 
due to the capacity to engineer their environments successfully. 
 
We not only engineer our technological domains, but also the informational character of 
our environment (Sterelny 2003, 2004). While biological niche construction describes the 
way in which organisms have modified their environments for their own ends, and how these 
changes have led to significant effects upon the organism and their ecology (Laland and 
Odling-Smee 2000; Odling-Smee and Laland et al 2003), epistemic niche construction 
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describes how environments have been structured within a cooperative milieu for information 
transmission. The adaptive benefits of niche construction have been one of the more obvious 
features of human activity throughout history, and the received view within archaeology 
presumes a functional relationship between technological innovation and human economy 
(Trigger 2006). The capacity to adapt to a variety of environments, while at the same time 
coordinating epistemic resources, has enabled large-scale regional specialization for humans 
(however, ENC activity is noticeably preconditioned by extensive cooperation, language 
ability, cognitive flexibility and technological innovation [Sterelny 2003]).  
 
The capacity for structured social learning is a key factor in the development of rich 
epistemic environments. Humans do not merely learn through imitation, but through 
structured interactions with our peers (Sterelny 2003, 2011, 2012). Teachers, and more 
experienced individuals actively engage with other agents for the purposes of passing on skill 
and knowledge (Sterelny 2011, 2012). In addition, social learning and technology has been 
critical in enhancing the fidelity of information. Institutionalized means for passing on skills 
to downstream generations has been vastly beneficial for the preservation of knowledge, 
whilst the development of symbolic storage (e.g. text, and other symbolic artifacts) has 
allowed for the outsourcing of memory (Donald 1991). Similarly to distributed-external 
cognition models, ENC recognizes the importance of cultural environments for supporting 
cognitive expertise.  
 
In what follows, I will broadly utilise the term cognitive ecology to refer to extended-
distributed cognitive models, as well as ENC. A cognitive ecological model describes how 
mental processes are distributed across a wide range of modalities – including social, 
physical and individual cognitive domains (Hutchins 2010; see also Gibson 1966). As 
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Hutchins states: “Cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context” 
(Hutchins 2010: 705). A cognitive ecological model views the mind as being connected to 
various features of the environment as supportive mechanisms for basic brain function, by 
further underscoring the ways in which environments matter to mental processes.  
 
I first I make the observation that cognitive ecological models assume the importance of 
cultural variation since the interface between individuals and their environments are typically 
subtle and distinctive. Ethnographers recognise that cultural practices are peculiar to a local 
milieu. Cognitive ecological models similarly presume that these interactions can be better 
observed in context, since cultural practices are uniquely relevant and serve an important 
cognitive function within a niche environment. The history of ethnographic research on oral 
traditions in the Pacific assumes cultural diffusion, and not universalism. Unlike the SiM, the 
means by which oral traditions are sustained are locally contingent and varied (Finnegan 
1995). Similarly, cognitive ecological models assume that cultural variation is obvious since 
a culture’s cognitive resources are regionally specific, and historically embedded. Cultures 
look different because the development of tools and strategies within a niche environment are 
frequently determined by a variety of contributing factors (including geography, climate, 
demographic pressures, and so forth).  
 
Second, a cognitive ecological approach recognises the variables associated with the 
methods employed for learning development. The socio-cultural environment is recognised 
as being important to epistemic worlds of agents, and the resources that are utilised for 
supporting cognition are locally contingent (i.e. context specific). Third, an ecological 
approach acknowledges the complexity of religious systems by emphasising the cumulative 
effects of cultural transmission. Cultural environments are engineered by previous 
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generations and inherited cross-generationally, with certain conditions (e.g. such as 
demographic changes and technological innovation) influencing long-term changes to the 
informational character of the environment.  
 
Much of the historical and ethnographic data on Pacific oral traditions in this dissertation 
will center on Māori orality and memory. For instance, I will look at how land and myth are 
interweaved into the traditional Māori epistemological framework for the purposes of 
information management. Without the use of administrative systems such as text, oral 
cultures would have relied on other – less symbolically external - methods for managing their 
informational resources. The traditional Māori mythic narratives evaluated below incorporate 
geographical locations into storytelling for various reasons (e.g. the spiritual and historical 
significance). However, I will consider how physical landmarks and myths assist in 
organizing knowledge resources.  
 
I argue that an ecological model can better describe the use of physical things – such as 
geographical locations - for mnemonic purposes, which further points to a wider cognitive 
system at play in the memory and transmission of sacred knowledge. In light of this, I present 
a case study demonstrating how the organization of geographical locations within Māori 
myth serves a cognitive function by structuring narratives and utilizing mnemonic cues 
associated with the landscape. For instance, a group of landmarks on a map establishes 
pathways for tracking the structure of a narrative within a story, and the journey of a 
character through progressive scenes are related to significant geographical locations on a 
map because they anchor the story to a real pattern of actions, with real physical places. 
Narratives are richly connected to geographical locations and support working memory. 
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These networks also scaffold the retrieval and storage of information, since both narratives 
and place are coordinated in such a way to act as an oral library system.  
 
Landmarks, for instance, act as mental anchors for the purposes of structuring and 
organizing information, and the historical research on mnemotechnics by both Frances Yates 
(1966) and Mary Carruthers (1990, 1998) will play a key role in this study for the purposes of 
expanding upon the functional relationships between memory, mythic narratives and macro-
spatial conceptual structures. Both Yates and Carruthers claim that mentally organized spatial 
mnemonic devices – such as the method of loci - have been a historically salient mental 
strategy for memory used by orators (most notably in their work on Classical, Medieval, and 
Renaissance oratory practices). The method of loci as a mental technique involves the 
visualization of various points or images on a building layout that are prearranged in a way to 
provide cues for recollection. By placing images, or points on a mentally constructed plan of 
a building or geographical space, orators need only imagine moving from place-to-place in 
order cue a memory resource (Yates 1966). Recollection is therefore structured into an 
artificial, mentally imagined space.  
 
Similarly, Frances Harwood (1976), in her paper "Myth, memory, and the oral tradition: 
Cicero in the Trobriands” has expanded upon this idea, that spatial memory is more 
efficacious in organizing knowledge and supporting oral memory. In the paper, she claims 
that the Trobriandic people of the New Guinea archipelago utilized place names, landmarks 
and myth to coordinate their epistemic resources. For instance, she observes that the 
Trobriandic people utilized geographical locations into their mythic corpus for the purposes 
of cueing historical and mythic knowledge. Some stories, for instance, involved a narrative of 
an ancestor who would travel to certain points on the map in the region. These points, 
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associated with historically significant places for a village, were subsequently incorporated 
into the myth. Harwood points out that these landmarks functioned as mnemonic devices for 
historical information, in addition to the structural benefits they provided for the narrative. 
Like the method of loci, the Trobriandic people employed spatial memory strategies for 
managing their mythic corpus.  
 
 Pathways and spatial memory will be important to my own research on Māori oral 
traditions. Similarly to Harwood, I claim that geographic locations have played a functional 
role for managing informational resources. Cognitive pathways, memory and myth will be 
examined further in light of Hutchins’ work on distributed cognition, and Hutchins’ (2005) 
application of conceptual blending research investigates the significance of combining 
internal representations and externally associated physical properties - in order to 
communicate more complex, multi-layered concepts (Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Hutchins 
2005). Conceptual coordination between working memory and learned concepts can be 
managed better, he argues, by anchoring concepts to physical structures. Spatial memory 
techniques, such as the method of loci, for example, are an effective mental strategy for 
memory because integrate complex conceptual structures with a physical layout. Hutchins 
argues that conceptual structures are purposefully mapped onto physical properties because 
they function as anchors for complex mental processes.  
 
I will argue, also, that oral maps (i.e. the structured relationship between myths and 
landmarks) adhere to similar coordinates and structures. Landmarks and pathways – once 
integrated into narratives – function as concrete anchors for working memory for storytelling, 
as well as a way to memorize geographical space. I contend that this kind of analysis is 
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pertinent for research on traditional Māori storytelling, since many mythic narratives entail 
salient connections between historical information, myth and landscape.  
 
In addition, a recurring theme throughout this study on oral cultures is that costly 
investments in religious cultural transmission are associated with managing knowledge 
stores, and I argue that this has not been emphasized enough by SiM (see also Bulbulia 2004, 
2009; Sosis et al 2007, for a functional examination of religious costs). Innate cognitive 
regularities do indeed operate on certain cultural outputs. However, many cultural strategies 
and tools for learning have been developed for the purposes of supporting the fidelity of 
transmission. These resources exist outside the nervous system, but nevertheless support key 
cognitive functions in the processing and communication of religious information. The case 
study on Pacific oral traditions discussed in this thesis will emphasize the techniques 
employed within Māori oral tradition and the costs associated with managing sacred 
knowledge. 
 
0.3 Oral Traditions: some conceptual disclaimers. 
 
In this thesis, while I mainly discuss the functional properties associated with the 
management of information within oral traditions, there has been some warranted 
controversy surrounding the term ‘tradition’ and whether or not this terminology can be 
evaluated from modern scholarship. For instance, one of the many problems for 
anthropological studies on the Pacific has been the contemporary reading of ‘traditional’ 
practices that are interpreted under the umbrella of colonialism and the Western influence on 
the perspectives of tradition (Hanson 1989; Linnekin 1992). It cannot be presupposed, then, 
that concepts such as ‘tradition’ can readily accepted terms applied within a historical 
analysis since the assumptions regarding historical authenticity have been directly or 
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indirectly fabricated be colonial interaction. Consequently, in the latter part of the 20th 
century there has been a push within anthropological circles to reconceptualize the term 
‘tradition’ when discussing Pacific oral cultures.  
 
It is argued that the label ‘tradition’ tends to imply an unbroken chain of knowledge that is 
passed down from previous generations to the present (Linnekin 1992). Earlier 
anthropologists who studied the Pacific initially thought that any insight into the history of 
Pacific peoples could be garnered from the orally transmitted knowledge of the locals in the 
present. However, it has been claimed, that the concept of ‘tradition’ cannot be defined as a 
bounded system of knowledge that has remained historically intact from generation to the 
next (Linnekin 1992; Finnegan 1995). Instead, culture and tradition – particularly within 
post-modern anthropological circles - is recognized as something that is “constructed in the 
present” and not a history that is  “passively ‘passed down’ from generation to another” 
(Linnekin 1992:251). We cannot have a window into the past based on what we know about 
orally transmitted knowledge in the present, and culture cannot be assumed to be a “bounded 
object” that is readily available for “scientific study” (Linnekin 1992:251).  
 
This also throws into question some of the terminology used by the SiM to describe 
cultural transmission, because tradition is shifting and context specific - not just the product 
of psychological uniformity. Linnekin’s own work in the Pacific, particularly in the Hawaiian 
context, indicates that ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ is a fluid construction pertaining to a specific 
socio-historical context (Linnekin 1983). She argues that interpretations of a pre-contact 
Pacific history are polluted by European influence, due in part to the enormous impact that 
European contact has had on Pacific cultures. A distinction, therefore, could be made 
between what is considered to be an authentic and constructed history: 
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“The conventional scholarly concepts of culture and tradition ... have in 
common an essentialist project: they both rely on and advance the 
proposition that a core or essence of customs and values is handed down 
from one generation to another, and that this core defines a group’s 
distinctive cultural identity. Cultural construction implies instead that 
tradition is a selective representation of the past, fashioned in the present, 
responsive to contemporary priorities and agendas, and politically 
instrumental” (Linnekin 1992:251). 
 
One of the more well known articles that demonstrates this push for academic self-
reflection is Allan Hanson’s (1989) paper “The Making of the Māori: Cultural Invention and 
its Logic”. In his paper, Hanson criticizes current conceptions of Māori ‘tradition’ as being a 
constructed history invented by early colonial anthropologists. Early ethnographers, Hanson 
argues, misrepresented key themes within Māori myths and legends in order to represent a 
model of the culture that satisfied theoretical trends within anthropology at the time. One of 
the many theories considered within anthropological circles at the time was the idea that 
Māori were direct descendents of an Aryan culture (Hanson 1989).  
 
Hanson’s criticism of these early ethnographic encounters is coherent with a view of 
Māori history that was invented to fit with the political agenda of the era, and further 
facilitate “race relations and nation building” in New Zealand by an attempt to fit Māori 
culture into a received historical framework that was coherent with the scholarship (Hanson 
1989:893): 
“The earlier vision was to create one culture, European in form, into which 
Māori’s would be successfully assimilated. To promote this goal it was necessary 
to identify similarities between Māori and European. As we have seen, the 
invention of the Māori culture promulgated by Percy Smith and his 
contemporaries did just that by using the Io cult as evidence for the Māori 
capacity for sophisticated thought and the Great Fleet to demonstrate the mettle of 
Māori ancestors and even to identify them as fellow Aryans” (Hanson 1989:894). 
 
 
 However, Hanson does not want anyone to perpetuate the normative view that an 
invented culture is somehow dishonest, despite the ethical implications. Instead, Hanson 
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argues that the concept of ‘tradition’ as an invention cannot be avoided. Similarly to 
Linnekin’s claims above, Hanson argues that cultural invention – despite its lack of 
authenticity – remains a normal part of social activity.  
“...The fact that culture is an invention, and anthropology one of the inventing 
agents, should not engender suspicion or despair that anthropological accounts do 
not qualify as knowledge about cultural reality. Inventions are precisely the stuff 
that cultural reality is made of” (Hanson 1989:898). 
 
 
Hanson seems to be neutral on whether-or-not culture invention is part of an explicit 
political agenda, or just a tacit product of socio-cultural development and interactions. 
Nevertheless, both Linnekin and Hanson argue that previous assumptions about the definition 
of ‘tradition’ were automatically based on the conception that a bounded set of customs and 
beliefs were being passed-on intact from one generation to another.  
 
It could, however, be argued that the term ‘tradition’ could be treated with a little less 
distrust than this, by merely acknowledging the term as a conceptual interpretation of the past 
(Sissons 1998; see Linnekin 1990). Even Linneken sates that it may be more helpful for 
anthropologists to consider the term ‘tradition’ as simply a helpful heuristic tool for 
describing the historical embeddedness of cultural attitudes and actions. So despite the 
challenges to scientific models, Linnekin states that researchers should treat the term tradition 
as an operationalized term that is functionally relevant for maintaining a dialogue within the 
social sciences. Put plainly, it is argued, that we must be careful not to overly deconstruct the 
concepts and terms that are helpful for operational purposes, otherwise we could be left with 
“no acceptable vocabulary” to work with (Linnekin 1992:261): 
“Logically, all social-science concepts are equally vulnerable to the anti-
essentialist challenge. Unlimited deconstruction has the potential to leave us 
with no acceptable vocabulary, only a critique. Terms such as 'culture' and 
'society' are indeed heuristic tools rather than things, Western categories 
rather than enduring naturalistic phenomena, but they are eminently useful 
tools” (Linnekin 1992:261). 
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Similarly, Ruth Finnegan (1995) argues that the term tradition can be controversial, but 
not overtly dysfunctional (Finnegan 1995:12-24). For her own ethnographic work on oral 
traditions in the Pacific she states that the individuals she encountered within cultures 
typically perceived oral performances as a connection to their own past. Finnegan states that 
individuals were usually conscious of both traditional themes associated with the past, and 
subsequently the contemporary influences on their oral corpus. For instance, she says that 
individuals are often intentionally playful when mixing traditional or older themes with more 
contemporary formulaic expressions. Indeed, modern alterations comprise vital historical 
relationships, by connecting the past with the present. Like Finnegan, I argue that the 
presumptions regarding the inability to separate traditional elements with more modern 
influences can be a shortsighted reading on a culture’s capacity to organize conceptual 
reasoning and knowledge sources.   
 
So while anthropologists should be critical of modern influences on oral traditions, it 
should also be recognized that the term ‘tradition’ is a useful heuristic tool when discussing 
the contemporary interpretations of the past (for both academics and living cultures). In this 
thesis, I will also operationalize the term ‘tradition’ to mean: the viability of culturally 
relevant historical information in the present. Cultural inheritance is the product of 
transmission and the reproduction of structured environments, while cultural context and the 
perceptions of tradition further shapes the epistemic framework of cultural actors in the 
present.  
 
Nevertheless, the content (or meaning) of a culture’s tradition will not be the focus here in 
this dissertation. Instead this thesis will concentrate more on the various modes of 
transmission and memory (over meaning and content). This thesis argues, then, that the 
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modes of transmission are just as critical to study of oral cultures as the semantic content of 
cultural practices. While the content of the knowledge is important to the study of oral 
traditions, so are the methods that are employed for managing informational resources. The 
strategies and tools used in the transmission of knowledge within oral cultures will be the 
focus of my own work. Put simply, this thesis will provide an examination of the functional 
processes associated with information management within oral traditions outside the 
interpretation of meaning.  
 
0.4 The Structure of the Thesis.  
 
In this thesis I will test SiM against the descriptive material from research on oral 
traditions. I argue here that the scope and breadth of managing religious knowledge requires 
culturally evolved mechanisms for stabilizing transmission, and this can be underscored by 
an interdisciplinary approach to religious cognition. The presence of information 
management strategies and tools (e.g. such as external symbols) alludes to the complexity 
and volume of informational resources that are managed by cultures. Information 
management and technological innovation are causally related, and the costs of managing 
information within religious traditions point to the demands of transmission. As far as oral 
traditions are concerned, information management systems are the product of tools and 
strategies that have been innovated of the course of a culture’s history for enhancing fidelity. 
The use of geographical locations within traditional Māori oral myth, for example, may serve 
a variety of functions, but I will highlight their effectiveness as tools for organizing 
knowledge. These kinds of cognitive strategies suggest the fundamental connections between 
cultural actors and their engineered environment, but they are also indicators that there are 
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costs involved in coordinating religious transmission. Cognitive optimality does not articulate 
these costs sufficiently.  
 
 Chapter 1 will provide an overview of cognitivist models and background on SiM. As 
stated above, SiM contends that innate psychological characteristics contribute to the cross-
cultural expression of religious beliefs and practices. There is something basic to human 
cognitive architecture that shapes the components of religiosity. The theories and methods 
underpinning SiM have emerged largely from research within evolutionary psychology (EP) 
and cognitive anthropology (see Sperber 1996). Researchers within EP claim that domain 
specific features of our intelligence are the products of an evolutionary history that selected 
for functional-adaptive purposes. As a result, many psychological traits that constitute human 
behavior are adaptations that have evolved to respond a variety of environmental 
contingencies. These evolved psychological adaptations also shape cultural behavior, and the 
proliferation of certain universal cultural patterns is the product of these genetically 
entrenched cognitive systems.  
 
Similarly, the general aim of the CSR is to assemble testable research methods that reflect 
these recurrent patterns for religiosity. The epidemiological model that will be discussed in 
this chapter describes how the frequency and content of religious representations is the 
product of information processing constraints in the brain (Sperber 1996; Boyer 2001). Innate 
features of our cognitive architecture therefore determine both the proliferation and content 
of religious representations. These predictions are based on the idea that religious beliefs and 
practices are transmitted at a cognitive optimum (Boyer and Ramble 2001). That is, the 
content of religious representations makes them both salient and memorable to our cognitive 
engines and this in turn determines their frequency. The minimally counterintuitive 
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characteristics of supernatural representations ensure their spread and universality of 
religious traits. Thus, on SiM view, innate cognitive biases naturally determine the shape and 
cognitive profile of religiosity.  
 
SiM assumes that the recurrent and stable features of human culture can be attributed to 
the native (i.e. innate) features of our intelligence.1 Modular theories have shaped many of 
the methodological approaches within the CSR, particularly the SiM. For instance, the basic 
tenet of SiM is that innate features of our cognitive architecture have a considerable influence 
on religious behavioral outputs (particularly the frequency and content of religious 
representations [Barrett 2007; Boyer 1994b, 2001]). Subsequently, internal cognitive 
constraints plausibly determine the underlying motivations for religiosity. This has been the 
impetus for Boyer’s claim that the expression of religion happens at a cognitive optimum and 
in his book Explaining Religion (2001), Boyer covers a range of contributions from research 
within evolutionary psychology pointing to the theory that religion is both exciting to our 
deeper ontological instincts about the world (i.e. natural perceptions that are fixed by 
cognitive hardware), while being easy to comprehend at a computational level (see also 
Boyer 1994a; Boyer and Ramble 2001). Religious beliefs and practices are the byproduct of 
cognitive functionality. 
 
In the same way the Sperber (1996) predicts that internal cognitive constraints lead to the 
prevalence of same cultural patterns over others, Boyer states that common traits and themes 
within religious systems cannot be attributed to specific internal modalities associated with 
                                                
1 Cognitivist/modular models often point to explanations for language as an example of this native intelligence. 
Noam Chomsky’s (1955/1975; 1988) work in universal grammar, in particular, has been influential in this field. 
Chomsky argues that while semantic features of language are learned, the structural features of our linguistic 
capabilities appear to be innate. In other words, we learn ‘meaning’ through conditioning and enculturation, but 
seem to possess native algorithms for generating syntactical structures and arrangements. The proficiency in 
which children are able to pick up language skills points to a predisposition for linguistic competency (more on 
this Chapter 1). 
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intuitive intelligence (Boyer 1998; Boyer and Barrett 2005). Stable features of religious 
transmission can therefore be attributed to how the spread of information is limited by the 
range of cognitive processing constraints. According to Boyer (1994b, 2001) and others 
(Gutherie 1995; Barrett and Keil 1996; Barrett 2000; McCauley 2000) a basin of attraction 
exists (also called the cognitive optimum [Whitehouse 2004]) that steers the expression of 
religiosity in a very predictable way. This includes – amongst other things – the expression of 
deities as anthropomorphic beings (Barrett and Keil 1996), and explanatory constraints on 
real-world phenomena (McCauley 2000).  
 
The final stages of the chapter will turn its attention Harvey Whitehouse’s (2004) ritual 
modes theory. Like my own thesis, Whitehouse states that the ethnographic data on 
religiosity often reflects the complex and costly features of ritualized beliefs and actions and 
this should be underscored. Whitehouse proposes, then, that constraints on memory and the 
prevalence of certain types of ritual are more causally relevant in the transmission of 
religious representations than domain-specific cognitive systems. Whitehouse claims that his 
ritual modes theory presents a suitable challenge to SiM thesis, since it focuses on those 
unique features of a cultural environment that influence the expression of religious ritual, and 
the political social structures associated with these practices. Whitehouse states that religious 
systems are regionally diverse because they are primarily shaped by both internal cognitive 
regularities (i.e. intuitive systems and memory), and the socio-ecological conditions that 
influence ritual patterns. The subtle complexities inherent within religious systems thus 
ensure their cross-cultural diversity.  
 
Whitehouse also takes the view that the stability of religious-cultural transmission is not 
satisfied by the theory of cognitive optimality. He argues instead that religious memory is 
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facilitated by differing religious ritual modes. Certain rituals support the memorization and 
transmission of religious systems. The niche environment matters to the way in which 
religious belief systems are expressed, as socio-ecological conditions play a role in 
determining the mode and expression of ritual. Context matters to Whitehouse’s ‘ritual 
modes theory’ and it is attempt to account for specific patterns of religious activity by 
surveying the socio-ecological conditions as well as the cognitive constraints of memory. His 
is an ecological examination of religious transmission. Religious memory is reinforced 
through different ritual modes that exploit semantic and imagistic memory systems. Doctrinal 
ritual modes – comprised of routinized, low arousal actions – are performed to activate 
semantic memory systems and structure implicit knowledge. While imagistic ritual modes – 
comprised of low frequency, high arousal actions – activate imagistic memory and shape the 
explicit recall of salient experiences. On Whitehouse’s view, ritualized actions are socially 
distributed with memory being spread out across a population of individuals.  
 
Chapter 2 will provide an overview for some of the historical and ethnographic literature 
on memory and oral traditions. The first section in the chapter will focus on the research by 
Frances Yates (1966) and other researchers within the field of historical mnemotechnics 
(Carruthers 1990; Harwood 1976) who have observed the common use of artificial memory 
strategies within oral cultures for organizing knowledge. The method of loci is recognized as 
one of the more well-documented and effective mnemonic strategies for organizing 
information for orators. Against this background I look at research on Melanesian and 
Polynesian cultures that have applied mnemotechnical analysis to myth and landscape. The 
authors’ discussed in this chapter suggest that landmarks and spatial imagery provide a means 
for organizing knowledge and a general cognitive orientation within oral cultures for 
remembering. The incorporation of myth and landscape for preserving an oral corpus 
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suggests that the problem of memory and the transmission of informational resources were 
consciously or unconsciously overcome through mnemonic tools and strategies. It is argued 
that here we find some common trends within oral cultures for organizing knowledge, and 
that macrospatial templates within mythic narratives correlate well with artificial memory 
techniques found with previous studies on mnemotechnics.  
 
Frances Harwood (1976) states in her study of the Trobriand people that some connections 
can be made between the Classical use of the method of loci and the way in which the 
landscape was mentally and linguistically organized through myth for the purposes of 
preserving and communicating a cosmology. Harwood (1976) takes the problem of cultural 
stabilization seriously, and argues that the means by which knowledge is organized within 
oral cultures is a commonly overlooked feature in the ethnographic literature. Myths provide 
an epistemic framework for social institutions, but Harwood states that the oral transmission 
of a mythic corpus is preconditioned by instability since oral transmission is prone to 
distortions over time. She states that without the use of symbolic technologies, oral cultures 
would have depended on other means for organizing and stabilizing information. Harwood 
argues that the common usage of macrospatial memory strategies (similar to the method of 
loci) and landmarks have been critical to this process. This chapter will introduce a 
comparative approach that will be more obvious later in the thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), 
whereby associations are established between cultural practices and how these conventions 
relate to some of the psychological data associated memory and communication (Rubin 
1996). Chapter 2 will therefore examine some of the literature on oral cultures and the 
methods by which information transmission is stabilized through mnemonic strategies.  
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Chapter 3 will expand upon the previous chapter by focusing specifically on Māori myth 
and epistemology. First, I look at some of the traditional attitudes to knowledge sharing, and 
the means by which knowledge was passed on within a traditional Māori context. Since 
knowledge was passed on orally, it was perceived as a protected object that could not be 
widely disseminated through other mediums (e.g. such as text). By presenting knowledge in a 
medium that enabled a wider reading meant the potential contamination of the knowledge 
source and its tapu status. The introduction of text by Europeans, and the general distrust of 
this medium by early Māori, demonstrates how conventions shape cultural attitudes towards 
the mode by which information is transmitted. This background on the epistemic taboos 
relating to information sharing will be relevant later in Chapter 5 when I examine how 
cultural perceptions and practices influence the structuring of information channels and 
methods by which knowledge is preserved. Environments are structured in a way to support 
the transmission of knowledge, but accessibility of information is not necessarily cheap. 
Learning environments and the informational character of cultural niches are constrained by 
rules and customs associated with the sacred, and I will argue that these conventions affect 
the perceptions of memory and communication also.  
 
Later in Chapter 3 I will look at some of the ways in which traditional Māori organized 
and transmitted these informational resources. A common theme that runs through the study 
of Māori oral tradition is the idea that traditional Māori pedagogy maintained a holistic 
approach to education. Myths, genealogy and landscape were all interweaved into a larger 
system of knowledge sharing. For instance, tribal identity and historical knowledge is 
founded upon both familial relations (i.e. whakapapa [genealogy]) and place (i.e. whenua 
[land]), and Mere Roberts (2012) suggests that there is a cognitive dimension to this. She 
argues that there are functional qualities associated with the memorization of whakapapa and 
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that its systemization – alongside mythic narratives - served as a cognitive map or library 
system for recalling knowledge (Roberts 2012). In addition, myths are intertwined with 
genealogical knowledge and subsequently inform a cosmogonical system that is the 
foundation for traditional Māori epistemology (Roberts and Wills 2001).  
 
Chapter 3 will further describe how place names and landmarks have played a similar role 
in the organization of knowledge, and I argue that there are strong correlations between the 
material discussed in Chapter 2 on macrospatial memory and the structure of myths that use 
place names. Similarly to Roberts’ claim that whakapapa functions as a cognitive map 
(Roberts 2012), I argue that significant geographical locations, intertwined with myth, had a 
mnemonic utility for organizing knowledge. It is argued that the incorporation of landmarks 
and place names into mythic narratives provide a means for coordinating cues for working 
memory when recounting mythic history. In addition, cartographic knowledge was 
incorporated into myths and provided a means for memorizing information about the 
landscape. Myths functioned as a kind of oral map, and later in this chapter I look at two 
stories that demonstrate the functional relationship between narratives and geography within 
the traditional Māori oral corpus (Wilson 1990). Mythic narratives were functional as they 
were structured in a way to recount the routes on a map to resourceful locations, such as 
stone quarries.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 will cover the material on cognitive ecological models that will be the 
central to this thesis. Both these chapters test the utility of cognitive ecological models 
alongside some of the ethnographic and historical material on Māori oral tradition. Chapter 4 
discusses the background on niche construction models and its application to human 
cognition and learning. Because this ecological model has been applicable to cultural 
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transmission and the structuring of learning environments it is also defined as epistemic niche 
construction (ENC) (Sterelny 2003). The basis of this model illustrates the human capacity 
for engineering their cultural environments for cognitive purposes. We are born and raised in 
environments that are rich in informational resources, and the cooperative social learning and 
technological innovations within cultural niches enable the distribution of cognitive expertise. 
The ENC model emphasizes the environmental properties and processes that support the 
cross-generational transmission of skills and knowledge.  
 
The second half of Chapter 4 will examine the ENC model in light of the research on 
traditional Māori pedagogy and orality. Here the focus will be on two features of Māori 
pedagogy: a) how religious norms and customs shape the epistemic environment; and b) how 
religious knowledge is passed on through structured learning practices. First, it will be argued 
that conventions relating to the tapu (sacred) act as regulatory measure on the flow of 
information. Epistemic conventions such as the oral preservation and supervision of 
knowledge sharing have played a considerable role in the cross-generational transmission of 
sacred knowledge. Second, religious conventions additionally influence pedagogy and the 
rules governing educational methods. Within a traditional Māori context religious norms 
emphasized the accurate retention of scared knowledge. Mnemonic and oral skills would 
have been an essential component in the education of those who were responsible for 
preserving and transmitting tapu knowledge.  
 
My examination here will demonstrate that religious-cultural transmission is far from 
optimal. Religious conventions influence the mode of transmission and this suggests a degree 
of complexity that has not been explained sufficiently by SiM. The stability and fidelity of 
cultural transmission within oral cultures is maintained through structured pedagogical 
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methods and the ENC model supports this premise. This challenges SiM theory that stable 
and fixed features of our cognitive architecture are the primary constraint on the transmission 
of religious representations. Optimality presumes a lack of cognitive support for 
transmission, while ENC describes a wide array of supportive mechanisms recruited for the 
transmission of religious knowledge. Methods for learning are locally contingent, locally 
optimal and historically embedded within the niche environment. 
 
Chapter 5 returns to the material on Māori oral maps first discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
Here the discussion revisits the use of spatial imagery and location within myths. In chapters 
3 and 4 it was argued that geographical locations within myths serve a cognitive function for 
structuring narratives and organizing knowledge. This chapter expands on this idea further 
with an examination of distributed (or extended) cognition models (Hutchins 1995a; Clark 
1998; Clark and Chalmers 1998). It will be argued here that physical structures – such as 
landmarks - not only assist in supporting memory, but they also act as cognitive inputs for 
conceptual reasoning (Hutchins 2005). In other words, physical structures act as material 
anchors for mental processes. In the first section of the chapter, I raise some concerns over 
the methodological uncertainty of an extended mind approach, by elaborating on some of the 
subtle differences within the extended-distributed cognition project. John Sutton (2010) 
evaluates some of the conceptual assumptions that have drawn criticism towards externalist 
models (see Grush 2003). Previous criticisms of cognitive ecological models have focused on 
Andy Clark’s ‘parity principle’ that makes the more ambitious claim that minds are 
commensurate with environments  (Clark and Chalmers 1998). While Edwin Hutchins’ 
(1996) distributed cognition model is more moderate in its description of agent-environment 
interactions. Distributive cognition describes how environments are merely supportive of 
cognitive processes. While the parity principle underscores the functional similarities 
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between minds and environments, Sutton claims that the distributed cognition model makes a 
clearer distinction between internal and external cognitive resources. External resources 
merely compliment minds, according to this view.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I provide a more detailed description of how minds and 
physical properties interact, especially in relation to the organization of oral maps. In his 
paper on conceptual blending, Hutchins describes how physical structures are recruited as 
cognitive inputs for both conceptual reasoning and working memory (Hutchins 2005). 
Conceptual blending describes the unconscious practice of coordinating a group of concepts 
into a blended arrangement so as to create other more complex conceptual structures (see 
Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Since the process structuring conceptual blends is complex and 
unstable, Hutchins claims that informational instability can be managed through the 
recruitment of physical structures, as they are effective as fixed supports. Hutchins argues 
that the projection of a material structure into conceptual models help stabilize reasoning 
processes since we naturally lean on external-physical structures as a necessary constraint for 
complex mental reasoning (Hutchins 2005). Conceptual blending is applicable to further 
discussions on traditional oral maps. Physical structures, and the sequencing of place names 
is the product of coordinating external and internal cognitive resources. Physical markers 
provide a cognitive anchor for this process, while linguistic devices – such as myths and 
place names – are structural inputs that assist in the organization of informational resources 
through the tractable division of geographical space.  
 
Subsequently, the rest of the chapter will look at the methods by which early Māori 
cartographic practices were enabled through oral myths and landmarks. It is argued that 
myths and place names mutually benefitted the mnemonic retention of crucial knowledge 
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about the landscape. One of the ways in which early Māori navigators remembered the 
landscape was through sequential pathways that were structured in accordance with the order 
of place names. These sequences were also present in the myths that conveyed information 
the physical terrain, the proper route for travel and a general spatial image of the physical 
geography.  
 
Oral maps are an example of how conceptual blending functions for supporting working 
memory. This kind of interfacing between minds and environment also demonstrates how 
physical structures are important for constructing complex conceptual models such as 
narratives and myth. In sum, Chapter 5 makes two key points: a) physical structures can be 
recruited to support the integration of complex conceptual structures. Oral maps and 
landmarks, in conjunction with mythic narratives, are viewed here as the product of this 
capacity to coordinate a variety of conceptual and physical structures to support working 
memory. Stabilizing mechanisms can exist outside the skull and a distributed cognition 
model demonstrates our unique capacity to integrate a wide array of modalities for the 
purposes of organizing knowledge. And: b) SiM undervalues this capacity to recruit external 
cognitive resources for stabilizing the transmission of sacred knowledge. The investment and 
costs associated with the storage and retrieval of sacred knowledge points to the complexity 
and volume associated with the managing of sacred knowledge. SiM claims that the 
informational character of religious transmission is determined by internal processing 
constraints (Boyer 2001; Sperber 1996). A cognitive ecological model, on the other hand, 
suggests information channels are shaped by a variety of cultural conventions, tools and 
strategies. Religious-cultural transmission is, therefore, the product of these culturally 
evolved networks. Therefore, our dependence on external cognitive resources for religious 
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transmission does not support an optimality prediction, but instead points to the extensive and 
complex workings of religious traditions.  
 
Cognitive ecological models offer a potential challenge to the current state-of-play within 
the cognitive science of religion and have emerged from a general dissatisfaction with 
individualist psychological accounts for religious behavior. Cognitive ecological models 
show that individuals are not divorced from their environments, but actively engaged in 
culturally evolved structures that support cognition. I argue that religious systems are 
elaborate and complex networks that are not easy to reproduce and transmit through intra-
individual transmission. This implies a level of cost and commitment in the transmission of 
sacred knowledge across generations. While the cognitive optimality thesis goes some way to 
explaining the prevalence of less complex and intuitive supernatural representations, it does 
not sufficiently describe the elaborate networks and structures – such as socio-political 
structures, the use of artifacts and the level of investment involved in transmitting sacred 
knowledge – that constitute a religious system (Whitehouse 2008). I argue that environments 
are structured in a way to support the large-scale transmission of these systems. The 
limitation on individual memory suggests that the structured engagement with external 
cognitive resources is critical to the supporting the transmission of religious knowledge. In 
addition, by understanding these systems better through both ethnographic and historical 
methods, researchers can develop cognitive models that are better matched to account for 
both the mental processes and uniquely contextual factors that shape the religious mind. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 Introduction. 
 
For the purposes of my examination of the CSR, the theoretical and methodological 
differences between modular and externalism demands closer attention in regards to the 
cultural and historical details of cultural transmission. Firstly, the material discussed on 
cognitivism and modularity here in Chapter 1 is intended to provide a general background on 
the theoretical development of the Standard Internal Model’ (SiM), and the model’s primary 
theoretical/methodological directions. Boyer (1994b, 2001) in particular argues that religious-
cultural transmission is constrained by deeply entrenched features of our cognitive 
architecture. He cites causal explanations within an evolutionary framework for religion 
being as a natural predisposition, since certain features of our cognitive architecture are 
predetermined by our biological heritage, and while these functional adaptations are 
beneficial in their natural domains, they are sensitive to religious information also.  
 
Modular theories of mind are models that describe the specialized functional features of 
the mind-brain that operate naturally to deal with the informational demands of our 
environment (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 1989, 1994; Barkow, and Cosmides, et al. 1995). 
This is underpinned by the idea that human behavioral characteristics are derived from the 
discrete operational features of our cognitive architecture. Evolutionary Psychology (EP), for 
instance, claims that these psychological adaptations are domain-specific in their scope, 
because they are adapted to respond effectively to a specific class of problem-solving 
activity. Within EP, it has been claimed that these psychological mechanisms operate on 
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cultural information also, leading to constraints on the processing, and transmission cultural 
representations (Sperber 1996; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004).  
 
The first part of this chapter characterizes a causal approach to cognition and culture as 
represented by modular models of mind. Here, I look specifically at how evolved and 
specialized systems in our cognitive architecture shape information processing - and its 
output - in terms of three main clusters of innate domain-specific skills - folk psychology, 
folk biology and folk physics (Boyer 2001). The first portion of the chapter looks at these 
clusters and how they relate to an epidemiological model of cultural transmission (Sperber 
1996). I complicate this account by showing how cultural factors interact with these 
biological constraints and drivers of our cognition. In particular, I will outline Sperber’s 
epidemiological model that states that these cognitive constraints regulate information 
transmission and ultimately shape the frequency cultural representations. The general claim is 
that we have a representational mind-brain that processes data from the external world in 
predetermined ways. Thus, a ‘cognitivist’ approach to culture has traditionally focused on 
how mental representations reflect external phenomena. This is why this approach has 
sometimes been called an ‘internalist’ or computational theory of mind (Putnam 1975; Fodor 
1983). 
 
Dan Sperber (1996) and Boyer (2001) recognize that the frequency and content of cultural 
representations can be traced to how information is governed by cognitive constraints, which 
act as biases in the regulation of information flow. Functional-adaptive features of our mind-
brain play a strong role in the expression of adaptive, or adaptively neutral cultural activity 
(Sperber and Hirschfeld 2006).  Against this background, I outline some of the more 
prominent theories within SiM, which are motivated by the premise that religious concepts 
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strike a cognitive optimum between these constraints on cultural transmission and the 
supernatural. Cognitive optimality, on SiM view, describes how the motivations for 
religiosity are established by both the supernatural qualities of religious concepts, as well as 
their comprehensible foundation in natural categories (Boyer and Ramble 2001). Put simply, 
religious representations are both exciting and easy to acquire. It is claimed that the native 
properties of human cognition must have an influence on religious-cultural patterns. SiM, 
therefore, makes predictions about ‘common traits’ in the expression of religiosity, claiming 
a cross-cultural universality that underlies religious diversity. On this view, religions are 
fundamentally composed of the same ingredients, and shaped by inborn psychological biases. 
Religious representations are the by-product of non-religious cognitive systems, and the 
frequency and content of religious activity is shaped by a cognitively optimal basin of 
attraction (Whitehouse 2004).  
 
1.2 The Cognitive Revolution: a computational theory of mind. 
 
Psychological approaches to the study of human culture have shifted away from the 
traditional behaviourist methods in psychology, which viewed the individual learner as being 
shaped by external/environmental conditions. Instead cognitivist approaches claim, that a 
significant proportion of our learning is supported by innate competencies that regulate 
environmental inputs. This section will focus more upon research that has emerged from the 
evolutionary biological sciences and its application to psychology. The basis for evolutionary 
psychology (EP), in particular, is that our cognitive architecture is constituted by a set of 
collection of specialised systems that have evolved to function for individual cognitive tasks 
(Cosmoses and Toby 1992; Hirschfield and Gellman 1994; Pinker 1999).  
 
  
  35 
EP often claims Noam Chomsky’s work in linguistics, and generative grammar, as their 
theoretical forebear (see Chomsky 1955/1975; 1988). The observation that a child’s ability to 
generate a variety of combinatorial associations with words and sentence structures, without 
being exposed to the necessary linguistic patterns, suggests a capability for language learning 
that is developmentally innate. Put simply, while words and sentences are learned - to a 
certain degree - it does not explain the intricacy in which children, can combine and 
recombine patterns of words and sentences without the necessary exposure to these linguistic 
assemblies under impoverished learning conditions.  
 
The poverty of the stimulus argument supports the theory that we are born with innate 
capabilities for linguistic expression. Chomsky argues that language is structurally 
dependent, in that words and sentences conform to grammatical rules associated with the 
learner’s language (see Hirshfeld and Gelman 1994). The grammatical rules for linguistic 
expression are not explicitly taught to the learner or infant. Though a child may learn the 
semantic association for words, they are not deliberately told how to form a sentence within 
logical structures. Chomsky (1988) and Steven Pinker (1995), in particular, have argued that 
the reason why the computationally demanding task of language learning appears to be so 
easy is that we are somehow bio-psychologically endowed with innate content-rich resources 
for linguistic competence.  
 
Pinker (1995) has argued that we possess a kind of content-rich language ‘mental organ’, 
or a specialised cognitive system for acquiring our language skills. The idea that there are 
innate features of our intelligence that have evolved for specialized functions – like language 
learning – has also formed the theoretical foundation for EP. Chomsky’s work, in addition to 
Jerry Fodor’s book Modularity of Mind (1983), in particular, has been influential in shaping 
  
  36 
EP’s theoretical position regarding specialized cognitive systems. Fodor argues that the 
mind-brain consists of modules, which he called ‘input systems’, describing these as 
specialised domains for processing information (such as colour, shapes, edge-detection and 
so forth [see Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994]).2 Fodor claims that there is an asymmetric 
relationship between perceptual systems (input systems) and conceptual systems (central 
systems) (see Sperber 1996: 119-120 for discussion). Perceptual systems are peripheral and 
can inform conceptual systems, but conceptual systems cannot alter the way in which 
perceptual systems process information. Vision is somewhat uniform in the sensory data in 
provides, conceptual systems are much more flexible. So while input systems are modular, 
according Fodor, the central/conceptual systems are not.3 According to Fodor’s modular 
model, information about the world is represented in specific, individual systems. We cannot 
infer anything other than what these sensory modalities tell us about our world. Modules have 
a functional autonomy, and are function for a specific purpose (hence their speed and 
encapsulation).  
 
We should remember that both Chomsky and Fodor identified something crucial to human 
development: that we are biologically endowed with specialized cognitive systems that 
enable predictable learning strategies. On the one hand, Chomsky’s language model is 
content-rich – it suggests that a language organ possesses innately bound information about 
                                                
 
2 This sensory data is then formatted for processing in a ‘central processor’ which means Fodor did not think 
that our cognitive architecture was all together massively modular, instead some of our ‘higher processes’ are 
non-modular. The central processor instead is a subsystem in the cognitive architecture in which information 
from other, more encapsulated modalities becomes integrated; this is where conscious thought is processed. 
Higher processes are usually considered to be “reasoning, inference, judgement and decision-making, semantic 
processing and so on” (Barrett and Kurzban 2006). That is why Fodor is careful to assume the fixidity 
associated with other sensory modules in the brain with the flexibility of the central system - where other 
explicit cognitive routines occur (Fodor 1983, 2001). 
3 The simplified characteristics of a mental module include these features (Fodor quoted from Schneider 
2008:3):“(1) Informationally encapsulated—the algorithms that characterize computations in the modules only 
have access to proprietary information (namely, the information in the module’s domain); (2) Fast—modules 
are able to perform a particular function very quickly; (3) Domain Specific—modules are only concerned with a 
very narrow kind of input; (4) Mandatory—the algorithms that the modules compute are automatically applied.” 
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linguistic structures (a language algorithm specialised for this purpose). On the other hand, 
Fodor’s modules, or input systems, are specialised information processing devices. They 
receive sensory input from the world, process information, and then send this formatted data 
to the central processor.  
 
The modularity of mind thesis has been influential for EP’s concept of domain-specific 
functions (specialised and encapsulated sub-computers). EP claims that the mind-brain must 
be comprised of domain specific systems that have evolved to be specialists for certain tasks, 
as a kind of cognitive division of labour. However, instead of underscoring the relative 
openness associated with Fodor’s central processor, those within the field of evolutionary 
psychology take a massively modular view of cognitive architecture, arguing that all of our 
cognitive systems are domain-specific (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Pinker, 1997; Sperber, 
1994).4 EP takes this massively modular approach seriously, by arguing that our mind-brain 
is constituted primarily by content-rich specialised systems that are adapted to solve a variety 
of specialized problems causally connected to an ancestral environment (See Barkow, 
Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Pinker 1997 for overview).  
 
Further, the argument for domain-specific psychological mechanisms versus a ‘general 
purpose’ problem-solving system is that human agents tend to be very adept at a restricted 
class of tasks under certain conditions. A brain with domain specific systems has the luxury 
of being able to routinely activate innately bound algorithms when confronted with a specific 
class of problems. Cosmides and Tooby (1987; 1994) suggest that a domain general system 
would be too computationally sluggish in any given task domain. A domain-general system 
would be burdened with having to evaluate all alternatives potentially available to a problem 
                                                
4 Although Fodor has criticized evolutionary psychology and especially Steven Pinker’s conception of the 
massively modular mind in his book: “The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of 
Computational Psychology”, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2000).  
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solving class. Indeed a domain general cognitive system lacks the capacity to respond 
effectively to specific environmental cues. One of the broader adaptive functions for a 
specialised system is the fidelity of information available to the agent, thus information must 
be relatively stable, transparent and bounded:5 
“A domain-general evolved architecture is defined by what it lacks: It lacks 
any content, either in the form of domain-specific knowledge or domain specific 
procedures that can guide it towards the solution of an adaptive problem” (1994: 
p. 94). 
 
Informational complexity within dynamic environments can be fatal when computational 
burdens generate errors or intractability (Sterelny 2003:206). EP claims, then, that adaptive 
decision-making must be relatively fast and optimal for a cognitive system. Organisms need 
to respond to their environments efficiently, and specialised cognitive engines are adapted to 
ignore redundancy and provide relevant information for effective responses. The breadth of 
decision-making abilities may be low, depending on the complexity of information that the 
cognitive system can manage. But if the information provided to the control system were 
appropriate, then the computational burden is lowered. Specialised systems assist in the 
navigation of complex environments in cases where complexity can cripple a system with too 
many variables.6 Perception and decision-making should be guided by a set of cognitive rules 
                                                
5 A good case for the modularity of mind model is level redundancy involved in everyday cognitive processes. It 
would be crippling for a system to consciously evaluate all incoming stimuli. Without a cognitive division of 
labour, domain general systems are required to process ‘real-world’ complexities on their own; without innate 
specialisation the mind-brain is a constant novice having to process all incoming external stimuli without any 
cognitive support. As complexity increases from the alternative inferences that a domain general system is 
required to evaluate on its own, the further the system becomes paralysed. 
6 Without specialised systems to organise the information coming from external stimuli, the cognitivist 
paradigm argues that our experiences become very noisy indeed. Predictable outcomes for a domain-general 
cognitive system are computational intractability. The frame problem is an excellent example of how 
computational intractability can lead to a combinatorial explosion within domain general systems (Dennett 
1984; Cosmides and Tooby 1994; Samuels 1998, 2005). The frame problem is often highlighted by the famous 
travelling salesman example (see Sterelny 2003:205-206). When a travelling salesman has to plan the most 
efficient route to the various cities he is required to visit, the issue of tractability is manageable when the list of 
stops on the list is rather low. However, as the list of stops increases so does the number of possible routes the 
salesman has to consider. The computational burden of processing variable inferences all at once can, as stated, 
paralyse the system. Inferential domains that are specialised do not run the risk of intractability. Redundant 
information can be readily filtered out and so too can error propagation (Cosmides and Tooby 2000). 
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(or algorithms) that enable the organism to coordinate strategic decision-making effectively 
without too much environmental noise.  
 
Putting the cognitivist paradigm within an evolutionary context has provided a more 
robust explanatory account for some of the innate or ‘native’ capacities associated with 
human cognition. We are hardwired for certain capabilities – such as language – and it is 
argued that this goes a long way to explaining common behavioural traits that can be found 
cross-culturally (Sperber 1996). Evolutionary psychologists like Leda Cosmides and John 
Tooby (1992) have emphasized the importance in reconstructing ancestral environments from 
what we know about our developmentally common cognitive traits, and our behavioural 
responses to a modern environment. This kind of modelling stresses that the modern 
environment is not the environment in which the brain has adapted to function. Instead, we 
have a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms that have been adapted to certain selection 
pressures preset to an ancestral environment. The environment of evolutionary adaptedness 
(or EEA) is conceived as a statistically probable time and environment that our ancestors 
were adapted to under very specific conditions. These conditions were determinant in our 
cognitive evolution and the causal relevancy of this environment (and time) constitutes an 
ultimate explanation for our cognitive profile.  
 
So EP emphasizes 3 important theoretical and methodological concepts (Laland and 
Brown 2002:157-158): 
 
1) The adaptive features of human cognitive architecture, or 
evolved psychological mechanisms; 
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2) A commitment to the claim that these cognitive adaptations 
are the result of specific selection pressures – the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA); 
3) The importance of domain-specific mental organs or 
modules in the mind-brain that have evolved to serve an adaptive 
purpose7. 
 
One of the more promising contributions EP has made to the field of anthropology is that 
despite the apparent variability of cultures there are the stable and recurrent features 
underlying cultural activity that are shaped by universal cognitive traits. Put simply, 
individuals learn and adopt cultural preferences in very uniform ways. EP argues that inputs 
are regulated by domain-specific systems in the mind-brain, and so we should be able to 
identify predictable patterns of behaviour.8 EP states that domain specific features of our 
cognitive architecture have evolved as psychological adaptations to respond to a restricted 
class of problem solving. These encapsulated cognitive systems have a bearing on the 
recurrent patterns of human culture also since they also govern the processing of publicly 
shared information (Sperber 1996).  
 
The next section will examine three functional adaptations of our cognitive architecture 
that influence human perception and behaviour. These systems also have a bearing on 
cultural transmission. EP claims that we possess native ontological perceptions that are 
constrained by specific cognitive adaptations. These systems naturally respond to the 
                                                
7 For an excellent overview of these issues see Kevin N. Laland and Gillian R. Brown’s book “Sense and 
Nonsense: evolutionary perspectives on human behavior”, Oxford University Press, New York (2003). 
8 The argument EP proposes is a kind of context-independent argument. We have a stone-age mind, but it just 
happens to function in a modern, technologically advanced environment (Laland and Brown 2003). This matters 
to the internalist argument because the mind-brain has standard operational features that should function in 
habitual ways, despite variables in context or cultural circumstances.  
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informational complexity of the environment, while humans have particularly sophisticated 
native psychological engines for dealing with social, biological and physical conditions.  In 
addition, these ontological cognitive systems determine cultural outputs (i.e. patterns of 
culture) since they are recruited in a variety of domains outside of their functional purposes 
(more on this below).  
 
These fixed features of our intelligence will feature prominently in the section on SiM. 
But first I will present some of the background literature associated with the research on 
innate ontological systems. These have often been called folk or naïve intelligences, since EP 
often views them as developmentally similar to linguistic competence in their operational 
capacity. Similarly to language, ontological cognitive systems (i.e. folk psychology, folk 
biology and folk physics) are viewed as functionally effective competencies, despite the lack 
of environmental exposure to the necessary informational resources. These cognitive systems 
also shape the content and frequency of cultural transmitted representations, since they are 
noticeably influential in biasing information processing outside of their functional domains. 
Put simply, processing constraints govern how cultural representations are transmitted, and 
this is relevant to SiM’s methodological direction in modelling the frequency and content of 
religious transmission (Sperber 1996; Boyer 2001).  
 
1.3 Habits of Mind.  
 
This section will look specifically at the proximate function of domain-specific 
psychological adaptations, and how – EP claims - these innate features of our cognitive 
architecture play a critical role in our abilities to navigate informational complexity. EP has 
identified something fundamental to the psychological basis of human adaptive behaviour: 
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we are social beings; ecologically intelligent; and technologically innovative. EP argues that 
these three proficiencies allude to the presence of innately bound cognitive systems that are 
highly responsive and effectual to these specific domains. Our social, biological and physical 
intelligences, it is argued, are adaptations to particular selective forces emerging from the 
conditions of our ancestral environment. Human folk cognitive systems respond quickly and 
are able generate flexible behavioural responses to complex problem solving tasks. These 
three folk systems are listed below, including a brief description outlining how they are 
considered rich features of our intelligence: 
 
Social Intelligence: Humans are group animals that develop and form 
strong social bonds. These traits are preconditioned by our capacity to be a 
highly cooperative species that function within informationally complex 
environments. Since we are adept at navigating social domains that are 
highly dynamic and complex, EP argues that we must be naturally 
predisposed to strategic social exchanges (Cosmides and Tooby 1989). 
Tracking political alliances and valuable social bonds with others’ would 
have provided an adaptive advantage, especially since the identification of 
friends, enemies and freeloaders are not always obvious (Sterelny 2003). 
Alongside the computational burden of navigating a socially political 
landscape, with our capacity to respond quickly to social complexity, EP 
suggests that the evolution of specialised cognitive systems for social 
intelligence would have been critical for living in groups.    
 
Biological Intelligence: Humans are very good and classifying and 
processing information about our organic worlds (Atran 1993, 1998). Scott 
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Atran (1998) notes a remarkable consistency in the ways in which cultures 
rank taxonomies within their local ecologies. This includes an intuitive 
hierarchical arrangement of species and living things versus non-living 
organic materials.  
 
Physical Intelligence: We perceive our physical world within the scope 
of a biased set of conditions that conform to intuitive rules of logic (Proffit 
and Gilden, 1989). For instance, the way in which we perceive motion, 
solidity, mass, distance and space is developmentally consistent. But we are 
also highly adept at technological problem solving within our physical 
world. Being able to successfully make predictions about physical dynamics 
in our world provides us with the capacity for technological innovation. For 
example, an intuitive sense of distance provides us with the relevant 
information required to manufacture and propel projectiles (e.g. from cricket 
balls to spears). Physical intelligence is also the foundation for our capacity 
to be technologically innovative, since most tools are functionally sensitive 
to the logical scope of our reasoning as purposeful devices (i.e. our capacity 
to evaluate the utility of the tool in a particular problem-solving task).  
 
EP argues that these natural and stable competencies point to the existence of domain-
specific systems that are adapted to respond to environmental contingencies. Cross-cultural 
biases towards a set of behavioural outputs suggest that we may have an innately bound: 1) 
folk psychology system; 2) folk biology system; and 3) folk physics system (Boyer 1994b, 
1998; Baron-Cohen et al 1997; Duchaine, Cosmides and Tooby 2001).  
 
  
  44 
In the case of folk psychology, for instance, it is argued that any casual explanation for 
human sociality will no doubt be attributed to some cognitive predisposition for navigating 
social exchanges. This may also suggest a rich evolutionary history involving group living 
(Dunbar 1996). It is argued by EP that the complexity of our rich social worlds would 
normally require a stored database of social knowledge that would be far too computationally 
demanding as a domain-general system. Tracking behaviour within a complex socio-political 
environment comes with higher cognitive demands, suggesting computational intractability 
for managing social exchanges without a specialised cognitive system. Others elsewhere have 
discussed the memory demands associated with tracking social worlds and this is causally 
relevant to our social intelligence (Dunbar 1996; Byrne and Whiten 1988). Tracking strategic 
information within our social worlds is complicated further by the additional task of 
navigating cultural norms and conventions (Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004).  
 
A specialised computational device that functions optimally in social exchanges should be 
commensurate with informational complexity – both necessary for tracking complexity, 
while enhancing it also. The case for domain specific social cognition is relevant when you 
consider the developmental trajectory of social skills in children. It has been argued that our 
capacity to be social is sufficiently explained by a capacity to predict the intentions of others, 
or a Theory of Mind (ToM) module (Baron-Cohen 1989, 1995; Whiten 1991).9 ToM ability 
seems to typically emerge in children after the age of 4 with signs of increased social skills in 
normal development and further into maturity (Baron-Cohen 1985; Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer 1987; Leslie and Frith 1988). This developmental course has been tested in false 
belief tasks amongst children who are able to recognise the mental objectives and attitudes of 
                                                
9 However, it is still unclear as to whether we can classify our ToM abilities as a computational module, or as a 
domain specific set of abilities (Samuels 2000:38). 
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others’ after a certain age.10 False belief tasks like these are used to demonstrate the universal 
constraints on inferential reasoning within social exchanges.11 The ability to attribute beliefs 
and desires to other agents is viewed as developmentally predictable amongst children, since 
we begin – at an early age - to tacitly acknowledge the intentional qualities of other minds, 
and use these inferences to navigate a social world.  
 
As mindreaders we can generate logical predictions about the mental states of others and 
respond to these cues within social exchanges. Various explanations for ToM suggest that 
being prosocial requires that we are good at predicting the intentional states of others (Baron-
Cohen 1988; Tomasello 1995). We can therefore be conditional co-operators: formulate 
strategic and adaptive decision-making based on the social information available to us 
(maintaining friendships, while being cautious with foes) (Nichols 2001). EP argues then that 
the research should be able to establish a causal connection between the political dynamic of 
hominin social worlds and our capacity to predict the behaviour of others. According to this 
view, being able to read the intentional states of others’ has enabled human prosociality and 
intra-individual cooperation since we are better able to establish alliances, for example, and 
track the complexity of the political landscape. We cannot help but be prolific in our 
interpretations of others’ psychological states since we are a group living species, and these 
practices bear upon our inherent interest in the social actions of others within a cultural 
context also (hence gossip and norms governing social behaviour).    
                                                
10 “Versions of false belief tests differ, but the most common one consists of a child observer watching someone 
(let’s call her Sally), putting a doll inside of a box. When Sally leaves the room, however, someone else (let’s 
call her Ann) enters and moves the doll from the box to the cupboard. When Sally re-enters the room the child 
observer is asked where they think Sally thinks the doll is. Children under the age of 4 usually answer that Sally 
thinks the doll is where it was moved to last – the cupboard – while more mature children between the ages of 4-
5 recognize that Sally thinks the doll is still in the box (excerpt taken from Murphy 2009; see Baron-Cohen et al 
1985; Leslie 1987; Leslie and Frith 1988; Scholl and Leslie 1999; Baron-Cohen, et al 2000; Perner, Leekam, & 
Wimmer 1987). 
11 This experiment has been conducted on mature autistics as well, who show similar dissociative behaviour as 
the children who are underdeveloped with ToM (Baron-Cohen et al 1985; Leslie and Frith 1988).  The autistic 
cases reveal that despite normal intelligence in other domains, social intelligence or ToM abilities remained 
impaired. 
  
  46 
 
In regards to folk biological intelligence, cognitive psychologists have argued that we 
employ intuitive inferences when making sense of biological categories – e.g. animals, plants 
etc - in our world (Berlin 1971, 1992; Atran 1993, 1998). It is suggested that all cultures are 
naturally inclined to classify and order taxonomic groups into analogous classes and 
hierarchies. Scott Atran (1998) argues that internal cognitive resources support this potential 
to be natural classifiers. Atran says that agents predictably structure their biological worlds 
into “taxonomies composed of essence-based, species-like groups and the ranking species 
into lower- and higher-order groups” (Atran 1998:547). He claims that this capacity to order 
our world into folk taxonomic categories is causally related to a specialised cognitive system 
for processing information about our ecology. This logical framework for classification is in 
part due to the capacity to recognise similarities and differences between species.12 Broad 
speciation ability is a product of mental perception governed by specific cognitive 
regularities that have evolved to allow for the tractable organisation of our environment.13 
Since this capacity is innate, we should expect to find this structurally dependent mode of 
                                                
12 There are four standard ways in which our cognitive systems make these inferences about biological 
properties in the world (Atran 1998:547-548): (1) People order plants and animals into species-like groups, 
which Atran calls generic-species. For instance, noticeable morphological similarities and differences allow for 
the ordering of different types of animal species into certain groups. Commonalities within generic species are 
therefore grouped as consistencies. (2) People infer an essence-based quality to these species. There is a basic 
assumption that there is an underlying causal linkage between a kind metaphysical essence and the outward 
appearance of a particular animal or plant. For example, we have the capacity track the maturing of a particular 
animal despite the differences in appearance from youth to adulthood. Atran gives the example of a being able 
to track morphological changes of a tadpole to a frog – we assume they are the same essence-based creature, 
despite their heterogeneous appearances. (3) People classify specifies hierarchically from general to specific 
groupings. Therefore we often class birds and fish as being in two broader categories, yet under these general 
categories we infer narrower types of classifications. Therefore a general order of classification maybe: birds – 
warblers - bush warblers. (4) This framework allows for individuals to make inductive inferences regarding the 
properties shared by certain species. For instance, Atran gives the example of diseases amongst bird species. If 
we can deduce that a particular disease is prevalent within a population of robins, we are therefore warranted in 
assuming that this disease may be contractible by other birds, than by other non-bird species.  
13 Therefore, Atran argues that our natural history expertise is structure-dependent, in the similar way that 
language is, though unlike the Chomskean module that is considered to be innate and restrictive in its 
information flow (Samuels 2000:18). Atran argues that unlike input modules, which are similarly restrictive in 
the way in which information is processed, a folk biological system can be classified as a core module, with the 
ability to make “use of one another’s inputs and outputs, although each module favours the processing of a 
different predetermined range of stimuli” (Atran 1998:555).  
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inferences cross-culturally (and we do).14 In other words, the ubiquity in which we find the 
capacity for ordering our organic world into categories suggests a domain-specific area of our 
intelligence that has evolved as a functional quality of our cognitive architecture.  
 
Another feature of our basic perceptual toolkit is our ability to make intuitive inferences 
about physical dynamics in our world. We have the capacity to distinguish physical 
causalities, and at a very young age we are able to detect cause-and-effect dynamics with 
physical properties in real time (Leslie and Keeble 1987). Infants also recognise the solidity 
of objects and perceive objects as rigid and spatially continuous (Spelke 1990).15 The case for 
a folk physics cognitive system is convincing if you consider the predictable development of 
this perceptual category. Renee Baillargeon (1994) and colleagues have shown that infants 
have an intuitive awareness of physical dynamics in the world (Baillargeon 1994; 
Baillargeon, Kotovsky & Needham, 1995), and in experiments that violate these intuitions, 
Baillargeon et al have found that children have intuitive expectations about physical 
causality, solidity and spatial awareness. Children intuitively recognise that you cannot 
breach physical constraints: 
“For example, infants aged 2.5 to 3.5 months are aware that objects continue to 
exist when masked by other objects, that objects cannot remain stable without 
support, that objects move along spatially continuous paths, and that objects 
                                                
14 It must be noted that folk physics, folk psychology and folk biology are considered to be core modules. 
Though information processing is constrained, core modules aren’t as encapsulated as input modules. See 
Samuels (2000) and Atran (1998) for discussion. In short, core modules are much more flexible and capable of 
sharing information across different domains.  
15 Elizabeth Spelke argues that infants have a core knowledge system for physical principles (Spelke and 
Kinzler 2007). This core knowledge centres on the spatio-temporal principles of cohesion (objects move as 
connected and bounded wholes), continuity (objects move on connected, unobstructed paths), and contact 
(objects do not interact at a distance)” (Spelke et al 2007:89). Consider the ability to catch a ball in motion. The 
catcher has to quickly calculate their distance from the thrower, register the movement and trajectory of the 
projectile and position themselves at the calculated distance in order to receive it. If there is a wall in the way, 
the catcher is not surprised when the ball doesn’t reach her. However, if the ball continued along the same path 
despite the obstruction, this would be a natural violation of a physical expectation. Core knowledge of these 
physical dynamics is the foundation for such an activity. While Spelke is sceptical that there exists a single-
purpose cognitive system for processing this kind information, others’ have argued that a domain-specific 
mechanism for folk physics exists for processing information unique to this domain (Sperber and Hirschfeld 
2004, 2006; Duchaine, Cosmides and Tooby 2001 ; Boyer 1998; Baron-Cohen 2000). 
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cannot move through the space occupied by other objects” (Baillargeon 
1994:133). 
 
Daniel Povinelli et al (2000) have observed how human juveniles are better than non-
human primates at solving problems within the physical domain since human primates have a 
broader capacity to make causal connections between physical dynamics and goal-oriented 
tasks. Tool-making abilities amongst humans are more purposeful due to our capacity to 
make causally relevant connections between the physical world, strategic inferences and 
technological innovation. This seems to suggest a cognitive system adapted to these causal 
processes. According to EP, the uniformity of development for these traits (i.e. folk 
psychology, folk biology and folk physics) suggests a massively modular mind comprised of 
content rich cognitive systems for adaptive specialization.16  
 
The next section will look specifically at how these psychological adaptations motivate 
and constrain the transmission of cultural representations. It has been argued that our 
cognitive systems are developmentally stable, while the communication and processing of 
cultural representations are regulated by inferential biases (Sperber 1996). These biases 
influence both the frequency and content of cultural representations. Subsequently, according 
to SiM, the reason why there is a general appearance of common cultural themes within 
religions may be due to primarily to the constraints and motivations of cognitive function. 
Folk (naïve or intuitive) capacities constitute what is called an intuitive ontology (see Boyer 
1994b, 2001a, 2005), and later the social, biological and physical intelligences discussed 
above will have a significant bearing for the discussions on SiM research, and the cognitive 
optimality thesis.   
 
                                                
16 Again, EP would argue that a folk physics system is a core module, however. Information from this system is 
available to other domains within the cognitive architecture. 
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1.4 Epidemiology of Representations. 
 
Cognitive anthropologist Dan Sperber (1996) claims that these inborn cognitive 
constraints have special bearings on the distribution and frequency of cultural 
representations. So while these cognitive systems (i.e. folk psychology, folk biology and folk 
physics) function as innate heuristic devices, they also regulate and determine cultural 
patterns. Sperber’s naturalistic approach to anthropology has been significant for the 
cognitive science of religion, and other fields where naturalistic explanations for cultural 
phenomena have been the focus. Sperber is especially interested in why some cultural 
representations are more prevalent than others within societies. We may assume that some 
cultural traits have a specific utilitarian purpose; hence their proliferation is derived from 
their functional corollaries (e.g. the construction of early bifacial hand axes remained fairly 
stable due to their salient utility). The economic benefits of certain tools will be salient, and 
motivate the prevalence of intergenerational replication.  
 
But this does not account for the frequency and content of all cultural traits, according to 
Sperber (1996). Even if a culturally ascribed behavioral trait is functional, that does not fully 
account for its transmission, as its functional value cannot explain how people are able to 
learn and pass on these skills. Sperber is interested in how skills and cultural representations 
are faithfully replicated. According to Sperber the frequency and content of cultural traits (or 
representations) are determined more by entrenched psychological features of our evolved 
cognitive architecture. Certain cultural representations remain fairly stable over time with 
some representations being more prominent than others’.  
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While most anthropologists would argue that this is a product of enculturation (i.e. cultural 
conditioning), Sperber is less convinced. For Sperber, the spread of cultural representations 
emerges from an interaction between cognitive (internal) and cultural (environmental) 
factors. Sperber’s stance on cultural transmission is inherently skeptical of a high-fidelity 
copying process. Unlike genes (which are viewed as replicating units of selection [Dawkins 
1976]), cultural information is a form of low-fidelity transmission. Sperber argues, our 
cognitive machinery reconstructs the information inferentially from one mind to the next, and 
these inferences are subject to cognitive regularities.  
 
Subsequently, Sperber claims that cultural transmission should be viewed as analogous to 
epidemiological patterns. Like any epidemiological model, certain infections are better 
understood through knowledge of host susceptibility. Indeed, Sperber is interested in how 
public (external) representations become mental representations (and vice versa). 
Subsequently, on Sperber’s view, cognitive constraints shape the large-scale diffusion of 
cultural representations within a population. This is not merely a copying process (from one 
mind to another), and Sperber does not think that public representations are accurately 
formed as mental representations. Instead, transmission processes are always subject to native 
cognitive biases, or inferential regularities, and the constraints on cognitive processing further 
determines our susceptibility to certain cultural representations.   
 
 Subsequently, the frequency, or spread, of cultural representations will depend upon the 
inferential stability of the information being transmitted. If our inferential engines cannot 
successfully generate a mental representation that is accurate enough, then that information 
may be lost or become distorted over time. Default cognitive biases sway the appeal, and 
comprehension of cultural representations.  
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For Sperber, there should be two separable, yet complimentary domains of interest for 
cognitive anthropology: the public, and the individual-mental: 
“… we should distinguish two kinds of representations: internal, or mental 
representations – for example, memories, which are patterns in the brain and 
which represent something for the owner of that brain – and external, or public 
representations – for example, utterances, which are material phenomena in the 
environment of people and which represent something for people who perceive 
and interpret them” (Sperber 1996:78). 
 
Sperber argues that more established forms of anthropological scholarship have oversold 
the significance of enculturation while ignoring the psychological constraints that operate on 
publicly represented data.17 The meaning-making profile of mentally representing public data 
exists through the interaction of internal and external modalities. Cognitive systems 
reconstruct representations of the outside world, and so the semantic properties of mental 
representations have a “‘meaning’ of their own” that are subject to fixed perceptual 
categories (Sperber 1996:80).  
 
This claim is coherent when one recognizes that not all mental representations are the 
result of publicly represented data (e.g. such as personal thoughts, memories, planning, and 
imagination etc) (Sperber 1996:78-79). For instance, Sperber and Deirdre Wilson argue that 
human communication is based on a “degree of resemblance” between individuals (Sperber 
1996:83; Sperber and Wilson 1986), and that cultural representations (public data) are 
transformed and reconstructed in the minds of others: 
“A process of communication is basically one of transformation. The degree of 
transformation may vary between two extremes: duplication and total loss of 
information. Only those representations which are repeatedly communicated and 
                                                
17 Sperber (1996) argues that most cognitive psychologists see mental representations as more basic. In other 
words, public representations cannot really be representations without the cognitive machinery to decode the 
information. Mental representations precede and therefore shape public representations. Whereas cultural 
anthropologists argue that public representations shape mental representations, hence external- cultural 
information – or public representations – shapes mental representations.  
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minimally transformed in the process will end up belonging to the culture” 
(Sperber 1996:83). 
 
Sperber’s epidemiological model describes the frequency, accuracy, and content of 
cultural transmission as patterns that correspond with psychological regularities. Some 
cultural representations may be more prevalent than others within a population - and 
therefore similar across all minds – but determined more by the innate representational 
abilities of individuals. Greater exposure to certain types of representations means that the 
fidelity of information transmission is higher. Similarly, even though Sperber argues that 
accurate replication is not a factor in cultural transmission, the fidelity of information being 
transmitted will depend upon a transformation process (i.e. the inferences made by minds 
when interpreting public representations). So while exposure is important, inferential biases 
will play a crucial role in the frequency (i.e. prevalence) of a particular representation.  
 
The constraints and uniformity of expression generated by cognitive systems also suggests 
an evolutionary story. According to Sperber: a “cognitive module is an evolved mechanism 
with a distinct phylogenetic history” (Sperber 1996:123-124). The proper domain of a 
particular module constitutes the environmental conditions under which it was selected (and 
the functional purpose of the modules suggest an evolutionary explanation), while the actual 
domain describes the operationally relevant environment in which the module functions (i.e. 
a contemporary environment) . 
 
 Modules have been explained by EP to have a functional purpose, and are normally 
recruited in their actual domain, despite being adapted to an ancestral environment (see 
Sperber 1996: 134-138). Sperber argues, then, that there are mismatches with actual and 
proper domains. Apart from proper modules being recruited for other tasks, Sperber claims 
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that certain modules can be ‘excited’ by conditions that exploit proper domains. For instance, 
facial recognition modules are excited by the aesthetic exaggeration of physical features in 
artistic representations (e.g. abstract paintings of faces) (see Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004). 
The actual domain registers this as ‘superstimuli’, and facial pattern stimuli excite cognitive 
systems for facial recognition within actual domains (Sperber et al 2004).  
 
First, Sperber argues that our native cognitive systems regulate the stability and frequency 
of cultural representations, which ensures that we have a natural cognitive bias to particular 
cultural themes over others. This ‘susceptibility’ may be due to the memorability or 
learnability of cultural representations that our cognitive systems are better adapted to 
register. Second, modules maybe aroused or excited by particular stimuli when they are 
recruited in actual processing domains.18 Some cultural representations may stimulate 
cognitive systems in the actual domain when confronted with cues that excite these systems. 
Cultural properties, such as the supernatural or artistic representations, stimulate perceptual 
categories when they are violations of registering natural categories. This model predicts that 
when intuitive domains are contravened by cultural concepts it motivates memory and 
transmission (see Boyer 2001a; 2001b). Because our mind-brain is naturally biased towards 
certain information in the world, Sperber argues that you can predict the regularity of cultural 
representations based on what we know about the operational constraints of native cognitive 
systems.  
 
 
                                                
18 A good analogy for this ‘attractiveness’ to certain cultural representations over others’ is our natural 
predilection for sugars. Our taste buds are attracted to certain flavours since our bodies are commonly adapted to 
seek out high-carbohydrate food sources, due to scarcity. In an environment where there is an abundance of 
food, this overactive allure becomes indulgence (leading to diabetes, heart disease and other pathologies). It is 
argued that the same is true for certain cognitive systems – we are psychologically adapted to track certain 
features of our environment, so we are genetically primed to pay attention to certain cultural representations. 
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1.5 The Standard Cognitive Model of Religious Cognition. 
 
Against the background on EP and cognitive psychology, this section will provide a brief 
overview of the explanatory models provided by the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and 
religious-cultural transmission. Like Sperber (1996), research methods within the cognitive 
science of religion (CSR) have typically focused on the recurrent themes and patterns 
associated with religiosity by identifying the perennial or universal cognitive themes that 
underlie beliefs and practices. These universals – or stable patterns of religiosity - suggest 
that our cognitive machinery has a deeply entrenched role to play in how we process religious 
information.  
 
For instance, the received view within the CSR – what I call the Standard Internal Model 
(SiM) - argues that religion is not only a universal feature of human behavior, but that there 
are certain universal traits within religions that are common and classifiable cross-culturally 
(see Boyer 2001b; Whitehouse 2004; Jensen 2009). The received view has been that religious 
information is governed by our secular brain: the same cognitive machinery that deals with 
the more functional characteristics of everyday informational processing is also recruited in 
the processing of religious information. The non-religious brain generates religious beliefs 
and practices.  
 
Nevertheless, SiM recognizes that content rich features of our cognitive architecture shape 
the processing religious representations – both the representational constraints and 
motivations, and the uniformity of cultural distribution. Religious behavior is therefore seen 
as a by-product of innately bound cognitive systems - systems that have evolved to function 
in other domains (i.e. proper domains). On SiM view, the cognitive profile for religiosity is 
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not specialized (i.e. there is no specialized modular system for being religious). Nevertheless 
our cognitive architecture has a variety of functional systems that are naturally susceptible to 
religious concepts (Boyer 1994b, 2001; Boyer and Ramble 2001; Barrett 1998; Barrett and 
Keil 1996; McCauley 2000). Our ability to process religious concepts will therefore depend 
on the kind of information being transmitted, and SiM recognizes a salient correspondence 
between the frequency and content of representations common in all religions.  
 
 
As a disclaimer, a lot of what we learn is context-dependent. Or example, our prejudices 
are product of our cultural upbringing. The cultural knowledge we acquire is normally 
associated with developmental conditioning, and the currency information that is functionally 
relevant is locally contingent. The same is true for our religious education. We develop our 
theological beliefs and habits within a cultural milieu that reinforces certain norms and 
attitudes. Due to the conditional relationship between regional influence and religious 
behavior, practices appear to vary greatly in their expression, and the ethnographic literature 
on religious activity emphasizes this cross-cultural divergence.  
 
However, the epidemiological model proposed by Sperber above proposes that despite 
these variations, there are universal themes within religions across cultures (see Sperber 
1996). Native cognitive constraints establish recognizable historical trends towards certain 
representations over others. Despite religions’ apparent diversity, there are analogous 
characteristics cross-culturally that have an innate psychological underpinning.  
 
Some of the research undertaken within the CSR elaborates on these similarities of 
religious expression by looking at the regularities of cognitive systems and how they govern 
cultural transmission. Stable features of our cognitive architecture subsequently determine the 
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shape and frequency of religious representations. For instance, SiM is mainly interested in the 
frequency and content of religious representations and how fixed features of our cognition 
determine religious expression.  
 
Similar to Sperber’s thesis on the epidemiological model, SiM contends that thee innate 
cognitive systems are stabilizing mechanisms that generate predictable religious patterns. 
SiM researchers argue that: a) religious knowledge is computationally undemanding, 
ensuring its coherency (religious representations are simple enough to process), while being 
b) motivationally salient, or exciting enough to stimulate individuals to remember and pass 
on the representations to others. These two qualities ensure the ‘learnability’ of religious 
information and its ease of transmission. The first condition ‘(a)’ assumes that religious 
knowledge is computationally tractable and therefore optimal to our native cognition (more 
on this below in the following sections). The second condition ‘(b)’ suggests that the salience 
of religious representations excites native psychological mechanisms (see Sperber 1996).  
 
Justin Barrett (2007) sums up two “theoretical commitments” that the SiM is motivated 
by: the concept of theological correctness (TC) and the theory of minimal 
counterintuitiveness (MCI) in relation cultural transmission [more on these terms below] 
(Barrett 2007:769). Both of these theoretical commitments underpin the SiM and the 
optimality of religious transmission. Explicit religious representations – the theological 
concepts we can describe - inform the theologically correct position any one person may have 
in regards to their beliefs and practices (Barrett 1999). So, for example, a worshipper maybe 
able to rationally express a committed belief to a religious idea, such as the Holy Trinity, 
while implicit representations (i.e. any subconscious processing of conceptual structures) can 
often depart significantly from the theologically correct position by adhering to natural 
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categories (instead of supernatural descriptions). There is a kind of syntactical regularity to 
the way in which certain representations are mentally inferred, while the semantic content of 
a belief may diverge significantly from the online representation that correspond to 
conventional (folk-intuitive) structures. Predetermined cognitive rules, SiM claims, shape the 
uniformity of religious expression.  
 
An example of ‘theological incorrectness’ (and the difference between implicit and 
explicit beliefs) has been outlined in experiments by Justin Barrett and Frank C. Keil (Barrett 
and Keil 1996; see also Barrett 1998): they argue that there is evidence to support the claim 
that people intuitively process information about supernatural concepts differently online, to 
the offline explicit versions of the ‘theologically correct’ representation. When participants in 
the experiments were asked about the qualities attributed to ‘God’, most respondents 
expressed their belief in an omniscient being. They were clear about the distinction between 
normal-everyday persons and the ‘super’ normal qualities associated with the God in 
question. In other words, they explicitly recognized the difference between natural and non-
natural (or supernatural) qualities in their questionnaire.  
 
However, when presented with a short narrative in which a God plays an intervening role, 
responses to the narrative seemed to suggest that individuals processed God concepts as a 
normal agent, with a fixed temporal location. A typical narrative used in the experiments 
went like this: 
“A boy was swimming alone in a swift and rocky river. The boy got 
his left leg caught between two large, gray rocks and couldn't get out. 
Branches of trees kept bumping into him as they hurried past. He 
thought he was going to drown and so he began to struggle and pray. 
Though God was answering another prayer in another part of the 
world when the boy started praying, before long God responded by 
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pushing one of the rocks so the boy could get his leg out. The boy 
struggled to the river bank and fell over exhausted” (Barrett 
1998:613). 
 
Participants in the experiment often expressed no discontinuity between the logical order 
of God’s actions and his omniscience. However, if God were indeed omnipotent then he 
would be capable of attending to two prayers at once. Barrett and Keil (1996), therefore, 
argue that despite our capacity to explicitly articulate the supernatural description of a god, 
we nevertheless fall back upon processing constraints that generate inferences about natural 
categories. There is a cognitive bias to how we represent religious representations, and 
supernatural beings are not afforded any special ontological status when processed on an 
intuitive level.  
 
When we make the distinction between explicit and implicit beliefs, D. Jason Slone (2004) 
argues that TC beliefs are explicit and communicated through offline cognitive processes, 
while the mental representations that conform to specific processing constraints (the 
theologically incorrect concepts) are processed online (through stable internal 
representational systems). Barrett and Keil argue, then, that individuals may express 
theologically correct beliefs offline, while conforming to intuitive representations online. 
Offline conceptual reasoning may include ideas about a god’s omniscience. However, these 
concepts become computationally demanding when specific cues prompt an intuitive 
response from participants in the experiment. While offline reasoning is considered to be 
much more reflective - and slower as a result – online reasoning is faster and biased towards 
predictable responses.19  
                                                
19 It is argued then that online reasoning pertains to the range of domain specific cognitive systems that are 
innately bound and automatic. Concepts of a god as a person or anthropomorphic entity may have something to 
do with a psychological mechanism for social interactions (Boyer 1998, 2001a, 2001b) or for detecting agency 
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This natural pull towards processing information is articulated further in the next section 
on the cognitive optimality of religious representations. Sperber’s epidemiological model 
(Sperber 1996), and the section on native ontologies (i.e. folk psychology, folk biology, and 
folk physics) will be relevant as the discussion turns to how fixed features of our cognitive 
architecture determine the cultural spread of religious representations. As outlined by the 
profile of theological correctness, the cognitive optimality thesis shows that the cognitive 
constraints on information processing establish certain defaults for the expression of religious 
representations. Pascal Boyer (1994) argues below that religious representations conform to 
certain cognitive rules, and that these rules shape how we process religious information.   
 
1.5.1 Boyer’s Cognitive Optimum. 
 
According to the epidemiological model of cultural transmission we can establish 
causal explanations for why and how religions look the way that they do based on what 
we know about our representational machinery. Pascal Boyer (1994a, 1994b, 2001) 
utilizes Sperber’s epidemiological model to describe how innate cognitive biases 
influence the frequency and content religious representations. Boyer’s view of cultural-
religious transmission is appealing to the scholarship on the psychology of religion 
since he observes the related features underlying all religious systems, and these 
comparable traits are causally related to innate psychological biases.  
 
                                                
(Guthrie 1995). Stewart Guthrie (1995) for instance argues that our cognitive systems are over-active in the 
domain for agency detection. Cognitive adaptations for detecting agency were probably helpful during the EEA 
(environment of evolutionary adaptedness) as a strategy for responding to false-positives in the wild. Put 
simply, it is better to assume threats in nature, than to be inattentive to hazardous cues. Guthrie argues then that 
humans overemphasize agency in nature as a default inference because it is safer to do so. Hence our overactive 
tendency to perceive agency, also enters into the production supernatural representations.   
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Boyer argues that we possess innate cognitive traits that govern inferential biases 
when tracking cultural information. The adaptive utility of our folk intelligence (see 
above) is salient, especially since we can establish: a) the relationship between 
development and cognitive proficiency; and b) causally related evolutionary 
explanations for their function.  
 
The above section on ‘intuitive ontologies’ discussed the innate competencies that 
are relevant to Boyer’s work on religious activity (i.e. folk psychology, folk biology, 
folk physics). Boyer claims that religious behaviour is not an adaptive trait. However, 
certain evolved cognitive functions – like our folk intelligences – ensures our 
susceptibility to religious beliefs and practices since they are prone to stimulus from 
certain cultural inputs. Put simply, Boyer argues that our innate perceptual categories 
also make us susceptible to religious concepts, since certain violating cultural concepts 
– like supernatural concepts - motivate these systems. Religious concepts contravene 
natural categories, and are therefore stimulate our ontological algorithms.  
 
Let us consider how religious representations are counterintuitive on this view. First, 
Boyer argues that religious representations violate our intuitions about the social world.  
For instance, Boyer argues that many supernatural agents – such as omniscient gods - 
appear to be “Full Access Strategic Agents”, in that they are perceived to be present in 
the social lives of religious adherents (Boyer 2001: 137-202). The gods can monitor 
sinful actions and wield punishments, for example. They are supernaturally accessible 
agents in a socially bound sense, since they oversee social norms and the behaviour of 
individuals. Psychic powers, for example, violate our natural intuitions about social 
interactions. Second, religious representations run counter to biological intuitions: 
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supernatural qualities often violate our expectations of the natural history domain. For 
example, the gods are immortal, some deities heal the sick, and the ancestors inhabit an 
afterlife. Third, religious representations run counter to our intuitions about the physical 
world. Supernatural entities often defy the laws of physics and are attractive to our 
cognition because they can, for example, be omniscient or walk through solid objects.  
 
However, while supernatural representations are counterintuitive, and especially 
appealing to our innate perceptual categories, there is a threshold of processing 
comprehension when managing counterintuitive information. Boyer argues, then, that 
religious representations are minimally counterintuitive to the extent that they are 
attractive, yet cognitively tractable since they are still anchored to some natural 
categories. A minimally counterintuitive (MCI) concept conforms to both a violation of 
expectations – i.e. the supernatural - while adhering to a natural ontology, and this 
establishes its coherency with real-world phenomena (Boyer and Ramble 2001). For 
example, ghosts may be counterintuitive in the sense that they can walk through walls, 
and are animated after death (they violate both physical and biological categories), yet 
they still conform to an agency profile - they have people properties (non-violated 
assumptions).  
 
Boyer argues that this is why gods have balanced anthropomorphic and supernatural 
qualities across cultures. The gods are often immortal, human-like beings that can read 
minds, while possessing super-normal powers within the physical world. Supernatural 
representations, according to Boyer, conform to natural categories with an arousing 
costume. This recipe of balanced properties within religious representation ensures the 
similarity of expression cross-culturally.  
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According to Boyer, MCI concepts are constituted by: (1) minor breaches of 
intuitive knowledge, and/or (2) the transfer of intuitive domains. For example, 
supernatural entities may breach knowledge domains by being immortal, while also 
being conceived as human-like agents. Ghosts, for example, are people yet they breach 
the intuitive domain of physics by being able to walk through walls. Breaches straddle 
both natural and non-natural domains that make them both salient to memory and 
computationally tractable.  
 
Transfers, however, are defined by a conversion of intuitive ontologies into a 
blended concept. This is why, Boyer argues, sacred artefacts possess intentional 
qualities (and intentions are analogous to human psychological qualities), but they 
remain a physical property also. Subsequently, there is a transfer of secondary 
ontological qualities with the real-world natural property. Being a physical property 
provides the material anchor for comprehension, while the perception of the object’s 
magical qualities motivate belief.  
 
Both of these conditions suggest a cross-cultural template for religious 
representations, and Boyer and Ramble (2001) has performed experiments involving 
stories containing counterintuitive concepts that have been observed as more 
memorable by their subjects. From these experiments, Boyer and Ramble developed a 
model that predicts the basic memorability of supernatural representations. For Boyer 
and Ramble, the parameters associated with this model suggest a universal template in 
supernatural concepts (Boyer and Ramble 2001:537): 
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[1] A pointer to a particular domain or concept 
[2] An explicit representation of a violation of intuitive 
expectations either: 
[2a] A breach of relevant expectations for the category, or 
[2b] A transfer of expectations associated with another 
category; 
[3] A link to (non-violated) default expectations for the category. 
 
As shown above: [1] could be a pointer to an agent-like entity, such as a ghost. Or [1] 
could be a pointer to a sacred object like a magic wand.  But the pointer is further conditioned 
by the violation of intuitive expectations [2], while the representation is further linked to a 
non-violated expectation [3]. For example: God [1] is immortal [2a] and listens to your 
prayers [3]; and the sacred stone [1] will grant you luck [2b] if you carry it close to your chest 
[3]. The ‘God’ example demonstrates the breach of an intuitive category – the God is 
immortal and violates assumptions about biological categories. The ‘sacred stone’ has 
intentional qualities, in that it takes an interest in another’s wellbeing – it grants luck - while 
still conforming to the properties associated with a physical object.  
 
However, Boyer and Ramble go onto say that cultural concepts are more specific than the 
templates for supernatural representations. Further, in order to explain the variables that 
ensure cross-cultural diversity in religious concepts, they say that contextual or culturally 
specific information adorn the templates and establishes a more culturally coherent version of 
the supernatural representation. Hence there is further: 
 
[4] a slot for additional encyclopedic information; 
[5] a lexical label. 
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Contextual information such as [4] ‘the ancestors inhabit artifacts’ (which is valid in some, 
but not all religions) is further contextualized through the [5] name of the concept. Boyer and 
Ramble argue that this explains why religions appear to be so diverse, despite these culturally 
specific religious concepts adhering recurrent themes. [4] and [5] are merely surface features 
of a representation (associated with offline processing [Barrett 2007]) 
 
These universal qualities underpinning religious representations suggest that the 
transmission of religious representations is consistent with a cognitive optimum. This is 
largely due to the claim that religious representations are attractive yet computationally 
undemanding for our cognitive systems. They are optimal precisely because they meet the 
criteria for MCI concepts: 
“In this framework, a religious idea would be described as cognitive & optimal 
if (i) it contains an explicit violation of commonsense thinking and (ii) it makes 
implicit use of the intuitive principles of commonsense knowledge” (Boyer 
1992:45).   
 
Elaborating on the concept of cognitive optimality, Robert McCauley (2000) has made a 
similar claim by stating that religious beliefs provide an explanatory model of the world that 
is coherent with our perceptual biases. McCauley contrasts scientific explanations with 
religious explanations by claiming that our naked brains are more suited for believing in 
supernatural explanations, while in contrast our intuitive cognitive systems become more 
encumbered with scientific explanations for natural phenomena. Our default processing, then, 
is to be biased towards information that is computationally less demanding. The logical 
conclusion – based on the prevalence of religious explanations for natural phenomena within 
cultures - is that the intellectual bias towards supernatural causality is the standard cognitive 
default in the absence of scientific explanatory accounts.  
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 Here, McCauley compares our tendency to be religious with that of our language learning 
ability, since both appear to be developmentally predictable features of our cognitive 
architecture.  
“Like natural language, religion exploits cognitive dispositions, which seem to 
arise early in human development. Because so many pivotal religious conceptions 
have so little theoretical depth, possessing everyday concepts prepares people for 
the acquisition of religion in a way that does not prepare them for the acquisition 
of science” (McCauley 2000:80). 
 
McCauley demonstrates this by comparing the technological and theoretical complexity of 
the scientific tradition with religious traditions. On this view, scientific explanations are 
framed as maximally counterintuitive due to their computational demands.  
 
Both Boyer and McCauley would agree, then, that religion is far more successful and 
culturally ubiquitous because of its cognitively optimal qualities.20 The cognitive optimality 
thesis contends that we can explain the frequency and spread of religious representations by 
way of our inferential biases that constrain our conceptual reasoning. SiM predicts that 
religious traditions are thematically consistent within religions cross-culturally, due to the 
motivationally salient structure of religious representations.  
 
                                                
20 As stated, intuitive ontology “provides a basic structure for concepts” (Barrett 1998:610). These basic 
structures, or intuitions, enable inferences about things in the world. Boyer calls these basic structures “causal 
schemata” (Boyer 1994a; cited from Barrett 1998). For instance, we automatically assume from our intuitive 
inferences that a goat is a living thing (i.e. our intuitive or folk biology). Yet there are non-schematic features 
specific to the species that are learned, such as the goat can climb steep inclines. Religious representations are 
constituted by non-schematic properties that violate expectations. These are only minimal violations of these 
causal schemas however. MCI concepts are more prevalent within cultures because they include both intuitive 
and counterintuitive properties that ensure their memorability.  The popularity of religious concepts cross-
culturally is explained but by a natural attraction alone, but additionally by our ability to process this 
information without a degree of effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  66 
1.6 Whitehouse and the Ritual Modes Theory. 
 
Unlike SiM, I argue that the transmission of religious information is more cognitively 
demanding and cultural systems vary in their approach to the methods employed in the 
transmission of sacred knowledge. Similarly, cognitive anthropologist and ethnographer 
Harvey Whitehouse (2004) has proposed model that potentially facilitates a more 
comprehensive description of the environmental and the psychological relationship that 
shapes religious activity. Whitehouse has previously criticized the cognitive optimality thesis 
and SiM for its over-simplified explanations for religious behavior (Whitehouse 2004, 2008). 
He is more concerned that the received views within the CSR do not take into account the 
costs of transmission (i.e. the investment in ritual), and the environmental conditions that are 
deeply interconnected with religious behavior.21  
 
For instance, the cognitive optimality thesis assumes that religious transmission involves 
reduced computational demands, while other institutionalized bodies of knowledge – like 
science – encompass more structured methods of learning (McCauley 2000). This view 
suggests that since we are all naturally attracted to supernatural ideas, and that a religious 
education is fairly cheap, (Barrett 2000; McCauley 2000).  
 
Whitehouse (2004) argues that this conception of religious transmission falls short of 
explaining what he sees in his own ethnographic research and other first-hand literature on 
religious traditions. First, religion is not easy. Beliefs and practices are often psychologically 
and physically demanding, with many rituals involving a high level of physical and mental 
determination on the part of the adherent (e.g. fasting, tattooing, abstinence, prayer and 
                                                
21 I have called these ‘Standard Internal Model’ [SiM] definitions of religious behaviour.  
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meditation etc). In addition, complex cosmogony and theology is often difficult to learn (e.g. 
the memorization of a religious corpus). There are costs to engaging in religious activity at 
various levels, and this suggests that transmission is far from optimal (see also Bulbulia 2004, 
2009).  
 
Second, religious cultures are comprised of socio-political systems constituted by norms 
and customs. These systems are often comprised of social inequalities and hierarchies – with 
religious norms determining the distribution of wealth and gender divisions (Whitehouse 
2004, 2008). Whitehouse would argue then that the cognitive optimality thesis fails to capture 
the perpetuation of these social complexities within religious systems: 
“Explaining religion it is not a matter of accounting for a single trait; it 
involves explaining a very complex and interconnected repertoire of patterns of 
thinking and behavior” (Whitehouse 2008:35).  
 
 
The complexity and variation of religious systems are sensitive to regional conditions, 
according to Whitehouse. Diversity is relatively coherent with the environmental 
contingencies of a cultural niche. For example, marriage customs are a part of deeply 
entrenched social norms, and appear to be recurrent form of ritual across all cultures. 
However, the rituals within these customs display subtle variations in their expression 
(despite their apparent similarities). Likewise, socio-political arrangements are structurally 
similar but vary within religious systems, while social ranking is often associated with the 
conventional norms of a religious system (e.g. hierarchies, kingships, and priest classes).  
 
Whitehouse argues that the dynamic between environments and ritual are not sufficiently 
framed by the cognitive optimality thesis. Whitehouse knows that the social and ecological 
conditions within cultures are diverse and these determine the modes of religious ritual. This 
ethnographic diversity is key to Whitehouse’s argument, and he maintains that the cognitive 
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optimality thesis is unsuccessful in explaining the relationship between ritual and socio-
ecological conditions across cultures (see Whitehouse 2004: Chapter 3, 2008): 
“A major limitation with CSR research has been its somewhat narrow 
emphasis on the issue of how universal cognitive biases shape and constrain 
patterns of religious transmission. Although that is clearly a valuable starting 
point, it only helps to explain variations on a theme. That is, it may help us to 
explain why certain features of religious thinking and behavior are especially 
widespread and may even help us to explain why some aspects of the universal 
repertoire are more heavily emphasized in one place rather than another...  But 
religious traditions are much more than just the sum of various universal 
themes. Some religions involve highly elaborated and distinctive cosmologies, 
for example. Others incorporate extensive ethical systems that run against the 
grain of intuitive moral reasoning” (Whitehouse 2008:41; emphasis added). 
 
 
Again, Whitehouse is concerned that the CSR has characterized ‘religion’ as being 
comprised of universally identifiable traits. However, religions are diverse and often run 
counter to any kind of optimal behavioral patterns.  
 
Matthew Day (2004a; 2004b; 2005; 2009) has made similar criticisms towards SiM as 
Whitehouse. However, in many ways, Day has dismissed the cognitivist approach to the 
study of religion as a methodological failure while subsequently critiquing the CSR for 
overlooking the external features of religiosity, while overselling internal regularities (i.e. 
domain specific cognitive systems) as the primary casual explanation for religious 
transmission: 
“The research program thus far has tended to treat the broad spectrum of 
rituals, music, relics, scriptures, ceremonies, and physical representations 
typically associated with religious traditions as features that are more or less 
irrelevant for a biologically fixed human cognitive system” (Day 2009:721). 
 
 
According to both Whitehouse and Day, the external socio-cultural environment should be 
factored into a cognitive model of the religious mind. Whitehouse states, however, that the 
purpose of the CSR is not to provide an overarching explanation for religious activity, but 
instead to “fractionate religion into numerous different traits, each of which must be 
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explained on its own account” (Whitehouse 2008:35). The CSR – especially SiM – has 
previously argued that it can explain the recurrent and universal features of religious systems. 
However, Whitehouse claims that while we find consistent features within cultures (that may 
indeed be related to internal cognitive constraints), we are also obliged to account for cultural 
variation and the subtle patterns inherent within a niche environment: 
“Valuable as the contributions of the CSR have been, it should be 
acknowledged that they constitute only a modest starting point in explaining 
religion. For the field to mature it must expand its horizons to take into account 
the role of ecological variables in processes of religious evolution” 
(Whitehouse 2008:35; emphasis added). 
 
 
The ecological variables that Whitehouse highlights are of interest to this thesis since 
religious systems are regionally diverse. Whitehouse is convinced that the expression of 
religious beliefs and practices are dependent upon are locally contingent factors in addition to 
cognitive constraints. For example, socio-ecological features, such as demographic 
conditions are causally relevant factors that shape the expression of religious activity since 
population size can influence social structures and the way in which ritual is organized. 
Subsequently, Whitehouse suggests that: “there is much more to explain about religion than a 
set of statistically recurrent features” (Whitehouse 2008:37). In other words, ecological 
variables count towards a cognitive explanation for religious activity just as much as internal 
psychological traits can.  
 
However, despite this skepticism towards SiM, Whitehouse argues that cultural 
transmission is constrained by internal cognitive processes (see Sperber 1996; Boyer 1998, 
2001). He also claims that it is shortsighted to assume that there is going to be a predictable 
uniformity of expression within religious systems. Indeed, ethnographic diversity suggests 
that it is hard to infer a narrow set of properties associated with any one pattern of religious 
behavior: 
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“Epidemiological approaches to the study of cognition and culture have 
tended to assume that invariable features of cognitive processing make some 
religious representations inherently more likely to be remembered than others, 
and thus more likely to become culturally widespread. The frequency 
hypothesis, however, suggests that what makes something memorable is 
always a combination of cognitive capacities and socially regulated 
transmissive cycles.” (Whitehouse 2001:179). 
 
According to Whitehouse, SiM overemphasizes the internal cognitive constraints that 
regulate religious representations. While there are indeed minimally counterintuitive concepts 
present in religions (e.g. agents with supernatural qualities), cultures also value and are 
deeply committed to concepts that are more complex and thus maximally counterintuitive 
(Whitehouse 2004). For instance, I will argue that the volume of sacred knowledge 
necessitates specific tools and strategies in order to support the fidelity of transmission. Oral 
cultures lean on culturally evolved tools and strategies to support the means for transmission. 
This includes both structured pedagogy (i.e. niche environments for learning), and artificial 
memory (i.e. mnemonic devices).  
 
These methods for augmenting the fidelity of transmission suggests that a mythic corpus 
can be computationally complex and demanding – to transmit and preserve – and so SiM’s 
cognitive optimality thesis falls short of accounting for informational complexity. In light of 
this complexity Whitehouse proposes that both memory constraints and the transmissive 
frequency of cultural practices are more causally relevant in the transmission of religious 
representations than domain specific cognitive engines: 
“Religion, like any cultural domain, is a distributed phenomenon. That is to 
say, it consists not merely of the thoughts and feelings of an individual 
devotee, but of the recognizably similar or complementary thoughts and 
feelings of a population of religious adherents” (Whitehouse 2001:169). 
 
The presence of religious knowledge will depend upon psychological features as well as 
the activities associated with the social distribution of information. However, Whitehouse is 
careful not to discount the causal relevancy of domain-specific cognitive engines in his own 
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model of religious transmission. Though he still regards domain-specific mechanisms as 
being important to the causal qualities of intuitive religious representations (i.e. such as MCI 
representations), he also suggests that researchers should take into account the computational 
burden in the transmission of knowledge intensive religious beliefs and practices. I argue that 
Whitehouse’s modes theory is compatible with the cognitive ecological models discussed 
below (in Chapters 4 and 5) since the modes theory recognizes the constraints of memory, 
and how cultural environments are both an intervening factor on religious activity and 
constitute supportive properties in its transmission.  
 
Whitehouse argues that certain rituals exploit semantic and episodic memory systems for 
the purpose of transmission (Whitehouse 2004). Semantic memory systems are part of our 
declarative memory and are generally considered to be supportive of implicit conceptual 
knowledge. For example, the recognition of a common animal – like a horse – is part of 
semantic memory. The same is true, for general knowledge about religious beliefs and 
practices, which is stored in semantic memory systems and shapes our implicit understanding 
of the sacred, according to Whitehouse. While, episodic memory systems are closer 
associated with autobiographical memory and memories of specific (often emotionally salient 
events) in our lives. Within a religious context, the emotional – sometime traumatic - rituals 
often ensure the salience, and conscious recollection of the events and experiences. For 
example, a wedding ceremony is structured in a way to ensure some emotional resonance the 
participators. The ritual is designed to be a spectacle of emotional significance, and episodic 
memory systems support the recollection and structuring of these autobiographical events.  
 
Edward Tulving (1972) first made this distinction between semantic and episodic memory 
by conceiving the two information processing systems as: 1) information retrieval 
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mechanisms 2) informational retention systems 3) information transmission systems, but with 
differing conditions on: “(a) the nature of stored information, (b) autobiographical versus 
cognitive reference, (c) conditions and consequences of retrieval... (d) their vulnerability to 
interference resulting in transformation and erasure of stored information, and (e) their 
dependence upon each other” (Tulving 1972:385). For clarification Tulving states here: 
“Episodic memory receives and stores information about temporally dated 
episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events. A 
perceptual event can be stored in the episodic system solely in terms of its 
perceptible properties or attributes, and it is always stored in terms of 
autobiographical reference to the already existing contents of the episodic 
memory store... The system is probably quite susceptible to transformation and 
loss of information... Semantic memory is necessary for the use of language. It 
is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words 
and other verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among 
them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these 
symbols, concepts and relations. Semantic memory does not register 
perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals... 
The semantic system is probably much less susceptible to involuntary 
transformation and loss of information that the episodic system” (Tulving 
1972: 385-386).  
 
Again, Tulving argues that episodic systems store information about specific 
autobiographical incidents and events. The explicit details of an experience is often stored in 
episodic memory and can also be related specifically the sensual characteristics of the ritual 
(e.g. the feelings, moods, and physical sensations of the ritual).  
 
On the other hand, Tulving states that semantic memory stores structurally implicit 
knowledge inputted over the course of an individual’s epistemic development. This 
constitutes implicit knowledge about the world that is not necessarily relatable to specific 
experiences, but does inform our conceptual attitudes. Whitehouse states that semantic 
systems are critical for the cultural transmission of doctrinal religious knowledge. Semantic 
memory enables our capacity to recall and conceptualize the more general features of 
theological knowledge.  
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Whitehouse argues that religions overcome the problem of memory limitations, and the 
transmission of complex religious knowledge, by establishing ritual modes that exploit these 
two memory systems. Whitehouse has observed, in his own ethnographic fieldwork, that 
religious rituals generally conform to two types of modes: doctrinal and imagistic modes 
(Whitehouse 2004). These two modes function to embed certain experiences and memories 
into both semantic and episodic systems. Doctrinal modes, Whitehouse explains, are usually 
comprised of high frequency, regular forms of ritual that elicit low simulative effects. 
Doctrinal modes are subsequently routine and expected to be performed regularly enough – 
over time – to entrench a mental template. An example of this is maybe liturgical routines or 
social practices that adhere to particular everyday cultural norms (e.g. such as food taboos). 
Doctrinal rituals are not intended to produce strong emotional responses in the practitioner, 
and because they are practiced regularly become embedded in our semantic memory systems. 
Theological concepts are commonly derived from semantic memory systems.  
 
On a socio-political level, doctrinal modes are normally found in large-scale societies with 
well-established, complex political and economic institutions. Doctrinal rituals are more 
frequent when informational resources are widely distributed within a larger population. For 
example, social patterns are more manageable through the use of socio-political hierarchies 
as populations become larger and more diffuse. The methods for managing populations 
through top-down methods of organization emerge from the demographic pressures which in 
turn influence the shape of religious patterns. Doctrinal ritual modes establish entrenched 
customs and norms that are the result of regular ritual patterns.  
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Imagistic modes on the other hand are low frequency rituals (i.e. irregular) that are 
performed specifically to prompt high arousal responses from the practitioner. These rituals 
are performed less-often and exploit episodic memory systems through the use of methods 
that illicit a strong emotional impact (e.g. tattooing, initiation rituals, trances etc). These may 
involve physically painful or psychologically shocking practices so as to leave an indelible 
mark upon the individual’s memory.  
 
At a socio-political level, Whitehouse argues that the use of imagistic rituals is normally 
more prevalent within small-scale societies. Small-scale communities lack the resources 
available for a highly politicized social structure, and so imagistic rituals play a role in 
reinforcing social cohesion, while eliciting strong emotional responses from individual 
practitioners. There are no requirements for entrenched political institutions within smaller 
scale social arrangements, while information is easily distributed within the population. Small 
communities depend upon these high-arousal rituals for religious transmission due to the lack 
of large-scale institutional practices.                                           
 
Whitehouse argues that both the imagistic modes and doctrinal modes will not be found 
exclusively in any one social structure. Instead you often find that religious systems utilize 
both ritual modes to varying degrees. But Whitehouse predicts that socio-ecological 
conditions will determine the common frequency of one ritual mode over the other. Therefore 
socio-ecological constraints in any one culture will influence the more conventional use of 
either doctrinal or imagistic modes. Social complexity, found in larger scale communities, 
will often generate rituals that lean towards the doctrinal mode, whereas more socially 
transparent (i.e. smaller populations) communities will typically employ of imagistic modes 
of ritual.  
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Whitehouse’s model is appealing its non-conformity for a definition or causal explanation 
for religiosity. It is moderate in its explanatory account. Whitehouse views the content of 
ritual is not the focus of examination, but the structure of rituals, and their relationship with 
other features of the socio-ecology. Subsequently, Whitehouse’s modes theory takes into 
account the context for religious practices, and his model is sensitive to the informational 
qualities that are unique to any one cultural milieu. Fig. 1 shows these conditions and their 
relationship to the differing ritual modes: 
 
VARIABLE  DOCTRINAL  
 
IMAGISTIC 
  
Psychological Features 
 
1. Transmissive frequency High Low 
2. Level of arousal Low High 
3. Principal memory system Semantic schemas 
& implicit scripts 
Episodic/ flashbulb memory 
4. Ritual meaning Learned/acquired Internally generated 
5. Techniques of revelation Rhetoric, logical 
integration, narrativity 
Iconicity,  
multivocality/ multivalence 
  
Sociopolitical Features 
 
6. Social cohesion Diffuse Intense 
7. Leadership Dynamic Passive/absent 
8. Inclusivity/exclusivity Inclusive Exclusive 
9. Spread Rapid, efficient Slow, inefficient 
10. Scale Large-scale Small-scale 
11. Degree of uniformity High Low 
12. Structure Centralized Non-centralized 
Fig. 1: Modes of Religiosity (Whitehouse 2008:43). 
 
Fig. 1 shows the variety of predictions that the modes theory makes about the 
dynamics of both doctrinal and imagistic modes. It pertinent to note here that Whitehouse 
does not discount the cognitive optimality thesis, however, the more cognitively optimal 
representations fall in the imagistic category (listed above). Rituals like these are 
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associated with the more intuitive cognitive biases, while doctrinal modes necessitate 
more structured methods of learning. As a result, Whitehouse urges that any cognitive 
account for religion should consider the more challenging (i.e. costly) aspects of religious 
transmission: 
“Religious systems, as such, are not particularly catchy and, indeed, are 
often extremely difficult to acquire... Thus, although religion has recurrent and 
intuitive features it also encompasses ideas that are extremely hard to learn and 
pass on. And it is in the complex balance between these two sets of features 
that we must look if we want to understand the evolution of religious systems” 
(Whitehouse 2008:41) 
 
Doctrinal features of a religious system may include the learning of complex theological 
knowledge or cosmological systems through various means (i.e. such as text or ritual 
repetition). Due to the complexity of these informational sources the demands for the 
transmission of doctrine is high (and not cognitively optimal). Whitehouse argues then that 
cultures have developed the means and methods for transmitting conceptually rich bodies of 
religious knowledge through ritual. He states that while intuitive representational systems are 
applicable to the transmission of religious concepts with low demands on working memory, 
cultures develop cultural technologies for supporting the transmission of computationally 
heavy religious concepts through doctrinal methods such as rehearsal and repetition 
(Whitehouse 2008).22  
 
Whitehouse’s own ethnographic research reflects this tendency in oral cultures to 
faithfully preserve oral sources of religious knowledge, and in his own interactions with the 
Pomio Kivung in Melanesia, Whitehouse observed that there was orthodoxy to the way in 
which sacred knowledge was remembered and communicated (Whitehouse 2007). However, 
                                                
22 Whitehouse likens this mechanism for cultural innovation to Michael Tomasello’s (1999) ‘ratchet effect’ in 
cultural evolutionary processes (Whitehouse 2008:41). As discussed in the chapter on epistemic niche 
construction (see Chapter 4) cumulative cultural evolution requires that a stable platform exist in order to 
develop further technological innovation. The current generation learns skills from the previous generation and 
further expands upon them. So in some ways religious activity remains unchanging, but as complexity increases 
so does the demand for no innovative ways to manage and transmit this complexity. 
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this was not the kind of knowledge that was recited verbatim from memory. Instead, the 
Kivung’s cosmogony formed a mental schema that provided a reliable cognitive orientation 
for communication and memory. While there was flexibility and creativity involved in 
speeches, for example, orators still adhered to certain doctrinal structures. Semantic memory 
stores meant that orators always had a cognitive template in which to work from: 
“What the orators knew, long before I came to know it as well, was that the 
cosmology and doctrine of their religious tradition formed an integrated 
network of connections that could be explored in speech, often in genuinely 
creative ways, but only by traversing well-worn tracks between the component 
concepts and networks of concepts. What gave these tracks their relative fixity 
was, as with a real track, the fact that people went over them time and again 
rather than randomly deviating and criss-crossing them. In the Kivung, 
unauthorized innovation on matters of doctrine and narrative was socially 
sanctioned. And heresy could not be committed inadvertently since regular 
reiteration of the orthodox canon ensured that innovations would always be 
noticed (Whitehouse 2007:270). 
 
Whitehouse argues, then, that semantic memory “evolved as a means of domain-general 
information storage” and this enables our capacity to integrate a wide variety of concepts and 
structures as cognitive inputs (Whitehouse 2007:270). The Pomio Kivung example above 
shows that doctrinal structures remain fundamental to the orthodoxy of their religious system 
and Whitehouse argues that this orthodoxy is maintained through the frequency of 
performance. The regularity of practice ensures its imprinting on memory systems, but 
Whitehouse also states that semantic memory stores are responsible for the unique features of 
ritual peculiar to a religious system. Cultures are historically embedded traditions and 
semantic memory stores would have been fundamental to the cumulative development of 
doctrinal systems. As Whitehouse states here: 
 
“The case of Kivung religion shows, even when we focus only on one type 
of ritual performed in one of its temples, that nuclear and global connection 
systems shape and constrain what people say and do at every turn. But no 
matter how closely we focus on those systems they will never enable us to 
explain why the Kivung tradition embraces particular configurations of 
systems and outputs while another tradition elsewhere embraces another. What 
is it that gives religious traditions their local and historical particularity, even 
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though their members are all equipped with the same cognitive toolkits? The 
answer lies in the operations of global storage systems like semantic memory 
that impose a degree of fixity on particular configurations of representations, 
resulting from cumulative past experiences” (Whitehouse 2007:270; emphasis 
added). 
 
Whitehouse argues then that learning strategies are a crucial component in the 
transmission of religious traditions. However, culturally evolved methods of transmission are 
innovated to cope with the demands of managing the informational complexity of a religious 
system. As discussed later in this thesis (in Chapters 4 and 5), traditional Māori oral tradition 
developed structured pedagogical methods to ensure the stability and fidelity of cross-
generational transmission. These were institutionalized methods developed for reproducing 
environments that sustained informational fidelity. Doctrinal modes, such as the repetition of 
oral history and genealogical sources, as well the use of mnemonic devices, have been critical 
for supporting transmission.  
 
Whitehouse argues that the innovation for informational technologies allowed for the 
cumulative evolution of religious traditions since many “...religious concepts require 
considerable cognitive, social, and technological resources to create, remember, and pass on” 
(Whitehouse 2008:44), and without ritualized rehearsal within religion traditions, the more 
cognitively demanding aspects of religious transmission would be lost (Whitehouse 
2008:42): 
“The doctrinal mode provided, for the first time in human history, the 
mnemonic scaffolding (based around regular public reiteration of religious 
creeds) for the transformation of imagistic revelations into more standardized 
bodies of doctrine” (Whitehouse 2008:44). 
 
 Of course, symbolic artifacts have played a key role in the preservation of religious 
knowledge, but so have social learning strategies. Structured learning interactions - without 
the use of symbolic artifacts – within oral traditions have been critical to the organization of 
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knowledge. Whitehouse suggests also that individuals learn alongside teachers and their 
peers, while constant exposure ensures the retention of sacred knowledge. Structured learning 
within a ritual context means that individuals can be closely monitored for correction and 
further improvement: 
“While much of the information in semantic memory would be gathered 
informally through everyday experience, expert knowledge must be built up 
through long-term study involving regular review and rehearsal of the 
information acquired” (Whitehouse 2007:267). 
 
Subsequently, being immersed in a culture is critical for religious conditioning, and 
structured pedagogical techniques increase fidelity. Doctrinal methods typically reinforce the 
stability and conservative features of a theological system. Semantic memory stores, then, 
constitute the epistemic basis for complex theological knowledge. It is argued that these 
stores form the template for our basic knowledge of a theological system (Whitehouse 
2007:269). 
 
When discussing traditions, we can assume that the resources available to a culture for 
information storage and retrieval will determine how a religious system is structured. As this 
thesis will argue, the storage and retrieval of informational resources has been evolutionarily 
significant for the accumulation of cognitive capital, and has been strongly preconditioned by 
two underlying characteristics: 1) the evolution of social coordination (i.e. the cooperative 
sharing - and regulation - of information and learning); 2) the cultural evolution of 
technological resources (i.e. the types of methods and tools employed in cultural 
transmission). So while we do indeed possess input connections to a variety of behavioral 
outputs, the human cognitive profile is unique in its capacity to exploit external cultural 
resources to extend its working memory capabilities (Sterelny 2003).  
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I will argue that while internal memory constraints are critical to understanding how 
religious knowledge is preserved within oral cultures, we should also consider how these 
cognitive constraints interact with culturally evolved features of the environment. 
Whitehouse argues that one of the ways in which we can model the storage and retrieval of 
sacred/religious knowledge is through the distribution of memory resources within ritual. 
Similarly, I will argue that religious enculturation is the result of the large-scale distribution 
of knowledge entailing both internal and external cognitive resources.   
 
1.7 Discussion. 
 
The cognitivist paradigm, and specifically evolutionary psychology, manages to frame 
human behavior as being governed by a set of inborn competences. Internal cognitive 
machinery regulates the flow of information between individuals and the environment. Some 
of these constraints emerge from content-rich mechanisms that have been adapted to track 
our environments reliably. This chapter has provided a general background on how human 
intelligence is partly constituted by developmentally specialized cognitive systems. It may 
come as no surprise to many scholars within the CSR that this chapter has focused on three 
cognitive domains that are commonly associated with the ontological foundations for 
supernatural representations (i.e. social intelligence, biological intelligence and physical 
[technical] intelligence), since they are the common focus of minimally counterintuitive 
theories on religious transmission. These characteristics are associated with the human 
cognitive profile, and play a large role in shaping the content and frequency of religious 
information. Inferential constraints operate on how religious representations are transmitted.  
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The SiM, and Sperber, show that there are common cultural traits across cultures that are 
associated with innate psychological biases; and that these recurrent cultural patterns are 
predictable. SiM argues that these psychological processes have significant role to play in the 
common themes that are recognizable within all religions. Subsequently, the cognitive 
optimum expects that the frequency and content of supernatural representations will look 
something like a bell-curve forecast: MCI concepts excite our innate ontological systems (by 
contravening natural perceptions), while anchored in natural categories. Excitement and 
tractability are ingredients that constitute the cognitive optimality thesis.  
 
Later I looked at Whitehouse (2004) and his ritual modes theory. Whitehouse’s modes 
theory accomplishes three things that are relevant to this thesis: 1) it accounts for the 
complexity and variation of religious traditions; 2) it is compatible with ethnographic data; 3) 
it shows how transmission is maintained through culturally evolved tools and strategies, 
despite the constraints on memory. Whitehouse’s modes theory also accounts for the 
transmission of religious beliefs and practices outside of theories related to SiM. Whitehouse 
argues that general cognitive systems such as memory have a role to play (alongside domain-
specific systems) in the expression of religious behavior. Memory constraints plus socio-
ecological conditions, according to Whitehouse, determines shape of a religious system. The 
details regarding religious memory can be subtle and complex. However, this chapter has 
endeavored to show how the cognitive resources for memory are distributed across social-
learning and technological domains.  
 
A valuable insight for further research from the modes theory is the idea that religious 
systems are part of a composite cultural network that cannot be reduced to either just innate 
features of the mind-brain, or basic common traits associated with religiosity. On 
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Whitehouse’s view the frequency and content of religious representations is determined by 
both cognitive constraints and socio-ecological conditions. Whitehouse does not discount the 
contributions made by SiM. However, Whitehouse’s model suggests that the cognitive 
optimality thesis has been oversold in SiM’s causal explanation. The idea that domain-
specific features of our cognitive architecture are the basis for religious cognition is 
insufficient, according to Whitehouse. In reality, there are a variety of factors including ritual 
modes and external cognitive devices that determine the cognitive profile associated with 
religious activity. Indeed, I argue that many features of a culture’s religious corpus are far 
more cognitively demanding than is assumed by a cognitive optimality model.23  
 
The modes of religious transmission are also locally contingent (i.e. culturally specific). 
This means that the ethnographic and historical data necessary to interpret cultural practices 
can be relevant to a cognitive examination. These details matter since the rituals unique to a 
cultural milieu tell us how knowledge is managed and preserved. According to Whitehouse, 
researchers cannot make clear the mechanisms of transmission without the relevant 
ethnographic data, since cultures develop specific ritual modes relative to local conditions. 
An understanding of cognitive regularities is critical to understanding religious transmission. 
However, environmental constraints and structures are also pertinent to a comprehensive 
understanding of how the components of information management within religious traditions 
are organized. This thesis will endeavor to make this point clear: some predictions about the 
interface between minds and environments are plausible because the literature reflects the 
causal relationship between cognitive regularities and religiosity. However, I will also argue 
                                                
23 For example, since a culture’s mythic corpus maybe crucial to the foundation of its cosmogony and social 
structure, its faithful transmission from one generation to the next is essential. Within some oral cultures the 
fine-tuning of skills for memory and eloquence has therefore been a critical part of the transmission process. 
The doctrinal mode of ritual discussed in this chapter highlights the importance of regular rehearsal. For 
instance, complex theological knowledge may be preserved through the frequency of practice and the repetition 
of performance. 
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that there is a strong case for a stable connection between culturally evolved properties and 
these regularities.  
 
The SiM poorly conceives cultural variation as epiphenomenal. I argue, instead, that the 
ornaments of religious activity are constitutive of religious cognition. The connection 
properties that matter to the expression of religiosity are causally varied. In other words, any 
kind of cognitive description for religious activity – especially when it comes to oral 
traditions - should be responsive to the subtle features that constitute both the learning 
strategies that support intergenerational transmission and the means by which knowledge is 
organized.  
 
For the CSR, it is important to acknowledge cognitive methods that employ interpretive 
descriptions or participatory observational methods since the cognitive activities related to 
transmitting religious information is often niche specific. While SiM offers a valuable 
methodological platform in order to demonstrate some of the common trends associated with 
religious expression, this thesis will show that there are many limitations to this approach. 
Subsequently, externalist, ecological or embodied approaches to religion are in many ways 
critical responses to the cognitivist paradigm and SiM, since these models underscore both 
the costs of transmission, as well as the variables associated with the presence of external 
tools and strategies for managing religious information (see Geertz 2010a). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.1 Introduction. 
 
In this chapter I will look more closely some the ethnographic and historical material on 
oral traditions and memory. Recent research on Pacific oral traditions has focused on the 
context and performance of a myth (Finnegan 1992, 1995; Rubin 1996). However, practices 
for knowledge preservation have not been uniform across all Pacific cultures, and many oral 
traditions have developed a variety of tools and strategies that are regionally unique. For 
instance, anthropologist Ruth Finnegan (1992, 1995), whose area of ethnographic reporting 
has been on Pacific oral traditions, argues that the problem with scientific approaches to 
understanding memorization within oral traditions is that mnemonic techniques differ across 
cultures (Finnegan 1992:114-116). The memorization, and strategies that support oral 
transmission, are typically unique to a culture and region.  
 
Finnegan further argues that the means by which traditions are preserved and transmitted 
typically fall out side of the scope of any comparative generalization. However, I argue, that 
there are also marked similarities in the way in which information has been managed within 
some Pacific cultures through oral means. For instance, the use of landmarks and place 
names for epistemic and mnemonic purposes appears to be a common trend within some 
cultures (Harwood 1976; Campbell 2006; Kahn 1990; Rubin 1996). And while there are clear 
differences in the subtle methods of learning within different oral cultures, there are also 
noticeable parallels between the use geography and myth that further suggests some optimal 
relationship between macrospatial properties and memory (Rubin 1995). These similarities, 
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such as the use of spatial imagery within storytelling, may be suggestive of some cognitive 
pull towards memory systems being commensurate with spatial dynamics (Rubin 1995).  
 
This chapter will examine some of the literature on the use of mnemonic devices within 
oral cultures, but it will also look at how oral knowledge is managed. Orality and 
memorization has a significant part to play in the transmission of knowledge and I will look 
at how landmarks, used in conjunction with myths, can be viewed as cognitive orienting 
devices. The first part of this chapter will provide an overview of the research in the field of 
historical mnemotechnics. Authors in this area typically apply historical methods to an 
examination of mnemonic techniques used by orators for recollective purposes (Yates 1966; 
Carruthers 1990, 1998). Frances Yates in her book The Art of Memory (1966), for instance, 
looks at the use of mnemonic devices, such as the method of loci, and earlier on her book she 
discusses its common usage as an effective memory tool during the Classical period. In short, 
the method of loci requires that an adept be taught how to mentally construct the layout of a 
building or area (e.g. a street map) with different images located at certain points on the 
schema for cueing specific information. In order to memorize a topic for oratory, the 
individual only had to imagine walking to that particular location on the layout to cue an 
image associated with a knowledge source (e.g. an image may have a particular connection to 
a body of oral text that the orator was required to recite). The imagined layout of a courtyard, 
for example, can be arranged in such a way that specific locations activated memory 
resources (and more on this below). 
 
Later in this thesis I will claim that there are correlations between spatial memory 
strategies like these and the use of landmarks for the storage and retrieval of information (in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). This chapter will look closely at how spatial imagery has been 
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incorporated into mythic narratives for mnemonic purposes, and the way in which organized 
geographical concepts – such as sacred/historical locations – were organized as coordinated 
information management systems. I will claim here that the stability of information 
transmission depended greatly upon the way in which oral cultures were able to recruit 
physical features of the landscape for conceptual purposes. This has relevance later, since a 
significant proportion of my analysis on Māori oral tradition in later chapters will focus on 
the use of landmarks as cognitive cueing structures for organizing knowledge.  
 
2.2 Mnemotechnics: an overview. 
 
Before proceeding towards this examination of geography and memory, it will be 
necessary to provide some background into the study of mnemotechnics and its 
application. This particular field will have more bearing in later chapters on cognitive 
ecological models since mnemotechnics is predominantly a study of artificial memory, 
and mnemonic strategies will be the focus of my examination of Māori orality and 
memory. Yates’ book The Art of Memory (1966) provides one of the more 
comprehensive historical treatments of mnemotechnical research and has been a broader 
influence on the study of oral traditions and memory. Yates argues that the development 
of mnemonic strategies were critical for the transmission of rhetorical techniques and 
oratory during classical period of around 4th century BC to the Renaissance. She claims 
that during the classical period orators were required to memorise and recall large bodies 
of information while being flexible enough to respond to inquiry during public speeches.  
 
Yates argues that it is crucial to recognise, then, the historical development of 
mnemonic skills within cultures since verbatim memory – i.e. the exact recitation of an 
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oral text - would not have been effective enough for these purposes. Instead orators were 
expected to be flexible and inventive, while retaining knowledge on the subject matter. In 
addition, memory was of particular importance to rhetoric because skilled orators were 
expected to speak without the aid of cues or notes.  
 
Memoria, Yates claims, was not a verbatim method, but a skill that allowed flexibility 
as well as retention. Yates claims that a great deal of what is known about these rhetorical 
techniques comes from Marcus Cicero’s recording of these techniques in the Rhetorica 
Ad Herennium (from around 90 BC). Memory was a skill that had to be exercised, and 
there were a variety of techniques that were available to students of rhetoric that were 
used to strengthen mnemonic abilities. Yates’ claim is that the method of loci (see above) 
functioned as a mentally structured information storage and retrieval system. Importantly, 
memory cues on this ‘cognitive map’ are both spatial and visual, and the method of loci 
was designed to reinforce and strengthen natural memory. Hence, the techniques 
themselves were considered to be a form of artificial memory.  
 
In both of her books The Memory Book (1990) and The Craft of Thought (1998) 
Carruthers claims that Medieval monastic groups placed a great deal of emphasis on 
memorization and oratory, since the preservation of sacred knowledge assumed to be a 
pious activity. It was common to use architectural structures as layouts for cognitive 
mapping, with memorable images being placed as cues at various points Carruthers1990, 
1998). Carruthers looks specifically at liturgies within ritual spaces that combined 
movement and the display of iconographic imagery. The blending of space and ritual 
served a function for both the direction and flow of the liturgical procession and 
recollection of specific knowledge stores or narratives (Carruthers 1998:266-267). 
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Rituals usually included the locational tools for memory – i.e. a place of worship of 
(locus); the direction and sequence (ductus) - i.e. the map in which the practitioner 
moves; and visual imagery (imagines). Carruthers argues that monastics of the period 
utilized actual space, architecture and images as an artificial memory source in the same 
way that the method of loci was used a purely mental representational tool for mnemonic 
purposes. Subsequently, Carruthers makes strong correlations between both 
psychological and analogue systems for memory by focusing on the functional 
characteristics of space, image and memory.   
 
Cicero’s manuscript also points out the importance of visual mnemonic cues over other 
sensory stimuli (such as aural cues, for instance) within mnemonic strategies. Instead of 
remembering through verbatim alone, Cicero argues that people learn and retain information 
more accurately when verbal skills are matched with visual cues: 
“It has been sagaciously discerned by Simonides or else discovered by some 
other person, that the most complete pictures are formed in our minds of the 
things that have been conveyed to them and imprinted on them by the senses, 
but that the keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight, and that consequently 
our perceptions received by the ears or by reflexion can be most easily retained 
in the mind if they are also conveyed to our minds by the medium of the eyes, 
with the result that things not seen and not lying within the field of discernment 
are earmarked by a sort of outline and image and shape so that we keep hold as 
if it were by an act of sight things that we can scarcely embrace by an act of 
thought. But these forms and bodies, like all the things that come under our 
view require an abode, inasmuch as a material object without a locality is 
inconceivable” (1942: De Oratore, II. lxxxvii, 357-358). 
 
But the Ad Herennium is also concerned with the emotional impact of images as memory 
devices. So while the Ad Herennium endorses the ordering of images in space as important 
for memory, there is importance placed upon the ‘energy’ of the images also. Cicero observes 
that the supernaturalness or emotional impact of images has served as a mnemonic also:  
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‘When we see in everyday life things that are petty, ordinary, and banal, we 
generally fail to remember them, because the mind is not being stirred by 
anything novel or marvellous. But if we see or hear something base, 
dishonourable, extraordinary, great, unbelievable, or laughable, that we are 
likely to remember for a long time... Ordinary things easily slip from the 
memory while the striking and novel stay longer in the mind. A sunrise, the 
sun’s course, a sunset are marvellous to no one because they occur daily. But 
solar eclipses are a source of wonder because they occur more seldom, and 
indeed are more marvellous than lunar eclipses, because these are more 
frequent. Thus nature shows that she is not aroused by the common ordinary 
event, but is moved by a new or striking occurrence.’ (1954: Ad Herennium, 3. 
35-36) 
 
The ‘bizarreness’ of images has an activating resonance for memory: 
“We ought, then, to set up images of a kind that can adhere longest in the 
memory. And we shall do so if we establish likenesses as striking as possible; 
if we set up images that are not many or vague, but active; if we assign to them 
exceptional beauty or singular ugliness; if we ornament some of them, as with 
crowns or purple cloaks, so that the likeness may be more distinct to us; or if 
we somehow disfigure them, as by introducing one stained with blood or soiled 
with mud or smeared with red paint, so that its form is more striking, or by 
assigning certain comic effects to our images, for that, too, will ensure our 
remembering them more readily. The things we easily remember when they are 
real we likewise remember without difficulty when they are figments, if they 
have been carefully delineated” (1954: Ad Herennium, 3. 37) 
 
Yates (1966) also emphasizes the importance of imagery as a mnemonic strategy. Yates 
claims that effective artificial memory strategies were often nurtured through the use of loci 
strategies (spaces), in conjunction with striking imagines (images), with mythological or 
monstrous figures being used in text for their active qualities: 
“It is as a concession to human weakness, to the nature of the soul, which 
will take easily and remember images of gross and sensible things but which 
cannot remember ‘subtle and spiritual things’ without an image” (Yates 
1966:82). 
 
The impact of emotional images are not only significant for rhetoric, but for ritual and 
exegesis also. Carruthers (1990) points to the mnemonic value of images in Medieval 
Christian rituals. She says that there is a mistaken popular perception that religious imagery 
during this period was used solely for iconic worship. Instead, religious images, and the 
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structuring of space, performed a mnemonic function for monastic groups during ritual and 
for the retention of a sacred corpus (Carruthers 1990: 221-222). Carruthers states that visual 
literacy was functionally relevant for a monastic education as a means for strengthening 
memory (see Carruthers 1998:116-170):  
“The monastic practice of meditation notably involved making mental 
images or cognitive 'pictures' for thinking and composing... The emphasis upon 
the need for human beings to 'see' their thoughts in their minds as organized 
schemata of images, or 'pictures', and then to use these for further thinking, is a 
striking and continuous feature of medieval monastic rhetoric, with significant 
interest for our own contemporary understanding of the role of images in 
thinking. And the monks' 'mixed' use of verbal and visual media is a quality of 
medieval aesthetic practice that was also given a major impetus by the tools of 
monastic work" (Carruthers 1998:3).  
 
Carruthers (1990) and Evelyn Tribble (2005b, 2011) have explored the mnemotechnical 
strategies and tools employed within Christian traditions.24 Carruthers (1998) in her book The 
Craft of Thought makes comparative links between Christian and Buddhist groups and their 
orthopractical methods (Carruthers 1998:1-2). Monastic groups in both traditions, in 
particular, seek to cultivate – through the use of rituals, texts, and artifacts etc – sacred habits 
for experiencing knowledge. Carruthers states that an ‘orthodoxy’ is merely the learning and 
transmission of doctrine, whereas an orthopraxis “emphasizes a set of experiences and 
techniques, conceived as a ‘way’ to be followed, leading one to relive the founder’s path to 
enlightenment” (Carruthers 1998:1). Put simply, a monastic education resembles a craft 
                                                
24 A more recent approach to mnemotechnics has been applied to a study of Elizabethan theatre by researcher 
Evelyn Tribble (2005). Tribble has looked at how actors at the Globe were able to learn the many plays (in some 
cases upwards of 70 roles) required for performance within such a short space of time. Tribble does some 
historical detective work here by investigating the strategies employed for memorization by the players. She 
says that instead of the actors just learning their lines verbatim, mnemonic strategies were built into the plays 
and theatre for active recall. She discusses the rhyming structures of the plays themselves (the tempo and 
rhythm of the prose), the design of the theatre, as well as apprenticeship systems for learning. But she also 
points to a particular mystery during at the Globe theatre, in particular an explanation for the use of large folio 
sized pieces of paper called ‘plots’. These plots contained sparse information about the entrances, music cues, 
and casting etc. Tribble suggests that the plots were hung up behind the stage and “functioned as a two-
dimensional map of the play designed to be grafted onto the three-dimensional space of the stage by the actors. 
Since players did not have the full text, this document allowed them to see and to chart the play, particularly to 
understand the rhythm of the scenes.” (Tribble 2005:146; see also Sutton 2006). The tools for learning the plays 
quickly were active in the performance of the play itself.  
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(analogous to that of any guild), which depends upon apprentices learning a specialized set of 
skills (Carruthers 1998:2).  
 
This approach, Carruthers argues, differs somewhat from the more traditional 
psychological models that focus on the individual-experiential aspects of religious practices. 
Instead, she points out that a religious education is dependent upon being taught and guided 
within a structured learning environment. A craft is not nurtured in isolation, nor are the 
experiences of an adept a purely individual conception. Instead, an immersive religious 
education involves the structured interactions between teachers and peers.  
 
Carruthers argues that the deliberate use of mnemonic devices within monastic instruction 
were intended to assist the practitioner in their capacity to memorize a corpus of knowledge, 
and the next section will look at how a comparative mnemotechnical approach can be a used 
as a practical heuristic for examining other oral traditions. Some of the anthropological and 
historical literature on Melanesian and Pacific oral cultures has focused on the problem of 
memory and transmission by examining the tools and strategies used for organizing 
knowledge (Harwood 1976; Kahn 1990; Campbell 2006). These authors discuss the use of 
myth and landscape as mutually beneficial structures for information management and 
cultural memory.  
 
I will argue later that this approach to artificial memory is relevant to a study of Māori 
myth and oral culture (in Chapter 3), as traditional Māori storytelling commonly incorporated 
place names and landmarks into narratives for structural purposes (i.e. the organization of 
information) (Wilson 1990). However, I will focus here in this chapter on Frances Harwood’s 
(1976) mnemotechnical examination of the Trobriand people from the Milne Bay Province of 
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Papua New Guinea, and their common blending of geography and myth. Harwood claims in 
her paper that there are strong correlations between the Western mnemonic strategies – such 
as the method of loci - and the use of landmarks for organizing knowledge. Harwood 
suggests that while the Trobriand strategy for memorization differs to the method of loci, 
comparisons can be drawn between the use of spatial imagery for oratory, and epistemic 
organization.  
 
2.3 Spatial Imagery, Mnemotechnics and Storytelling. 
 
In her paper “Myth, Memory and Oral Tradition: Cicero in the Trobriand” (1976), 
Harwood attempts to describe the relationship between memory and the traditional oral 
practices associated with landmarks and myth. Harwood argues that connections can be made 
between the Western Classical methods of artificial memory, and the use of landmarks in 
Trobriand narratives. However, Harwood is interested in the connections between memory, 
myth and social institutions, particularly how social institutions are stabilized through the use 
of myth. Since myths establish a critical dialectic between actors and their social institutions, 
the stability of myths through mnemonic organization, according to Harwood, should be a 
considerable focus of research for anthropologists. For instance, Harwood argues that myths 
reinforce the epistemic legitimacy of social norms and customs. This is more apparent in the 
normative actions of religious ritual, whereby customs are meaningfully articulated through 
myth. However, Harwood argues that the preservation and transmission of myth within oral 
cultures would inevitably require some form of information management system. According 
to Harwood, the stability of a mythic corpus is a relevant problem without access to robust 
administrative systems for storage and retrieval. Preliterate societies like the Trobriands were 
without the means for outsourcing of informational resources through external symbolic 
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artifacts, and oral practices are naturally unstable by themselves since individual memory is 
fallible. Harwood argues that that this is where landmarks and place names are relevant as 
memory devices, since physical structures functioned as concrete markers on a conceptually 
organized landscape.  
 
Harwood first reviews Malinowski’s ethnographic material conducted on the Trobriand 
people, focusing primarily on Malinowski’s interpretation of myth as ‘social charters’. 
Malinowski argued that myths are functional in legitimizing social institutions since they 
reinforce norms, customs and a general epistemic framework. Through myth, social 
institutions are given an “aura of rightness” (Harwood 1976:785). For Harwood, 
Malinowski’s work remains valuable to the study of the oral traditions, not just for its 
ethnographic details, but also for Malinowski’s explication on the social function of myth. 
Instead of seeing the value in interpreting the meaning of myth, Malinowski was more 
interested in how myth “enhances and codifies belief”, while also vouching “for the efficacy 
of ritual” and the normative attitudes towards customs and morality (Malinowski 1948:101; 
from Harwood 1976:785): 
“For Malinowski the meaning of a myth is to be equated with its use; it is 
not what members of a culture say about a myth, but what they do with it 
which is important” (Harwood: 1976:785). 
 
 
Malinowski’s interest was in identifying the various institutions that constitute a cultural 
network. His analysis was an attempt to draw causal links between myth and social 
institutions. According to Malinowski, institutions like kinship, family, and political rank are 
concepts and experiences that are articulated through the use of myth (Harwood 1976:785). 
Myths act as meaningful conduits between these institutions and members of society.  
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However, Harwood claims that Malinowski’s theory is missing a crucial component. She 
argues that while a culture’s myths help to organize and demarcate social institutions, 
anthropologists often fail to describe how myths are stabilized within oral traditions. If myths 
support the stability of social institutions, then what mechanisms, she asks, are in place to 
ensure the stability of myth? Without access to text-based media, myths within oral traditions 
are prone to distortion and change over time. Individual memory and communication is 
fragile, and if the premise is relevant - that the stabilization of myth is causally connected 
social structures - researchers on oral cultures should examine the means by which 
knowledge is organized within preliterate societies: 
 “Malinowski’s fieldwork procedure consisted of drawing up a list of 
institutions such as gardening, fishing, and the kula trade. He was then faced 
with the problem of articulating the relations between these institutions, and 
solved the puzzle by introducing the theoretical framework of functionalism in 
which every institution is seen as being linked with and supportive of every 
other institution in a reverberating ring, such that a change in any one 
institution sets off a wave of repercussions affecting all other institutions. 
Malinowski, however, neglected to indicate the mechanisms by which the 
institutions are perceived, distinguished, and linked together in the minds of 
the Trobrianders themselves. It is at this point that the cognitive aspects of 
mythological charters come into play” (Harwood 1976:785; emphasis added). 
 
Harwood argues that oral cultures have developed various means by which to organize 
and preserve knowledge, and that the use of geography in the Trobriandic culture may be 
relevant to the stability of their mythic framework. The Trobriandic people interlaced many 
of their mythic narratives with geographical locations on the island and these points acted as 
important physical anchors for the memorization of myth and ancestral history. Geographical 
locations can be thought of, then, as markers for memory. Harwood goes so far as to say that 
within all non-literate cultures you will find the use of mnemonic strategies for supporting the 
transmission of myth, and in addition to these networks the Trobrianders utilized ‘structural 
devices’ within their myths for reinforcing memory (Harwood 1976:785). Harwood not only 
sees landmarks within Trobriand culture as memory markers, but the use of geographical 
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locations in narratives also served as a way of cognitively organizing these myths into 
‘thinkable units’ (Harwood 1976).  
 
According to Harwood, the management of information requires that a mythic corpus be 
arranged into discrete components in order to ensure the tractability of knowledge, and 
demarcation of social institutions. This has cognitive benefits because it facilitates the 
organization and outsourcing of memory to physical things in the world: 
“Given the premise that each mythical charter is tied to an institution and 
that it is myth itself which serves to demarcate the boundaries between one 
institution and anther, the puzzle arises as to the means by which myths are 
kept separate so as to prevent the boundaries of the myths from blurring, and to 
keep myths from running together and coalescing. The mechanisms must be 
found which divides a corpus of myth into separate thinkable units” (Harwood 
1976:786). 
 
Harwood says that the “axes of time and space” on the landscape functions as an 
organizational strategy to separate the boundaries of myth within a tradition (Harwood 
1976:786). For instance, mythic narratives can be associated with the historical (temporal 
qualities) significance of a location (the spatial property), thus further ensuring its epistemic 
legitimacy. However, as a consequence, spatial properties – such as geographical locations – 
provide a fixed relationship between myth and history. Places were tied to the historical 
relationships that were articulated through myth. Harwood observes, that within Trobriand 
culture myths were commonly bound to actual things in the world – such as places – and 
these places were also a means to establish connections with a history. Thus, space and time 
were seen as connected. 
 
By using Malinowski’s initial field research Harwood points out that the conceptual 
integration of mythic narratives and history are closely associated with the landscape within 
the region. The people of the Trobriands assign knowledge stores to specific locations on the 
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landscape for retrieval through the use of narrative. This, Harwood argues, further ensures the 
organization of the corpus into manageable units: 
“Linking myths to particular localities would appear to be one means of 
dividing a corpus of myth into cognitively distinct segments. This mnemonic 
of location ties each portion of the corpus to a separate node on a geographical 
grid. Thus modifications or elaborations of one mythical charter tend to be 
prevented from setting up repercussions on other mythical charters and their 
linked social institutions” (Harwood 1976:788). 
 
Attaching mythic narratives to significant geographical locations serves both a mnemonic 
purpose – for organizing knowledge – and an epistemic purpose a functioning a frame-of-
reference within a larger cosmological system. First, within the Trobriand culture, mythic 
narratives are ranked in order of “logical precedence” (Harwood 1976:787). This structure 
follows a type of creation myth all the way down to role real-world activities and properties. 
For example, a particular animal may be associated with a supernatural genealogy that 
explains its creation and purpose in the natural realm. An animal may have a purpose in the 
world that can be explained through a particular myth. Consequently, the gods are typically 
associated with the creation of a real-world thing, organic material or process (e.g. an animal, 
a type of food or custom). So while a society’s cosmological system can be organized into 
discrete and separate units, myths create the foundation for integrating each section of the 
hierarchy: 
“(a) first emergence and the origin of man; (b) loss of immortality, the cycle 
of death and rebirth, the origin of witchcraft; (c) the origin of agriculture and 
the Kula trade, various types of magic, etc” (Harwood: 1976:787). 
 
 
Harwood argues that this mythical organizational structure, coupled with oral storytelling, 
provides a mnemonic support for remembering valuable informational resources. Social 
institutions are given their legitimating strength through myth. However, Harwood states that 
each myth associated with a particular event in the Trobriand cosmogony is also tied to a 
specific geographical location in order to ensure the stability of transmission. Each story may 
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follow the route of an ancestor to specific points on a map, and further retell the deeds 
performed at these significant locations. From this Harwood contends that it is “possible to 
construct a mythical geography of the Trobriands” from their storytelling (Harwood 
1976:787).  
 
 
Harwood describes locations as ‘structural markers’ for ensuring that the corpus of myth is 
“separated into separate cognitive units” so as to serve as a “mnemonic for recall” (Harwood 
1976:791). In addition, locations organize “the totality of a Trobriand mythology along a 
temporal axis of logical precedence which is coextensive with the spatial axis of the sequence 
of locations” (Harwood 1976:791). Stories are attached to actual places. Therefore a 
storyteller need only follow a particular sequence of locations in order to cue a narrative (and 
as an analogy, Harwood states that Trobriand myths being attached to geographic locations 
are comparable to the Christian use of mnemonics - e.g. such as rosary beads and the Stations 
of the Cross - whereby ritual action and artifacts support theological memory [Harwood 
1976:787)]).  
 
Understanding the preservation and organization of myth is key to Harwood’s research. 
As stated, for oral traditions there is always the risk of myths being distorted through 
intergenerational transmission. According to Harwood, the landscape provides a reliable and 
concrete platform upon which myths can be organized into areas (or units). Harwood 
recognizes that the cognitive organization of mythical narratives requires that an oral culture 
organize their stories into their own divisions as separate locations on a map. Since the myths 
can be traced to a specific location on the island, the “spatial bracketing” acts as cognitive 
device for locating that myth within the larger corpus of mythic narratives (Harwood 
1976:789): 
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“Myth, I maintain, has built-in stabilizing mechanisms which prevent 
dramatic upheavals at least in the majority of instances. One mechanism, that 
of bracketing a myth and its associated social practices by tying it to a specific 
location, serves to insulate a myth form the rest of the corpus. Changes rung on 
the structural possibilities of any one myth are constrained from having a 
domino effect upon other myths, but they allow for a more gentle osmosis in 
which the mythical corpus and its associated social correlates move toward 
coherence through a long term process of accommodation” (1976:790). 
 
 
Harwood concludes her examination by underscoring correlations between the structure 
and organization of myths within the Trobriands and Classical mnemonic techniques. 
According to Harwood, parallels can be drawn between Trobriandic organization of 
knowledge on the landscape, and the method of loci mnemonic discussed above (by Yates 
[1966] and Cicero [1954]). Since spatial location and imagery is a notable feature of 
storytelling amongst the Trobriands, Harwood concludes that geographical locations can be 
viewed as serving a similar function to macrospatial mnemonic strategies like the method of 
loci (for coordinating the storage and retrieval of information on an imagined landscape): 
“The Greek mnemonic of location may be a residual form of an aide 
mimoire which serves to structure the myths and legends of non-literate 
societies in all parts of the globe. Furthermore, I contend that the mnemonic 
device not only serves as a remembrance of things past, but is also a source of 
living tradition which informs, modifies, and is modified by systems of 
ongoing social relations. That is to say, location as a structural marker has both 
cognitive and instrumental functions.” (Harwood 1976:783) 
 
 
Harwood is interested in the use and efficacy of artificial memory within oral cultures, in 
general. She argues that there are common underlying features with early Western artificial 
memory techniques and Trobriand oral tradition. This is not to say, however, that there is 
some direct relationship between the techniques used by the Classical mnemonists and the 
Trobrianders, only that the similarities seem to point to cognitive predisposition for utilizing 
spatially organized properties as artificial memory devices.  
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Similarly to Harwood, Miriam Kahn (1990) has observed from her fieldwork with the 
Wamira people in Papua New Guinea, that the locals utilize the landscape to express 
historical relationships and memory with mythical narratives. For instance, Kahn argues that 
there are strong epistemic differences between the Western and traditional Melanesian 
concepts of time and space. Instead of time being transcendent of place, the Wamira people 
consider landmarks and geography to be representative of their temporal world. In other 
words, land is not only associated with place, it expresses something temporal to the 
Waimieran people also: 
“In Melanesian societies, mythological events are often articulated with 
places in the landscape. Various aspects of a people’s past are perceived, 
recorded, and experienced spatially in terms of geographical features” (Kahn 
1990:51). 
 
In addition, Kahn argues that aside from the epistemic nature of landmarks they also 
function as a means for recording the past. For the Waimierans, a way of relating to the past 
is to view the passage of time as physical markers on a map. Temporality is, therefore, linked 
indelibly to space and place. Specific events are remembered and subsequently ‘anchored’ to 
places on the landscape. Instead of considering time in relation to particular events (like 
Western contemporary conception of history), Melanesians comprehend time as spatial 
relations (Kahn 1990:52): 
“The past is often anchored to recognized, tangible, and named forms in the 
landscape. In rendering geography sacred, people are able to reap the harvest 
of the historical relationship in their contemporary lives. Geographical features 
are instrumental as sources of living tradition that inform, modify, and are 
modified by ongoing relations. Moreover, such physical markers of the past 
may serve as mnemonic devices for individuals and groups, thus helping to 
establish their identity” (Kahn 1990:52). 
 
While Harwood looks at mainly geographical locations, Kahn’s paper focuses on the use 
of stones as epistemic markers. Kahn notes that a large proportion of the Waimieran mythic 
corpus is recorded and cued through the use of stone markers on the landscape. Stones play 
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an important role in denoting areas of significance as well as being mnemonic cues whereby 
spatial relations overlap with mythical knowledge about the region: 
“Of the places I visited on the northeast coast, Boianai is the village with the 
most fascinating stone memorials to its past. One cannot walk more than a few 
paces without encountering an important stone or group of stones… In 
Waimera, some 30 kilometers further east along the coast, mythologically 
significant stones, while slightly less numerous than in Boianai, are viewed in 
equally important light. As in Boianai, these stones anchor mythological 
narratives to the land. Some serve the additional purpose of being charters for 
proper social behavior. For example, in one myth two women, named 
Maradiudiva and Marakwadiveta, turned into stones; the stones presence today 
reminds Waimierans about the proper etiquette for sharing food” (Kahn 
1990:55). 
 
Kahn states that stones are anchored to areas where ancestral figures were believed to have 
traveled, and these stones were subsequently named for the sacred status. Myths encompass a 
history as well as an identity for the Waimieran people (Kahn 1990:59), and Kahn states that 
myths are structured in conjunction with the routes traveled by mythological figures (or 
ancestors). Myths are retold with the characters in the narrative moving from one area on the 
landscape to the next. Like Harwood’s case study, the landscape serves a unique function in 
supporting in organizing knowledge.  
 
Similarly, in Matthew Campbell’s (2006) paper “Memory and Monumentality in the 
Rarotongan Landscape”, Campbell provides an archaeological examination of an existing 
road in Raratonga called the Ara Metua that circles the island, which used to be a link to the 
various marae systems plotted around the island. The maraes, it is said, were originally linked 
to the original road and built by the ancestor Tangi’ia Nui who left the areas to guardians that 
eventually became ancestors of the chiefly class.  
 
The Ara Metua can be seen today within its modern context with chunks of the pre-contact 
circuit having been almost destroyed or replaced by the current roading system. Campbell 
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says that in its day the road would have been an economic lifeline for the various maraes, 
traveling and trade. Various stories describe Tangi’ia who traveled the circuit bestowing titles 
to the leaders of each marae, subsequently the road acted as an ancestral connection to the 
social structure of each marae.  
 
In addition, Campbell states also that the route acted as a mnemonic system for 
remembering the stories associated with Tangi’ia: 
“The inscription of a cosmological principle on the landscape through the 
physical construction of the road and its associated marae allowed Rarotongans 
to control it. The road represents the controlling powers of the universe, and 
allowed the Rarotongan elite in turn to direct and control those powers. A ritual 
procession along the road replicates the route of Tangi'ia, so it is also an act of 
remembrance, akin to the performance of oral tradition. The link with Tangi'ia 
is genealogical, he was the founding ancestor, and first gave the ancestors of 
the mata'iapo and priests their titles. The road and the memory it embodies can 
be strategically employed to reinforce the socio-political system” (Campbell 
2006:107). 
 
 
Though it is important to emphasize the mnemonic aspects of orally transmitted 
genealogical maps, Campbell states that the purpose of the road is to validate a historical 
sense of identity amongst Rarotongans. Genealogy connects people to their history and place 
(Campbell 2006:109-110). Subsequently, making claims to areas of land depends upon a 
person’s status or family connection and this is further is legitimated through genealogy: 
“Genealogy legitimizes status relationships between people, and 
consequently legitimizes relationships between people and resources, in the 
case of the Land Courts to land, but also social resources. The explicatory and 
mnemonic aspects of genealogy are of interest to us here, but these are 
peripheral to its primary function” (Campbell 2006:109).  
 
Campbell also looks at concepts of time and space within Rarotongan culture and the 
relationship between a cosmology and the landscape. Broadly the paper investigates how 
Pacific societies may have understood conceptions of the past through the landscape and how 
“these memories could be conditioned by strategic actions in the present” (Campbell 
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2006:102). From an archaeological point of view Campbell says that the construction of 
monuments for representing the past is an interactive property that shapes meaning in the 
present.  
 
2.4 Macrospatial Knowledge, Orality and Cognition. 
 
The research discussed here looks at some of the methods used for organizing knowledge 
with oral cultures, by focusing on the mnemonic techniques associated with myth. The 
fidelity of cultural transmission within oral cultures is a just one focus of this thesis, and so it 
will be necessary to underscore the means by which orally taught knowledge is preserved and 
passed on. The cultural practices surrounding oral transmission may be better described 
through the anthropological and historical literature, but the goal of this thesis is to see if 
these descriptions can be is framed within a cognitive model. As an example, David C. 
Rubin’s book Memory and Oral Traditions (1995) examines how the structural elements 
within oral storytelling are formulated to make them salient to memory systems. Rubin looks 
at three aspects of this formulaic structure within oral storytelling: thematic, imagistic and 
rhythmic strategies, and there are noticeable correlations between the experimental evidence 
for narrative mnemonics and the characteristics associated imagery and location. Firstly, 
Rubin argues that imagery is an analogue system that is quite distinct from language abilities 
because it recruits our visual sensory modalities for representational purposes (Rubin 
1995:41-46). He observes that there is strong relationship between imagery representational 
abilities and visual perception. The mental recollection of spatial imagery, for instance, 
recruits our visual systems for structuring representations.  
 
  
  103 
But Rubin presents compelling experimental evidence demonstrating the optimal 
connections between spatial imagery and working memory (Rubin 1995:46-48; see Paivio 
1969, 1971; Bower 1970; Rubin 1978). For example, in experiments performed with the 
method of loci technique, Rubin points out that the use of mental imagery paired with 
locational cues yielded convincing results as a mnemonic strategy. Noticeably, imagery and 
macrospatial methods appeared to be better than verbal recall or verbatim. He states that the 
use of ‘paths’ – that is, the mental recollection of traveling to locations within a space – for 
recollective purposes was easier to coordinate than lists, and our memory systems are well 
suited for tracking spatial information when prompted. While language is better at 
maintaining the order of more rigid sequences in a verbal composition, spatial imagery is 
more salient to our memory systems and easier to recall (Rubin 1995:49-50; see Paivio 1971, 
1975): 
“The method of loci involves instructions (1) to form integrated images in 
which the items to be remembered interact with their loci an (2) to use, or 
transform the material to be learned into, easily imaginable items. Both of 
these factors have been shown to aid memory in controlled laboratory research. 
First, the instructions to produce an image in which the items to be learned are 
interacting produces superior memory than instructions either to produce an 
image in which the items are separate or to use various verbal methods such as 
repetition and association… Second, when no instructions are given to college 
undergraduates, it is routinely found that words that are easiest to image are 
easiest to recall” (Rubin 1995:47).  
 
He says that the use of pathways – like in the method of loci – is also effective in 
supporting narrative sequences. Subjects were noticeably better at their representational 
capacity to recall the spatial qualities of maps and routes, than linguistic cues. Rubin argues 
that this could be why stories within oral cultures make use of spatial imagery and 
movement. Characters usually move from one scene (or location) to another where a 
particular activity or section of the story is recounted. The location of a story can initiate the 
recollection of a story’s details, while implicitly facilitating the structural components of a 
narrative. 
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Spatial information such as location and movement seems to be an important aspect of 
storytelling and memory according to Rubin (1995:51). He cites evidence for spatial 
cognition and the reading of text performed in experiments by subjects who were asked to 
remember the relative locations of places mentioned (Johnson-Laird 1983; Perrig and Kintsch 
1985; Taylor and Tversky 1992; citations from Rubin 1995:51-52). In the experiments, 
subjects were read a narrative describing either a bird’s eye view of a spatial area, or the 
description of a traveled route. The data suggests that subjects were able to mentally 
represent spatial maps and make relatively precise inferences about certain locations based on 
what was read to them. Rubin concludes that spatial cognition must be imagery based, or at 
the very least we are highly adept at understanding spatial imagery through narrative: 
“It is likely, given the importance of spatial information in oral traditions, 
that audiences and singers also construct relatively stable spatial models of the 
world described in a genre or piece and use them to understand and remember” 
(Rubin 1995:52). 
 
Rubin argues that oral traditions are often unable to successfully transmit abstract concepts 
without the use of concrete imagery as a mental anchor for memory. Without the use of text, 
it is argued that abstract or heavy theoretical concepts pose significant demands on memory 
and are therefore typically absent from orally transmitted myths (see also Havelock 1963, 
1978 – citation from Rubin 1995:60). Thus, stories use archetypal mythical characters (e.g. 
heroes and monsters) as concrete representations for abstract concepts: 
“… Heroes and gods often symbolize or take the place of a particular group 
of people that would be difficult to image otherwise… Characters, or character 
types, in oral traditions often serve a mnemonic rile similar to that of the Greek 
heroes and gods. Each character has an expected image and an expected role to 
play that exemplifies some more abstract, not easily imageable concept” 
(Rubin 1995:61). 
 
The goal of an orally transmitted education was to successfully exploit memory biases by 
cloaking hard-to-learn concepts in easily memorable forms. By utilizing both spatial relations 
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and affective imagery, oral traditions were able to better store and transmit bodies of 
knowledge with the minimal use of external memory aids. The use of space and location in 
oral storytelling as way of cueing sections of a narrative appears to be a common feature in 
most oral epics (Rubin 1995).  
 
Pathways as sequences within a story bring order to a narrative, while salient imagery 
helps to ensure the comprehensibility of conceptually rich ideas. Rubin’s research suggests 
that there are recurrent trends within oral cultures, which may additionally point to a 
cognitive bias towards thematic structures within oral myths. In particular, Rubin states that 
there are correlations between the ‘method of loci’ systems for artificial memory and other 
forms of mnemonic devices used within oral storytelling. Spatial imagery and verbal recall 
appears to be a noticeable trend within the studies done on memory. As stated above, 
geographic landmarks are used as representational devices for cuing memory and this 
suggests that there is a robust causal connection between spatial imagery and memory.  
 
The claim by Rubin that there are strategic resemblances between the Classical method of 
loci system and other formulaic structures in oral storytelling should not lead us to a 
comparative analysis suggestive of any historical connection between divergent cultures. 
However, we may be able to infer some optimal relationship between minds and the 
innovative development of narrative. In the above case studies from Melanesia and Polynesia 
the authors specifically discussed the use of spatial imagery in conjunction with myth in for 
supporting oral methods of knowledge transmission. I argue that this suggests two important 
recurrent features within oral cultures: (a) that the problem of memory and information 
management within preliterate societies was socially and technologically constrained; and (b) 
the common characteristics associated mnemonic devices cross-culturally may be indicative 
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of a feedback relationship between the modalities associated with optimal working memory, 
and the technological development of narrative structure. Granted, one could make the 
broader conclusion that by underscoring certain structural commonalities we could make 
some subtle nod in the direction of universalism. I argue that these commonalities motivate a 
cognitive examination, however the locally contingent variables that ensure recognizable 
divergence should not be treated as marginal. Optimality and informational fidelity is still 
effectively the product of resource contingencies, and the informational character of any 
niche environment cannot be uniformly characterized. The resources utilized for information 
transmission – whether they are social or technological – are often the historically entrenched 
consequences emerging from a variety of conditional determinants (e.g. including 
demography, ecological factors, economic activity, technological innovation etc). In short, 
niche diversity is still relevant to a cognitive examination of the tools and strategies 
employed in oral cultures for transmission fidelity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1 Introduction.  
 
By focusing primarily on traditional Māori methods of orality this chapter will examine 
how physical properties and learning strategies have been critical for oral memory and 
communication. I will provide a general overview of the data related to Māori oral tradition 
and epistemology, and in chapters 4 and 5 this descriptive material will be the evaluative 
focus for my discussion on cognitive ecological models. The comparative literature on the 
history of Māori oral tradition, below, describes how traditional cultural norms informed the 
attitudes towards knowledge sharing, and the mediums by which information is disseminated. 
First, this chapter focuses on Māori epistemology and the supportive learning methods for the 
oral transmission of knowledge. It will provide an overview of the functional role that 
whakapapa (genealogy) and whenua (place) have played in the management and preservation 
of informational resources. The psychological function of Whakapapa and ‘place names’ are 
seen here as learned mental schema – or cognitive maps – for organizing and transmitting 
knowledge. In the second portion of this chapter, however, I will look at how this concept of 
cognitive mapping is relevant to the conceptual organization of the landscape as a means for 
organizing knowledge.  
 
3.2 Text and Talk: Māori epistemology and oral tradition. 
 
In his article “Some Māori Attitudes to Documents”, Michael King (1978) discusses some 
of the cultural differences between Māori and Pakeha regarding their attitudes to recording 
knowledge through text. King states that there has been tendency in the West to 
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overemphasize written and textual methods as the most effective method for preserving 
information, while overlooking the cultural norms associated with orally transmitted 
knowledge in other cultures. Textual methods for transmission has enabled the deregulation 
of knowledge, leading to the wider reading of previously guarded informational resources. 
King states that this mode of transmission ran counter to the tikanga (customs) within Māori 
oral tradition. Standards of conduct were instilled so that tapu knowledge could be preserved 
and passed on faithfully, and the problem with text is that knowledge would be more 
accessible, thus diluting its sacredness. 
 
Due to the cultural conventions surrounding the oral transmission of knowledge, King 
argues that Māori viewed memory skills as a particularly valuable skill. As a result, there was 
a great deal of importance placed upon the means by which sacred knowledge was passed.  
But unlike text, King points out orally transmitted knowledge requires mnemonic support for 
preservation: 
“Traditional Māori learning did employ memory aids: there were rakau 
papatupuna, for example, notched sticks to assist in the recitation of 
genealogies; there were instructions that could be made on knotted cords; there 
were boundary markers; and, sometimes, there was the preservation of 
personal or family tattoo patterns in carving and rafter patterns… But, by and 
large, the great body of personal tribal information that people needed to know 
to establish and retain their identity, and to help them survive physically, and to 
be committed to memory” (King 1978:11). 
 
Oral methods for learning meant that there was closer attention placed upon the accuracy 
of transmission. The reliability of transmission required learning methods that often 
emphasized repetition and strategies for memorization. Strict codes of conduct for retention 
was achieved through cultural norms connected to the observance of tapu (sacredness), as 
well as mana (prestige), and mauri (aura or life force) (King 1978:11-12). Sacred knowledge 
was (and is), therefore, a feature of Māori ritual of oral transmission guided by specific social 
conventions. Mana, however, is accorded to those who possess status and were charged with 
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the duty of protecting knowledge. Communicators of sacred knowledge accordingly held a 
special status within the tribe.  
 
King states that traditional Māori epistemology considers knowledge as a ‘thing’, with its 
own life force, or ‘mauri’. As a result, certain individuals acted as the keepers of tapu 
knowledge. Subsequently, there was a strict code of conduct associated with the passing on 
of knowledge. According to King interpretation was never left to the reader, but monitored 
through the method of transmission (i.e. from teacher to student). King states, then, that any 
attempts to put tapu knowledge into a text format would have been seen as a profane. The 
regulation of knowledge ensured that it was passed down accurately, but it also meant that it 
could be safeguarded.  
 
Similarly to King, historian and anthropologist Anne Salmond (1982) argues that 
epistemic values informed the way in which knowledge was perceived, while further shaping 
the attitudes towards sharing knowledge within Māori oral tradition. Salmond (1982) 
examines the epistemological metaphors within traditional Māori culture by looking at the 
differences between English and Māori conceptions of knowledge. Salmond states that 
English metaphors of knowledge seem to imply an inexhaustible and mutable resource that is 
open and always changing (Salmond 1982:82). However, Salmond says that Māori 
epistemology framed knowledge as a tangible commodity. Subsequently, due to the 
perception by Māori that knowledge was an exhaustible resource, the frivolous sharing of 
these resources could result in the weakened power of the individuals who possessed it: 
“The Māori metaphors of knowledge… draw upon notions of oranga 
(necessity for life) and taonga (cultural wealth), and here knowledge is 
depicted as above all exhaustible and destructible, a scarce resource, conserved 
within the group, guarded by chosen individuals and never to be squandered” 
(Salmond 1982:82). 
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This conception of knowledge as a tangible object is closely tied to the myth of Tāne and 
his quest for the three baskets (kete) of knowledge. In the story of the baskets of knowledge, 
Tāne ascended to the heavens and brought back with him three baskets of wisdom to be given 
to man: 
"Tāne was again purea at the ahurewa of the house Rangiatea at the time 
when the wananga and sacred stones were produced. Here are the names of the 
wānanga and of the treasured stones: (1) The kete tuauri; (2) the kete tuatea; 
(3) the kete aronui. These are the baskets [receptacles] of the wānanga given to 
Tāne-wananga. 
"The kete tuauri is the basket of ritual chants pertaining to the conduct of all 
matters connected with Rangi-nui and Papa-tuanuka, as also of the control of 
all things desired to be performed by the offspring of Papa-tuanuku. 
"The kete tuatea is the basket of evil, of all things evil, no matter what it be. 
All evil things are found in this basket, all things practised by the offspring, or 
by Rangi-nui, or by Papa-tuanuku, by the sun, by the moon, by the stars, by the 
wind, by the rain, by water, by trees, by stones, by all things. That is the basket 
exposing their evil acts, dissensions, strife among men and gods, all are found 
there. 
"The kete aronui is the basket of love, sympathy, compassion, of peace-
making, of the condition known as permanent peace, and of all actions 
pertaining to the knowledge of arts by means of which are benefited men, land, 
trees, water, earth, herbage, food-supplies, animals, birds, fish, insects, and all 
other things seen by man” (Best 1924: 103). 
 
The story here underpins the Māori conception of knowledge as being fixed and bounded. 
There is a clear epistemic divergence from modern conceptions of knowledge here. Within 
Māori cosmology, knowledge is viewed as something that is tangible and immutable, while 
the modern Western conception knowledge is conceived as an intangible body of data that is 
open and given to change. 
 
This conception of knowledge as having an autonomous reality is relatable to King’s 
observation that the indiscriminate sharing of knowledge further deteriorates its sacred 
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power. According to Salmond (1982), this is why importance was placed upon the correct 
management and recitation of knowledge (Salmond 1982:84): 
“Once knowledge (including valued technologies) comes into a man’s 
possession however, from elders, ancestors and gods, the task is to pass it 
down to succeeding generations, and to keep its sacred power intact by 
ensuring that the conditions of transmission are tika or correct” (Salmond 
1982:83). 
 
King and Salmond have cornered a key issue that will be important to this thesis in 
coming chapters: that cultural conventions shape both the epistemic framework of a culture 
and the means by which knowledge is transmitted. Religious norms and conventions play a 
significant role in the way in which individuals treat knowledge and the way in which it is 
passed on. But King’s article also explicates on the importance of memory and the 
preservation of knowledge resources, and in the next section I will look at how cultural 
conventions inform the cognitive aspects of transmission and the way in which mnemonic 
strategies support Māori oral tradition. Against this background on the epistemic values 
surrounding knowledge sharing, the next section will look at how knowledge is organized 
and managed with traditional Māori oral tradition. I look at how the mapping and 
organization of Whakapapa (genealogy) has played a role in the management of information 
relevant to both tribal/kinship structure and the memorization of a mythic corpus. The 
discussion on orally taught mnemonic strategies in the next section will be more relevant to 
later sections on the mnemonic value of landmarks and place names.  
 
3.3 Whakapapa as a Cognitive Map. 
 
The sacred conventions associated with Māori oral tradition reflect this need to preserve 
knowledge and this is further bolstered through the accuracy of retention. Achieving high 
fidelity information transmission through oral means alone has its own problems, and one of 
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the major constraints to the preservation of knowledge within oral traditions is individual 
memory. Without the modern use of administrative tools, such as text, the faithful 
transmission of knowledge requires the use of mnemonic tools and strategies for 
preservation. Because pedagogical techniques within Māori culture were traditionally bound 
by oral customs, it has been suggested that Māori used mnemonic techniques that better 
enabled preservation and transmission (Best 1921; Haami 2004).  
 
One of the methods by which an oral history was preserved within Polynesian cultures 
was through the structuring of myths and genealogical records. Authors on traditional Māori 
culture have claimed that a whakapapa (or genealogy) functioned as an information storage 
device for maintaining and tracking a people’s history and cosmology. Since Māori political 
structures were based on kinship, managing information was closely connected to genealogy 
and was critical to the functioning of the social structure. However, these complex ‘family 
trees’ that tracked descent lines (often from the atua [gods]), also contained valuable 
historical, social and ecological information connected to a larger mythic corpus.  
 
For instance, Bradford Haami (2004) states that whakapapa acted like an extensive list that 
communicated crucial data about the local ecology, familial and political relationships as well 
as associations to land and territory: 
“Whakapapa (genealogy) was essential to the preservation and recitation of 
oral history. Whakapapa remains the ‘skeletal framework’ which validates 
traditional history. Genealogy formed the basis for the order of life and acted 
as a marker in tabulating the chronology of human history, and that of the 
universe… The creation of the universe, the formation of the earth and its 
elements, the emergence of biodiversity, the source of knowledge, the creation 
of humans, the arrival of people in Aotearoa, and their subsequent travels, were 
all remembered through genealogies” (Haami 2004:15). 
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Essentially, whakapapa functioned as an information storage device, and as a virtual 
reference library for transmitting an oral history. As an informational resource the structure 
of a whakapapa provides a multivalent function: it primarily communicates familial 
knowledge, but it also acts as a kind of epistemic charter for organizing information and 
legitimizing socio-political institutions. Because social structures were founded upon myths, 
and a specific cosmological understanding of the world, whakapapa validated tribal identity 
and customs associated with familial rank.  
 
The diagram below in Fig 2 is a visual representation of a genealogical chart showing the 
whakapapa from Tamatea-Ariki-nui: 
 
 
Fig. 2: “A Black and White Diagram Showing the Whakapapa from Paikea and Tamatea-Ariki-Nui to Tuta 
Nihoniho, Materoa, Rapata Wahawaha, Wiremu Potae and Sir Apirana Ngata” from ‘Takitimu’ (Mitira 1972). 
Digital Image taken from the New Zealand Electronic Text Centre (NZETC), September 2012 
(http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/MitTaki-fig-MitTakiPxiia.html). 
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Due to the value of whakapapa, Haami states: “Great effort was taken to ensure that 
whakapapa were memorized correctly” (Haami 2004:16). Similarly, in “Mind Maps of the 
Māori” (Roberts 2012), Mere Roberts offers some insight into the methods used within oral 
traditions for memorization. Roberts (2012) focuses particularly on the use of whakapapa as a 
cognitive support for memory and oral transmission. She states that within Polynesian 
cultures the more conventional template upon which the universe is organized is with the use 
of genealogical maps, like whakapapa.. Roberts (2012) suggests that myth and utilitarian 
knowledge go hand-in-hand and like all preliterate societies Māori had to devise ingenious 
methods for preserving valuable information about their ecology, economy and geography.  
 
Whakapapa is commonly known as a map for tracing familial descent within Polynesian 
culture. By definition, familial relationships are ‘layered’ on top of one another, and the 
recitation of a person’s whakapapa required the memorization of how these descent lines 
were ordered: 
“[By] using genealogy as a cognitive template the origins and history of all 
things can be spatially arranged in hierarchical order, a format which facilitates 
memorizing and retrieval… Known as whakapapa, literally meaning ‘to place 
in layers’, this framework is most commonly used to record human descent 
lines and relationships in which the lineages connect each papa or layer (a 
metaphorical reference to each generation of a family). While detailed 
cosmogonical accounts were regarded as esoteric knowledge and restricted to a 
select few, all other whakapapa of things of this world were common and 
essential ‘everyday’ knowledge” (Roberts 2012:2-3) 
 
First, Roberts first discusses the navigational skills that were important to Polynesian and 
Micronesian voyaging. All cartographic skills were memorized by oral means and 
experience. Without the use physical maps navigators had to rely on star guides that were 
committed solely to memory (see Turnbull 1991).  
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However, Roberts claims that this ability to memorize and recall real world knowledge 
(such as navigation) was aided through the recitation of mythic narratives also (Roberts 
2012). For instance, the supernatural world, and the natural history of a particular region were 
typically integrated into myths in order to epistemic frame of reference. Stories often 
conveyed strategic information about the environment. She states that while whakapapa acted 
as a template for recalling myths and familial relationships, it also extended into the natural 
world and Māori would have used whakapapa as a record of information about their ecology.  
 
Second, Roberts (2012) sees the whakapapa template as an epistemic framework whereby 
knowledge is organized into a workable structure. Put simply, whakapapa acts as library 
system for organizing the natural world and distinguishing ecological properties, such as 
species and fauna. The memorization of a whakapapa structure provides more than a 
genealogical library. Indeed, Roberts says that: “whakapapa act as cognitive maps, 
delineating spatial and temporal discontinuities within a particular environment” (Roberts 
2012:743-744). Whakapapa organized the environment into an accessible library that 
conveyed information about how animals, resources and geography interrelate.  
 
For example, Roberts uses the kumara (sweet potato) as an example of how cosmogony, 
myth and the natural world are intertwined within Māori oral tradition. She argues that the 
whakapapa structure coincides with narratives to support the memorization of information on 
the kumara and its ecology (Roberts 2012: 744-746; see also Roberts et al 2004). Roberts 
provides an abbreviated version of the mythical narrative associated with the kumara here: 
 
“It tells of how a folk-hero, Rongo-maui, climbs to the heavens to obtain 
some of the kumara tubers from his older brother Whanui (a star known also as 
Vega), who is guardian of the celestial kumara. On being refused, Rongo-maui 
decided to steal some of the tubers thereby accounting for the origin of theft in 
this world. After returning to earth with the precious tubers in his scrotum, he 
  
  116 
impregnated his wife Panitinaku (tinaku = to germinate, sprout, conceive) who 
then gave birth to their earthly descendents in the waters of Wai o Mona-Ariki. 
(This underwater birth of the kumara is often re-enacted today in the practice 
of placing stored tubers in water to stimulate sprouting of shoots prior to 
planting). After cooking the kumara to remove its tapu (sacredness) they were 
eaten and enjoyed by her nephews the Maui brothers, who then enquired as to 
their provenance. Pani’s silence persuaded one of the nephews to secretly 
follow her and upon observing their birth he informed his brothers they were 
being fed on the impurities of Pani, which caused them to depart to far-off 
lands. In shame at being observed, Pani fled to the underworld with her 
daughter Hine-mata-iti, who became the ancestor to the kiore (Rattus exulans 
or Pacific rat) a nocturnal animal which inhabits dark places. In the meantime 
Whānui looked down and on seeing men cultivating his stolen kumara, decided 
to seek revenge. So he sought the help of Nuhe, Toronū, and Moka. Each 
summer the physical manifestations of these celestial beings descend from the 
heavens as caterpillars (one species is known to scientists as Agrius 
convolvuli) to attack the leaves of the kumara crop” (Roberts 2012:744-745; 
see also Best 1972: 827–833). 
 
The story above, for example, outlines the history of the kumara (a native sweet potato), as 
well as the social norms for behavior in relation to the resource – its nutritional and ‘tapu’ 
qualities. The above excerpt emphasizes the importance of cooking kumara before eating (in 
order to remove its tapu). But Roberts also argues that these stories provide crucial 
information regarding the planting and harvesting of the plant food itself  (i.e. the fertility of 
kumara in certain areas and seasons) (Roberts 2012:5).  
 
Roberts argues that the structure of whakapapa outlining familial relationships were 
typically used as effective information storage devices for animal and plant taxonomies. They 
serve as memory supports for the types of ecological information that were important to a 
functioning economy: 
“… it provides the mental framework for spatial information about the local 
terrain, in this case the ‘environmental realm’ of Rongo. This deity, the 
personification of the kumara, immediately locates the listener in a specific 
landscape i.e. the gardens in which food plants were cultivated. The narrative 
acts to put flesh on the bones of the whakapapa, describing in more detail 
spatial, temporal and functional interactions between the kumara and its 
surroundings” (Roberts 2012:745). 
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The story of the kumara provides information on its spatial relationships with other plants, 
and where the kumara is grown (in wet areas), as well as temporal information about the 
seasons (alongside information about predators and pests) (Roberts 2012).  
 
In another example, Roberts examines the taxonomic organization of fish and lizards 
within the whakapapa structure. She states that the myths surrounding the god Punga, for 
example, convey information for species with their common ancestral lineage (Roberts 
2012:746). Speciation appears to be connected to general aesthetic attitudes also, since 
Roberts states that Punga, god of ‘ugly things’, was also associated with fish and lizards. 
Species were also identified within a whakapapa for their morphological similarities (Roberts 
2012:746).  
 
As an epistemic framework, whakapapa also constituted a cognitive orientating device. In 
their article “Understanding Māori Epistemology” (1998) Roberts and Wills claim that 
whakapapa was integrated into a belief system that incorporated myth, history, kinship and 
ecological knowledge. Roberts and Wills claim that cognitive devices like whakapapa were 
elements that constituted a 'worldview', and while cultural practices can be isolated and 
examined for their cognitive function, they nevertheless remain part of a larger cultural 
framework that reinforces certain values and experiences. A functional worldview, they 
claim, also encompasses concepts of time and space, in addition to attitudes towards 
knowledge (i.e. an epistemology). Roberts and Wills (1998) provide a brief overview of how 
knowledge was organized by early Māori through cognitive maps like whakapapa. As stated 
above, whakapapa performed a functional role as a genealogical and mythological library 
system: 
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“Whakapapa thus encapsulates the Māori worldview. It acts as a cognitive 
template for the ordering and understanding of the visible and invisible worlds, 
as a paradigm of reality” (Roberts and Wills 1998:46; emphasis added). 
 
Within Māori culture “‘to know’ something is to locate it in space and time” (Mere and 
Wills 1998:45), and knowledge about a person or tribal identity was embedded in an idea of 
place and knowledge of ancestry. Like whakapapa, the landscape is littered with markers 
tracking the myths and historical identity of the people and their relationship to it. Place 
names are therefore crucial to an understanding of tribal history and identity since they 
connect people to a place and time. Having a historical basis for identity, therefore, requires 
that an individual recognize when and where their tribe and family is from: 
“Knowledge is a sacred power that belongs to a group rather than the 
particular individual who may hold it for a time, and can only be passed on to 
chosen members of the group. As a sacred power knowledge can be ‘talked 
into’ physical objects as in the blessing of a building or a ceremonial ornament. 
Likewise, stories are told of how ancestors, in claiming territory, named 
landmarks, rocks, trees, waterfalls, and so on, and thereby locked together 
tribal understanding with the entities themselves so that a place and its 
knowledge could be separated” (Roberts and Wills 1998:49). 
 
Within a traditional Māori epistemology, knowledge is viewed as something tangible that 
can be stored at various locations or ‘talked into things’ (Salmond 1982). This is why 
knowledge, once encoded in myth, was associated with actual locations. Places are where 
knowledge can be found, and later in Chapter 5, I will look specifically at the cognitive 
dimensions of memory and landscape. I argue that oral cultures utilize physical properties – 
like places – as cognitive inputs for supporting memory. However, in the next section I will 
outline some of the historical data on the use of landscape and myth within Māori oral 
tradition. Like whakapapa, it is argued that the landscape was utilized for organizing 
knowledge and supporting oral memory, by organizing the landscape through myth and place 
names. The cognitive organization of physical cues follows on from the previous chapter’s 
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overview on mnemotechnics, while the next section elaborates further on the traditional 
Māori use of geography and myth.  
 
3.4 The Epistemic Landscape. 
 
As Anne Salmond (1982) states, landmarks were not just metaphors, but concrete places 
where knowledge was stored. Roberts and Wills (1998) observe that Māori identity is closely 
linked to genealogy and place and this is why location and myth is so tightly bound up with 
whakapapa. Within traditional Māori culture, knowledge can be located on the landscape and 
embodies a sacred value alongside its place. As in the case of the kumara whakapapa above 
certain informational resources can be unlocked by the retelling of a mythic narrative. Place 
names and landmarks helped reinforce a particular conception of knowledge – and that 
information could be ‘located’ on the landscape also.  
 
Roberts (2012) suggests that landmarks or place names served a similar function to 
whakapapa for supporting memory and knowledge storage. Valuable information could be 
placed on the landscape, like repositories of knowledge, and then accessed through the 
retelling of certain narratives. Like the method of loci, characters within a story travel 
logically from one location to another in a sequence that follows a particular pathway. 
However, the narrative normally associates the location with significant historical 
knowledge, or information about the landscape itself. Mythic narratives in conjunction with 
landmarks facilitated the organization of knowledge into manageable units:  
 
“In pre-literate societies, mental maps help to locate and fix things of 
importance to a culture in time and place. The landscape itself is clearly an 
important referent not only in spatial terms but once names, it also served as a 
repository of mythical, spiritual and historical information. Once rendered 
cultural, the landscape acted as a mnemonic whereby knowledge of past events 
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could remembered and recalled by walking the land and retelling the 
narratives pertaining to the place… In this respect place names may also have 
a whakapapa in which various layers of information overlay and conceal 
hidden historical and mythological meanings” (Roberts, 2012:747; emphasis 
added). 
 
Comparisons can be made here with the Melanesian examples discussed in Chapter 2, 
particularly Harwood’s examination of the Trobriand use of landmarks as memory devices 
(Harwood 1976). In both cases, information is cued through storytelling and the recollection 
of place. Roberts and Wills (1998) argue that place, or whenua, serves as mnemonic support 
for unlocking historical information about tribal knowledge (Roberts and Wills 1998:54-55). 
Salmond states that the naming of places is not just a matter of applying labels. Instead, 
knowledge actually belongs to, or is found in specific locations (Salmond 1982:84): 
“Landmarks and certain buildings are critical to group structures of 
knowledge in Māori society. It is not so much that structures of knowledge is 
projected onto an imaginary landscape or into a metaphorical building process; 
rather, specific knowledge is ‘bound into’ specific landmarks and chiefly 
houses, carvings, carvings and heirlooms belonging to the descent groups, in a 
direct and immediate relationship” (Salmond 1982:84). 
 
Names have a power, and the capacity to fix knowledge in a specific location meant that 
knowledge could accessible in space and time. The ‘truth-value’ of something is founded 
upon a landmark with historical and mythic significance attached to an actual physical 
property. In the Māori case, the naming of a place often applies to the ancestral history of a 
tribe with the stories themselves describing ancestors who traveled to these locations. Place 
names are often associated with a story or deed involving an ancestor (or mythical being) 
traveling along a route with place names being ordered into a logical sequence on a map:  
“In the accounts of any descent group (its histories, songs, players, proverbs 
and oratory), stories are told of how ancestors claimed territory, naming 
landmarks after parts of their bodies; how they traveled across that territory, 
leaving names behind them… A child would often be taught a particular 
account in the one place, so that the place and its knowledge were one, and the 
place and its name became a guarantee for the truth-value of that account – ‘I 
know it’s true because I have seen that very rock’” (Salmond 1982:84-85). 
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Salmond focuses on the epistemological value of place here, and further comparisons can 
be drawn between Harwood’s (1976) study of the Trobriands and the traditional Māori case 
study (see Chapter 2; Harwood 1976). A peoples’ history can be plotted on a landscape, and 
the truth-value of that historical relationship can be interfaced through myth. Once more, 
Salmond does not contend that Māori viewed these relationships of spatial and temporal 
properties as merely metaphorical associations. Instead, the naming of territory is 
commensurate with an epistemic frame-of-reference that cannot be separated from 
knowledge: landscape and naming functions as a physical system of knowledge storage. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, landmarks are used in conjunction with myths to support oral 
transmission. I argue that spatial imagery plays an important part in the myths and history of 
Māori oral traditions.  
 
There is also a cognitive dimension to the structure of myth and the use of place names, 
and it will be argued further in Chapter 4 that landmarks functioned as cognitive inputs for 
supporting memory and representational ability. But first, this section will look at some of the 
data concerning the relationship between landmarks and myth within Māori oral tradition. 
The records discussed below were compiled for the New Zealand Geographic Board (NZGB) 
(1990), and clearly demonstrate how maps were orally passed on through storytelling. The 
compiled material in Place Names of the Ancestors: a Māori Oral History Atlas (1990), 
provides a historical overview of Māori place names from around Aotearoa, alongside the 
their origins and social function. The book puts into context traditional Māori place names by 
supplementing the myths associated with the landmarks and their translations. The book’s 
goal is to show how myth and landscape interface for the purposes of organizing knowledge 
and oral memory. According to Māori Oral History Atlas these were oral maps constructed 
within mythic narratives for the purposes of recalling critical geographical information.  
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Furthermore, oral maps contributed to an epistemic framework (i.e. worldview), since 
myth and storytelling aided in the coordination of knowledge and place. It is argued that, 
unlike the European (Pakeha) names for geographical locations (which evidently became 
common with colonization), Māori place names embodied valuable information about the 
land and its history. For example, many of the mythic narratives within Māori oral tradition 
related to landmarks and follow the route of an ancestor or mythical figure. Each place name 
would be interconnected with a story about the character and the location and. Often, the 
name of the locale could be used to convey details about the local ecology or geography. So 
while a landmark functioned as a narrative cue, the stories themselves provided a mental map 
of the terrain. 
 
The Māori Oral History Atlas (Wilson 1990) points out that navigational skill relied 
heavily upon oral accounts of the landscape. Without the use of physical maps, stories that 
contained details about a route or territory were committed solely to memory, and since 
Māori oral tradition relied upon individual memory for the transmission of knowledge, 
features of the landscape functioned as mnemonic cues: 
“The names of the landscape were like survey pegs of memory, marking the 
events that happened in a particular place, recording some aspect or feature of 
the traditions and history of a tribe. If the name was remembered it could 
release whole parcels of history to a tribal narrator and those listening. The 
daily use of such place names meant that the history was always present, 
always available. In this sense living and traveling reinforced the histories of 
the people” (Wilson 1990:xiii). 
 
Particular names given to landmarks functioned as information storage tools for memory. 
Names could embody information about a particular area, and these were used as signposts 
within stories, whereby place names were ordered in a sequence that reflected locations on a 
map. The events in the story were often placed in a particular order according to the order of 
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the place names on the landscape. The narrative of a story followed a route along these 
places, thus providing a structure for the story (as well as a means to convey a logical 
sequence of locations on a map). This method of coordinating myth and place constitutes the 
oral map while supporting navigational memory: 
“It is this relationship between the historical tradition and a group of names 
which gives rise to the concept of the “Oral Map”. The story explains and 
orders the geography and the land geography reinforces the history. The two 
serve each other” (Wilson 1990:xiii). 
 
The Māori Oral History Atlas points out that the significance of place names were often 
contextually mutable, and so when tribes moved to a different region they just ‘replanted’ 
their history within the new area by utilizing the same names from their ‘place of origin’ 
onto the new territory (Wilson 1990). As a result, comparisons can be made between Māori 
and Polynesian myths from other territories. Indeed, Agathe Thornton (1989) has previously 
noted that there are strong similarities between the motif-sequences, formulas and narrative 
structures of Māori and traditional Hawaiian myths (Thornton 1989; see also Grey 
1971/1854). These similarities suggest that it is not only the stories themselves that are 
passed on, but the oral ‘styles’ (or formulas) as well.  
 
The Māori Oral History Atlas (Wilson 1990), however, examines specifically the use and 
structure of oral maps within myth. Here, I examine two stories from the Atlas in order to 
highlight how myths and geography were blended into a historical-mythological narrative. 
These two stories from the Atlas, ‘He Oriori Mo Wharau Rangi’ (‘Hau: A Lullaby for 
Wharau Rangi’) and ‘He Whakarāpopotonga I Ngā Kōrero Mo Poutini’ (‘Poutini: A 
Guardian Taniwha’) both follow particular routes along geographical locations that are 
integrated into a narrative.  
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The below lullaby provides a mythic description for how the rivers on the West Coast of 
the North Island were named. The latter part of the story is focused Hau and his pursuit of 
Wairaka (who is thought to be his wife):   
 
“He Oriori Mo Wharau Rangi, 
 
1 
Taku pōtiki, e, ko Wharau Rangi e! 
Ka rongo o tūpuna, ka makā mai ki au, 
Māku, e hine, ma te hurl e, 
Ma te whakarongo kite whita kōrero 
I pipiri ki te pō 
Ngā toka whakaahu o to kōrua kuku e, 
0 tōku rua wāwā’i, o taku rua pakē, 
Ka wehea ko te tau e. 
  
2 
Hoki mai, e hine, kite ao, mārama! 
Whakatū tāua ki aku manu e, 
Te tangata i patua e te tini o Tio, 
Waiho nei ki tāua, e. 
 
3 
E hine āku, e tangi nei kite kai, 
Me whakainu koe kite wai e ngata, 
Me whakangongo koe kite wai ka rail; 
Te mate o Tāwhaki, e. 
Whakaputa kite toni, ka kē te kāhu, 
Na Tiurangi, e, na Tiupākihi. 
Na Kapokai, e. 
 
4 
Kimikimi noa aria ahau, e hine, 
I to kunenga mai i Hawaiki, 
I te whakaringaringa, i te whakawaewae, 
Te whakakanohitanga. 
Ka mānu, e hine, te waka i a Ruatea, 
Ko Kurahaupō. 
Ka iri mai tāua i runga i Aotea, 
Te waka i a Turi. 
Ka ū mai tāua te ngutu Whenuakura; 
Huaina te whare, Rangi Tāwhi 
Tiria mai te kūmara; 
Ka ruia mai te karaka kite tai ao nei. 
Keria iho e Hau ko te punga tama wahine, 
Ka riro i ngá tuahine, i a Nōnokouri i a 
Nōnokotea. 
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Ko te here i runga ko te korohunga. 
Kapua mai e Hau ko te one ki tōna ringa. 
Ko te Tokotoko o Tūroa; 
Ka whiti i te awa, 
Ka nui ia, ko WHANGANUI; 
Tiehua te wai, ko WHANGAEHU; 
Ka hinga te rakau, ko TURAKINA; 
Tīkeitia te waewae, ko “TIKEI!; (RANGITĪKEI) 
Ka tatū, e hine, ko MANAWATŪ; 
Ka rorowhio ngātaringa, ko HŌKIO. 
Waiho te awa iti hei ingoa mōna, ko Ō HAU; 
Takina te tokotoko, ko ŌTAKI; 
Ka mehameha, e hine, ko WAIMEHA; 
Ka ngahae ngā pī, ko WAIKANAE; 
Ka tangi ko te mapu, e. 
E tae hold ki a Wairaka, 
Matapoutia, poua ki runga, poua ki raro, 
Ka rarau e hine! 
Ka rarapa ng kanohi, ko WAIRARAPA, 
Te rarapatanga o to tipuna, e. 
Ka mohiki te ao, ko TE PAE A WHAITIRI; 
Kūmea, kia warea Kai Tangata 
Ki waho kite moana. 
Hanga te paepae, poua iho; 
Te pou whakamāro o te rangi, ko Meremere. 
Waiho te whānau, ko te Punga o tōna waka 
Ko te Haumea, ko te Awhemā; 
Kaati, ka whakamutu, e hine!” (Wilson1990:63). 
 
 
Translation in English:  
 
“Hau: A lullaby for Wharau Rangi, 
 
1 
My little Child, Wharau Rangi! 
What your grandsires heard they freely gave unto 
  me 
For me and mine, O maiden, because I listened, 
Heeded, and retained the stories complete. 
In the house was told the Kāhui Rongo ritual, 
Told to a group in the night, 
Hence the rock shrine of your tight-lipped elder, 
Hence my store pit, renowned pit, to be shared 
  with my absent loved one, ah me. 
 
2 
Return, O maiden, to the world of light! 
Let us pause and pay tribute to my noble ones. 
He who was killed by the myriads of Tio 
  
  126 
Bequested grief and sorrow to you and me, 
  ah me. 
 
3 
O maiden my own, now fretting for food, 
I shall offer you the water that satisfies 
You are to sip from the water that spurts. 
Now as to the death of Tāwhaki, 
It came in the third month with Hawks 
  a Screaming, 
Aloft were Swooping-in-the-heavens, Swooping- 
  down-to-earth, 
And the Food-snatchers, ah me. 
  
4 
I am trying to remember, O maiden, 
How it was you sprang forth from Hawaiki, 
How the hands were formed, then your feet, 
Until your face took shape. 
Now afloat, O maiden, is the canoe of Ruatea, 
And ‘tis Kurahaupō. 
We two were carried hither aboard Aotea, 
The canoe of Turi. 
We landed at the river’s mouth at Whenuakura, 
The house there was named Rangi Tawhi; 
The kūmara was then planted; 
The karaka, too, soon flourished in the land. 
Hau thereupon dug the odd extra female plots, 
Which were taken by his sisters Nōnokouri and Nōnokotea 
To mark them off, the border of a robe was hung, 
Hau scooped up a handful of earth 
From the portion of the Staff of Tūroa; 
He then crossed the river 
Which won him great renown, and it was 
  WHANGANUI; 
He splashed through cloudy waters, hence 
  WHANGAEHU; 
He felled a tree so he could cross, hence TURAKINA; 
He strode across the land, hence ‘Tīkei; 
  (RANGITĪKEI) 
Then he stumbled, O maiden, hence MANAWATŪ; 
A buzzing sound assailed his ears, hence HŌKIO; 
A tiny stream he named his own, hence Ō HAU; 
He held his staff as he spoke, hence ŌTAKI; 
The water beyond were lost in the sands hence 
  WAIMEHA; 
He stood and stared in amazement, hence 
  WAIKANAE; 
Then he breathed a sigh of relief 
For he had come to Wairaka. 
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And he cast a spell; fixing it above, and fixing it    
  below. 
It was thus he came to rest, O maiden! 
He gave a flashing glance, hence WAIRARAPA; 
Indeed it was there your ancestor gazed about 
  him. 
The clouds lifted up on high, hence TE PAE A WHAITIRI; 
The lengthened day was made to detain Kai 
  Tangata 
Out on the open sea. 
The beam was made and posts were fixed; 
The posts were Stiffened-was-the-heavens and 
  Meremere. 
The family became the anchor of his canoe, 
They were Te Haumea and Te Awhemā; 
Enough, ‘tis now ended, O maiden!” (Wilson 1990:66). 
 
 
 
Below is a table (Table 1) showing the place Names from ‘Lullaby for Wharau Rangi’ and 
their translation (Wilson 1990:67). The names relate to parts of the story above, but they also 
demonstrate how imagery is utilized in the story as a mnemonic: each name is shown to have 
a concrete-physical association to both the landscape and a component of the story: 
 
 
Place Name Translation 
Whanganui Great river 
Whangaehu River of cloudy water 
glance 
Turakina River Crossing on a felled 
tree 
Rangitikei River crossed by 
striding 
Manawatū Stumbling 
Hōkio The hearing of a 
buzzing sound 
Ō Hau (River) of Hau 
Otaki The holding out of a 
staff 
Waimeha Water lost in the 
sands 
Waikanae Water of staring in 
amazement 
Wairarapa Water of a flashing 
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Te Pae a Whaitiri Lifting of the clouds 
on high 
 
Table 1: Place names and translations mentioned in ‘He Oriori Mo Wharau Rangi’. From “Place Names of 
the Ancestors: a Māori Oral History Atlas” (Wilson 1990:62-67). 
 
This simple lullaby contains cartographic information (as an informational resource) while 
conveying a mythic-historical story about these places. Oral mnemonics and devices would 
have been essential for the transmission of knowledge, and in the above example stories are 
intertwined with a places for a similar purpose. The attachment of these stories to place 
names – and subsequently specific geographical locations - provides a physical anchor for 
memory. In the latter half of the lullaby place names are retold in a sequential order following 
pathway locations on a map (see Fig. 3). However, the logical structure of these kinds 
narratives also supports the premise that spatial imagery is linked to declarative memory 
(Rubin 1995). The underlying features of the oral map stories suggest that there is an optimal 
connection between the narrative structure of myth, spatial knowledge and memory. In Fig. 3 
below we see how these names are placed on the map, as well as the route taken by the 
characters in the story.  
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Fig. 3: Route from oral map for ‘He Oriori Mo Wharau Rangi’. From “Place Names of the Ancestors: a 
Māori Oral History Atlas” (Wilson 1990:62-67). 
 
 
The second narrative I will look at involves a chase involving the taniwha, Poutini, who 
kidnaps the wife of Tamaāhua, who then pursues Poutini southwest across the North and 
South Islands. In addition to protecting the waters along the West Coast of the South Island, 
Poutini is also said to guard “both the people and the spiritual essence or mauri of pounamu, 
greenstone” (Wilson 1990:83). In particular, Poutini is in service to an atua (god) named 
Kahue (or Ngahue) whose spiritual force or ‘mana’ is connected to pounamu (greenstone) 
(Wilson 1990:83). The story of Poutini begins with an abduction of Waitaiki, and the 
eventual pursuit initiated by Tamaāhua. The husband pursues Poutini and his captured wife to 
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various locations from the top of the North Island and down to the West Coast of the South 
Island. Poutini eventually transforms Waitaiki into pounamu (or greenstone) in order to hide 
her and lays her down in a riverbed.  
 
The story is a mythic explanation for the origins of pounamu (greenstone) in the Arahura 
River. However, it is said that the story of Poutini summarizes the very first ‘geological 
survey’ of New Zealand, as the prominent place names used in the story coincide with 
specific locations where ancient quarries can be found (Wilson 1990:84). The narrative 
follows the chase by Waitaiki’s husband, Tamaāhua, as Poutini navigates his way to various 
locations of significance where the mining of certain stones were once common: 
“He Whakarāpopotonga I Ngā Kōrero Mo Poutini, 
Ko Poutini te īngoa o te taniwha, arā, te kaitiaki a tōna iwi, me te mauri hoki o 
te pounamu o te tali hauāuru o Te Waipounamu. 
Na, he mōkai a Poutini nā te atua nei nā Kahue (Ngahue), nāna nei i tuku tōna 
mana kite pounamu. Ka noho ai a Poutini i te moana he tautiaki tāna mahi i te 
mauri o te pounamu I ngā wā katoa. 
I tētehi wā i kawe motutia e Poutini tētehi wāhine no Tūhua, ka kāwhakitia e 
ia, tau noa atu ki roto I te awa o Arahura. Tēnei ano te tāne a taua wāhine kei 
muri e whai haere atu ana. Ka mau a Poutini ki taua wāhine - ko Waitaiki te 
īngoa - kātahi ka whakakōhatutja, hunā iho ki roto i te awa o Arahura. Tukua e 
Poutini tōna mauri ki a Waitaiki, arā, te mauri o te pounamu. Waiho tonu iho a 
Waitaiki hei whaea mo te pounamu, whānau mai ai āia te katoa o te pounarnu. 
Ko te tāne a Waitaki i hoki ki tōna kāinga i roto i te pōuri i te aroha ki tāna 
wāhine. 
No Poutini Ngāi Tahu te iwi e mōhiotia nei ko Kāti Waewae, he hapū here i a 
Ngāi Tahu Whānui ki Te Tai Poutini. 
He taniwha a Poutini, ko ia te kaitiaki o Kahue (Ngahue). Nā, ko Kahue, 
(Ngahue) he atua pounamu. Tōna hoariri mai rā anō, ko Whatipū. He kaitiaki 
tēnei no Hinehōanga ko ia nei te atua o ngā hōanga, arā, ngā kōhatu orooro 
pounamu. 
I tētehi wā, ka kitea atu a Poutini e Whatipū e tere haere ana I waenga moana 
kātahi ka whāia - koia nei hoki tāna mahi i ngā wā katoa - kāore i mau a Poutini. 
Tēra a Poutini e huna mai ra i roto i te wai i tētehi kokoru whāiti i te tahatika o te 
moutere TŪHUA. Ao ake, i te atatū tonu, ka kite atu ia i tetehi wahine ataahua e 
haere ana i te tahatika. Ko Waitaiki te īngoa o taua wahine. Ka titiro atu a 
Poutini ki te wahine nei e unu ana i ōna kākahu, ā, kua ruku kite wai. I te tino 
ataahua o taua wahine ka pohanetia e Poutini. 
Kua warewaretia e ia tēra tāna hoariri, a Whatipū e kimi haere ra āia i 
waenga moana, mau atu ki a Waitaiki kawe motutia, tau noa mai i Tahanga (kei 
te taha tonga tēnei o Moehau a Tama). 
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Tērā te tāne a Waitaiki, a Tamaāhua, kei roto i tō rāua moenga ktahi anō ka 
oho ake te wairua. Ka tirotiro kei whea a Waitaiki, ka karanga, kāore he 
whakautunga mai, ka karanga anō, ko taua āhua anō. Kua pāwera ia kātahi ka 
heke kite tai, nā, e hora ana ngā kākahu o Waitaiki I te tahatika. Mōhio tonu a 
Tamaāhua kua pā he aitūā ki tāna hoa. I roto i ōna pōkekakeka mō Waitaiki ka 
hare ki tana tūāhu ki rēira tuku ai i tana karakia ki ōna atua Ida hōmai he 
māramatanga ki āia. Ka puta te māramatanga tērā, ko tana tekateka hei kai 
tohutohu i te ara hei aru mana e kitea āi e ia a Waitaiki. Heoi, ka whiua e ia tana 
tekateka, ka tārewa i te takiwā, ā, ka tohu te mata o te tekateka ki tuawhenua. 
Kakama tonu te whakarewa a Tamaāhua i tana waka, ko ia e aru ana I te ara i 
tohua ra e tana tekateka. 
Tērā a Poutini kua tae ra ki TAHANGA, kua kā te ahi hei whakamahana i a 
Waitaiki. Ka mahana anō a Waitaiki ka whati te tira a Poutini I tuawhenua tau 
noa mai i WHANGAMATĀ i Taupō. 
I muri, ka tae atu a Tamaāhua ki Tahanga, kua mate noa atu ngā ngārahu o te 
ahi a Poutini: Heoti, aru tonu ia i te huarahi i tohua e lana tekateka, ā, ka tae at-u 
ki Taupō, arā, ki Whangamatā. Nā i rēira e tōpū ana ngā ngotungotu o te ahi a 
Poutini kua mātao kē noa atu. I tēnei wā kāore anō a Tamaāhua kia mōhio ko wai 
tēnei e kāwhaki nei i a Waitaiki, he tangata, he taniwha, he aha rānei. 
 
Pēnei tonu te mahi a ngā tokotoru nei. Ko Poutini rāua ko Waitaiki ki mua ko 
Tamaāhua me tana tekateka ki muri whai haere atu ai. Tae atu ki ONETĀHUA, 
tae atu ki WHANGAMOA I Whakatū, ki RANITOTO ka huri ki te tonga aru haere 
atu i te tahatika ka tae atu ai ki PĀHUA (kāore i tawhiti atu i Punakaiki). Haere 
tonu, pahemo ake a Māwheranui, a Taramakau, a ARAHURA, tae at-u ai ki 
Mahitahi. I ngā rā o mua haere ai ngā tūpuna mā runga waka mai i konei ki 
TAKIWAI. I a Tamaāhua e whakawhiti ana i te puaha o te awa o Arahura ka 
rongo iho ia i te āhua mahana o te wai o tēnei awa. Tēna tana tekateka e tāwhiri 
mai ra i aia heoi tāna he whai kau atu, ka ahu rāua ki te tonga. 
Mai i Mahitahi ka tere a Tamaāhua mā runga waka ki Takiwai — ko te puaha 
tēnei o Piopiotahi. Ka tirotiro ia kāore he aha i rēira ēngari ko tana tekateka kua 
huri te mata kite ara I arumia mai ra e rāua. Kua tino pāwera a Tamaāhua i āia e 
whai haere atu ana i tana tekateka. Tae atu ki Arahura - ko te awa tēnei i 
rangona ra e ia te mahana o te wai - kua mōhio tonu ia kua tino pangia tana hoa 
wahine e te aitūa. Heoi, ka whakarite i āia mō te parekura - he tauā ra hoki ia.   
Ko Poutini kua mōhio - he atua ra hoki - tēnā a Tamaāhua kei te whai haere 
atu i roto i te awa o Arahura ki te patu i aia kia mate rawa ātu. Kātahi ia ka huna 
ki roto I tētehi awa e whangai a-u ana ki roto o Arahura. Ko te awa tēnei e 
mōhiotia nei i nāianei ko WAITAIKI.   
Mōhio tonu a Poutini ina mau ia i a Tamaāhua e kore ia e ora. Ka tan tana 
whakaaro mēhemea e kore e oti tāna i hiahia ai, ara, kia riro i āia a Waitaiki, e 
kore hoki ia e pai kia riro i tētehi atu. Na rēira i whakakōhatutia ai e ia, i tukuna 
ai e ia tōna mauri pounarnu ki a Waitaiki, waihotia atu e ia kia takoto ana i te 
whaiawa o te pūnuatanga o Waitaiki awa ki roto a Arahura. Ka hun a Poutini ka 
aru ki te moana, whakamōkihi haere, ā. ka pahemo ano i a Tamaāhua, ko ia tēna 
e tere ana kite moana, ngaro atu, waiho a Tamaāhua kia kimi ana i a Waitaiki i 
roto o te awa o Arahura. 
Kei rēira tonu a Poutini e tere haere ana I nāianei, he kaitiaki nō ngā whenua 
o te tai hauāuru ki te tonga me ngā pounamu i whakatapua iho e ngā tūpuna o 
neherā. Koia taua tai c mōhiotia nei i nāianei ko TE TAI POUTINI. 
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Kitea rawatia ake e Tamaāhua tana hoa wahine kua kōhatutia, ara, he 
pounamu kōmā nei, he ataāhua, he īnanga te īngoa o taua pounamu, he pounamu 
tino nanawanuitia e te tangata i nāianei. Ka mutu rā anō tana tangi ki a Waitaiki, 
ka titiro ake ki ngā maunga e rua e tū mai ana i rēira ka taunahatia e ia ko 
TŪHUA tētehi ko TAMAĀHUA tētehi. Ka mutu ana whakarite kātahi ka hoki. Ka 
moe anō he wahine ka puta he uri, ko ngā kōrero mō aua uri kei te mōhiotia e 
tōna iwi o tōna takiwā. 
Mai rā anō i aua wā o mua, ka kōrere te hukapapa o ngā maunga, ka rere te 
waipuke o Arahura ka tahia iho ngā kuru pounamu, koia nei ngā uri o Waitaiki. 
Ko ngā un ēnei o te mauri o Pounamu. 
Ko tēnei pakiwaitara e whakaatu ana i ngā wāhi mahinga a ngā tūpuna o 
neherā i a rātou maripi, arā i ngā toki, i ngā mere, i ngā hei me ēra atu taonga a 
mua. 
Nā, i TŪHUA he matā te taonga, paopaoa ai kia ngahoro ngā kongakonga 
koia nei a rātou maripi. I TAHANGA, he pakawara te īngoa a te kōhatu i orooroa 
hei toki; i WHANGAMATĀ - he matā anō ēngari he panetao te īngoa i mōhiotia e 
ngā kaumātua, he rere kē i ngā matā o Tūhua. I ONETĀHUA ko ngā kōhatu ēnei 
kua pūngurutia e te wai; i WHANGAMOA he pākohe, he wāhi mahinga mere me 
ēra atu mea; i RANGITOTO ko taua kōhatu anō, kei rēira ngā wāhi mahinga o 
ēnei taonga a te patu, mere, me ēra atu mea. Kei PĀHUA ka kitea tēnei kōhatu, te 
Hine a tauira, mā tēnei hei wiri e puta ai te rua ki te pounamu. Kei TAKIWAI, arā 
Piopiotahi tētehi wāhi mahinga i nga taonga kuru takiwai (tangiwai), kāore e 
kitea tēnei taonga, te takiwai, (tangiwai) i ētehi wāhi atu. 
Hoki rnai ki ARAHURA ko te tino rangatira o ngā kōhatu katoa, e mōhiotia nel 
e te ao whānui, ko Pounamu me ona tini kārangarangatanga; īnanga, kawakawa, 
kahurangi, kahotea, totoweka, tēnā te nuinga atu o nga īngoa. 
E kī ana te kaihihi koia nei te whakaatu tuatahi i ngā wāhi i kitēa ai ngā 
kōhatu e ngā tūpuna o nehera e whakaatu ana hoki i ngā wāhi mahinga o a rātou 
taonga.” (Wilson 1990:79-82) 
  
Translation in English:  
“Poutini: A guardian Taniwha, 
Poutini was a taniwha, a giant water being. He was guardian for Kahue 
(Ngahue), the atua or deity of pounamu, greenstone. The only being that Poutini 
feared was another taniwha named Whatipu, the guardian for Hinehöaka, the 
atua of hōaka, sandstone. Grinding with sandstone ‘knives’ was the only way the 
tūpuna could cut the tough pounamu stone. 
Once, when Poutini was being pursued in the oceans by Whatipi), he took 
refuge in a shady corner of a bay at TŪHUA (Mayor Island). It was early 
morning. Lying quietly in the still morning water, Poutini saw a beautiful woman 
coming down to the water’s edge to bathe. Her name was Waitaiki. He watched 
as she removed her clothes and slipped into the sea. He lusted after her. 
Disregarding the danger of being discovered by his enemy, Whatipū, he 
slipped through the waters of the bay and with a swirl of water and - not a sound - 
he caught Waitaiki and fled with her across the sea towards the mainland. 
Meanwhile, back at Tūhua, Waitaiki’s husband, Tamaāhua, woke and called to 
his wife. No answering call came and, disturbed, he went looking for her. He 
found her clothes at the water’s edge and knew that some dreadful fate had 
befallen her. Distraught, he went to his tūāhu (place of ritual) and sought to 
discover her late by the powers of karakia (incantation) and divination. He used a 
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tekateka to gain the knowledge he sought. A tekateka is a small, dart- like spear. 
He hurled it in the air and it hung there quivering and pointing to the mainland in 
the direction taken by Poutini and his beautiful captive, Waitaiki. Rushing to his 
canoe, Tamaāhua paddled off in pursuit. 
Poutini had stopped at TAHANGA on the Coromandel Peninsula and lit a fire 
on the beach to warm Waitaiki. Then he fled across the land to WHANGAMATĀ 
on the western shore of Lake Taupō where he lit another fire for Waitaiki. 
Meanwhile, Tamaāhua landed on the beach at Tahanga and discovered the fire, 
but the ashes were cold. Using his tekateka again to divine the direction of his 
quarry, he took off in pursuit, eventually arriving at Whangamata. He discovered 
the remains of the second fire and, again resorting to use of his tekateka, traveled 
on in pursuit of Poutini and Waitaiki, still ignorant of what had happened or who 
was involved. 
The chase went on - fires and tekateka at every pause. To RANGITOTO or 
D’Urville Island, to WHANGAMOA in the hills above Whakatū (Nelson) and to 
ONETĀHUA or Farewell Spit. Then down the western coast of the South Island 
to PĀHUA near Punakaiki and on past Māwheranui, past Taramakau and 
ARAHURA, right to Mahitahi where the tūpuna when traveling south left the 
land and took to the sea using canoes. As he crossed the mouth of the Arahura 
River, Tamaāhua noticed the water was not as cold as the water of other rivers he 
had been crossing, but he was too hot in pursuit to waste time - the tekateka was 
drawing him southwards. 
By canoe he paddled south from Mahitahi to TAKIWAI25 at the mouth of 
Piopiotahi, Milford Sound. Here he found the tekateka hovering in the air and 
pointing back along the route he had just come. Frustrated and angry, he headed 
north again following the tekateka. It paused, waiting for him, at the mouth of the 
Arahura River, where he had noted the water was warmer on his journey south. 
By incantations he knew that his beloved Waitaiki was in distress up the Arahura 
River valley. He prepared himself, as a warrior, for battle. 
Poutini was indeed hiding in the upper Arahura River, by a stream which flows 
into the main river. That stream we call today WAITAIKI. He knew, because he 
was of the atua, that Tamaāhua was coming up river, prepared to kill him. He 
knew he had little chance of escape should he be found, but he did not want to 
leave his beautiful captive. Deciding that if he couldn’t have her then no-one else 
would either, he changed her into his own essence — pounamu —  and laid the 
woman-stone in the bed of the river, just by the junction of the stream now called 
Waitaiki with the main river. Then he slipped silently away downstream, right 
past the wrathful husband, Tamaāhua, striding up intent on destruction. Poutini 
swam to the coast and ever since he has cruised its waters as the kaitiaki, 
guardian spirit, of the land and its sacred stone. That is why the coast is known as 
it TAI POUTINI, ‘the tides of Poutini’. 
Tamaāhua found his beautiful wife Waitaiki. She was lying in her final bed, all 
grey-green and smooth — inanga stone. He began to tangi for her and for himself 
at his loss. When his tangi was complete he looked around him and named two 
hills, TŪHUA after his island home, and another TAMAĀHUA after himself. He 
then began the long return journey whence he had come. He married another 
                                                
25It is important to note the difference in between the word 'Takiwai' which is another pronunciation of 
'Tangiwai', meaning bowenite. 
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woman and had many children and is known in the traditions of several tribes of 
the Coromandel coast/northern Bay of Plenty region. 
Ever since those ancient times, when the winter snows melt in spring and the 
waters tumble down the wild Arahura gorges, pieces of pounamu are broken off 
the great body of Waitaiki and make their way down the riverbed. These are the 
uri, children, of Waitaiki, the mother lode of the stone and the parent of the mauri 
that lies within pounamu.” (Wilson 199083-84). 
 
 
Fig. 4: Route from oral map for ‘He Whakarāpopotonga I Ngā Kōrero Mo Poutini’. From “Place Names of 
the Ancestors: a Māori Oral History Atlas” (Wilson 1990:78-85). 
 
The place names associated with the characters and the story are highlighted in the English 
translation above (and the map in Fig 4) shows the route taken by Poutini in the story. Below, 
in Table 2, the place names of the story and their translation are outlined in a table. The 
geographical locations named within the story are related to actual stones that were 
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commonly mined in those regions. Tūhua, for instance, is now called Mayor Island following 
colonization, and is a dormant volcano off of the upper North Island coast near bay of Plenty. 
The island has a rich source of obsidian, or volcanic glass, which was used to make cutting 
tools (Seelenfreund 1989). More importantly, the island in the story is named after the 
resource it provided, and the other place names from the story is associated with their mineral 
resource are outlined in Table 2 below (Wilson 1990:85): 
Place Names Translation/Current Name Stone 
Waitaiki (Stream of) Waitaiki  
Te Tai Poutini The tides of Poutini  
Tūhua (Hill of) Tūhua  
Tamaāhua (Hill of) Tamaāhua  
Tūhua Mayor Island obsidian 
Tahanga   Tahanga basalt 
Whangamatā Whangamatā obsidian 
Rangitoto D’Urville Island argillite 
Whangamoa Hills above Nelson argillite 
Onetāhua Farewell Spit argillite 
Pāhua Pāhua flint 
Takiwai Piopiotahi (Milford 
Sound) 
bowenite 
Arahura Arahura pounamu 
Table 2: Place names and translations mentioned in ‘He Whakarāpopotonga I Ngā Kōrero Mo Poutini’. 
From “Place Names of the Ancestors: a Māori Oral History Atlas” (Wilson 1990:78-85). 
 
 
Māori Oral History Atlas (1990) claims that the above story provides details of an oral 
map that traced specific location geological resources were accessed. The narrative is 
structured with the names of these ancient quarries being ordered in a logical sequence, as 
they are located. The book claims that these kinds of stories provided a navigational function. 
The story provided information about the terrain and the optimal means for travel.   
 
The mnemonic value of the myth and place in is demonstrated well by the Māori Oral 
History Atlas (1990). But we also need to know why and how there is an optimal relationship 
between myth and physical space, and in Chapter 5 I will return to the stories above in 
relation to a cognitive analysis. In addition, The Māori Oral History Atlas (1990) does not 
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discuss the spatial imagery and memory extensively, however correlations can be made 
between Harwood’s (1976) examination of the Trobriand use of myth and Māori oral maps. 
Chapter 5 will expand further on the use of ‘oral maps’ in Māori oral tradition and how a 
cognitive ecological model can better describe how physical structures - such as landmarks - 
support representational ability and memory in this case. On this view, myth serves a 
navigational function as well as a psychological function. It was argued in Chapter 2, that 
myths involve action-oriented themes, spatial imagery and supernatural elements because 
these characteristics serve as memorable cues. Rubin (1995; see Chapter 2) argues that the 
prevalence of action, mythic characters and space within oral storytelling is to be expected 
since these structures are more optimal for working memory. This does not imply, however, 
that these simple ingredients will constitute an effective means by which memory and 
narrative intermingle. Instead, Rubin claims that there is a typically cognitive bias towards 
mnemonic imagery located within a mentally represented physical space (Rubin 1995: 41-
48).  
 
3.5 Discussion. 
 
The literature discussed in Chapter 2 supports the premise that spatial imagery is 
incorporated into oral storytelling as a means of structuring a narrative (see Harwood 1976; 
Kahn 1990; Campbell 2006; Chapter 2), and in the case of Māori oral maps, the stories 
themselves provide mnemonic support for the memorization of a particular route taken on a 
map. Place names and myths seem to have a multivalent purpose within the context of 
information sharing. First, they function as a mnemonic device and subsequently act as 
organizational tools for a narrative structure. These devices ease the cognitive burden during 
oratory, while the active engagement of storytelling is enabled in real time by material cues. 
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Second, oral maps perform an epistemic function in establishing a material basis for 
knowledge systems. Roberts (2012) claims that whakapapa is a system for information 
storage and retrieval. So Whakapapa is more than just a genealogical map, but a library of 
informational resources. It also serves an implicit epistemic function by establishing a 
cultural frame-of-reference that is used to communicate a variety of cultural concepts. A 
similar claim can be made for landmarks and place names as shown in the Māori Oral 
History Atlas (1990). Myths and place names act as material anchors for knowledge 
transmission. They perform an epistemic function, like whakapapa, in organizing 
informational resources and establishing epistemic markers.  
 
Importantly, the next two chapters will look at both Māori pedagogy and oral maps, in 
conjunction with two cognitive ecological models that underscore the dialectical relationship 
between reproduced (i.e. engineered) environments and information management. The next 
two chapters will look at how these resources function as cognitive properties. In order to do 
so, we will have to demonstrate how brains are in many extended into the environment 
through cultural processes. We engineer environments specifically for cognitive purposes. 
The stories that were told within the traditional Māori corpus should not be viewed as merely 
epiphenomena of other key cognitive functions. These stories were an encapsulation of a 
historical corpus that was essential to the cosmogony, social structure and epistemic 
framework (Marsden 2003:56).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
 
“They [the elders] would wait late at night at the marae, until late and then 
the lights went down, all the lights were switched off, tilly lamp, candles, they 
blew it out and the room was in total darkness and they’d practice on us as 
little children for the retention of memory. They’d practice talking so that we 
can beam in with our ears and we were more comprehensive and tentative of 
the information because there was no visibility of our eyes to contaminate our 
brain, it was totally clear” (Mahuika 2012:279). 
 
This excerpt is taken from an interview conducted by Nēpia Mahuika with Anaru 
Kupenga of the Ngāti Porou tribe.26 Kupenga speaks of how traditional forms of 
memory training were employed to sharpen the mnemonic ability of students who were 
expected to learn their tribal history and the verbal arts. These memory skills, Mahuika 
argues, have been learned less frequently since the introduction of text, but given that 
tribal knowledge had to be passed on orally, mnemonic ability would have been a skill 
that was nurtured in close contact with tribal elders. A student would be expected, then, 
to gain an education in both the corpus of their tribal history as well as the appropriate 
methods for memory and orality.  
 
This chapter will survey some of the ethnographic material on traditional Māori 
pedagogy and epistemology. I will examine the claim that cultural transmission within 
traditional Māori society was strictly regulated by cultural norms and conventions. With 
more ‘traditional’ Māori learning methods, the informational character of the 
environment was regulated by both tikanga (customs), and the tapu (sacred) status of 
these learning methods. Due to the sacred nature of these learning methods, not all 
individuals had access to the sacred corpus of knowledge (Bowdon 1979). As a result, 
                                                
26 From Anaru Kupenga’s “‘Kōrero Tuku Iho’: Reconfiguring Oral History and Oral Tradition”, (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Waikato, 2012) 
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memory and eloquence would have been essential skills that were nurtured not only for 
communication, but also for the preservation of an oral history (i.e. the accurate 
retention and communication of sacred knowledge). 
 
The descriptive data discussed on Māori pedagogy will be set against the background of 
an epistemic niche construction (ENC) model. Put simply, ENC describes how organisms 
shape their informational environment, and the feedback effects generated by engineered 
environments. Humans are unique in our capacity to actively engineer our cultural 
environments for learning purposes, also. Cultures rely heavily on the informational 
resources available to them in order to subsist in a wide range of environments. Within oral 
cultures the sustained organization and transmission of valuable information would have been 
critical to an economy and subsistence. 
 
This chapter will argue that the cognitive resources available for supporting information 
transmission are often peculiar to a cultural niche. Organized educational methods condition 
individuals to function in socially and technologically complex environments. The first half 
of the chapter will provide an overview of the ENC model that will be applied later to the 
literature on Māori pedagogy and epistemology. However, it will be valuable to provide some 
background on the basics of biological niche construction in order to appropriately convey 
the underlying mechanics of cultural niche construction (i.e. ENC), and an early portion of 
the chapter will be devoted to the theories supporting biological externalism.  
 
Cultural environments are critical to the development of human cognition, and we depend 
greatly upon the tools and strategies that are learned. While cognitivist theories claim that 
many of our cognitive traits are innate and fixed, ENC argues that we are cognitively plastic, 
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and subsequently sensitive to external cognitive properties in our environment. A 
behaviorally malleable species would suggest an opportunistic evolutionary heritage, one that 
required adaptively strategic responses to informationally complex (and changing) 
environments. Out of these conditions hominin cognition would develop an emergent 
dependency upon engineered cultural niches (e.g. tool use, information sharing, and so forth).  
 
I argue that our learning environments support both working cognitive connections, while 
critically regulating the flow of information. In the second portion of the chapter I will put 
into practice the ENC model by examining traditional Māori pedagogy. The importance of 
structured learning environments will matter to the material on Māori epistemology, and I 
claim that religious traditions are supported by external cognitive properties specific to a 
cultural niche. Information transmission is further regulated by religious norms and customs. 
In traditional Māori social structures, elders in the tribe, who were also charged with the 
responsibility of preserving, and further communicating an oral tradition, commonly 
monitored the sharing of knowledge (Bowdon 1979; Pere 1982; Metge 1984). This 
application of the ENC will help to elaborate further on my own critique of SiM, but it will 
also demonstrate the importance of the historical and ethnographic data for motivating a 
cognitive examination of religious activity. I look specifically at how learning methods and 
mnemonic strategies support cognition for the purposes of transmitting sacred knowledge.  
 
4.2 Niche Construction: an overview.  
 
 The received view of biological change describes how organisms adapt to changing 
external conditions (i.e. environments) over time (Sterelny 2000, 2001). On this view, 
cumulative morphological changes to organisms remain subject to the standard principles of 
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variation, competition and inheritance between organisms. On the received view, adaptations 
occur on the phenotypic level, while environments are adapted to by organismic change. For 
example, organisms develop defenses from predation with some animals evolving methods of 
concealment, like camouflage. The plumage on the Egyptian Nightjar, for example, allows 
the bird to rest during the day in sand and not be visibly detectible by predators. Its plumage 
color - pale browns - is well adapted to hiding in sandy conditions. In this example, predation 
defense is an example of how environmental conditions are a causal explanation for 
evolutionary change.  
 
Other models, however, have emerged to describe more complex interactions between 
organisms and environments (Godfrey-Smith 1998, 2000; Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman 
2000; Lewontin 1982, 1991; Sterelny 2000, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). These models recognize a 
gap in the literature regarding the role that engineered environments play in shaping 
organismic development and behavior. The niche construction model recognizes that 
organisms are active agents that make noticeable changes to their local ecologies, and in turn 
these changes act back upon the organism leading to fitness effects (for both the engineering 
organism and those who share their ecology with them).  
 
Richard Dawkins (1982) articulated this idea famously in his book The Extended 
Phenotype (1982), where he describes how organisms exploit their ecologies for fitness 
purposes. We see this extension of the phenotype in termite mounds, spider webs and beaver 
dams. On Dawkins’ view, genes build organisms that exploit their environments – through 
their own activities – leading to fitness advantages. Dawkins observed that we should look at 
an organism’s phenotype as being extended into the environment - as a kind of exosomatic 
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system – since many species depend greatly upon environmental resources for shelter, 
ecological defense and also as suitable means for harvesting food resources.  
 
The concept for extended replication systems are taken seriously by niche construction 
models (Laland and Odling-Smee et al 2003; Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman 2000; 
Sterelny 2001), and while the extended phenotype and niche construction models appear 
similar, niche construction views organisms as ecological engineers, whereby environmental 
changes lead to further organismic/ecological effects. These engineered ecologies both alter 
the selective environment, while constructed ‘niches’ or ecological systems are inherited by 
downstream generations. Organisms actively influence their evolutionary future through their 
own activities. In turn, their descendants, who also utilize these niches, are inheritors these 
engineered environments: 
“…to varying degrees, organisms choose their own habitats, mates, and 
resources and construct important components of their local environments such 
as nests, holes, burrows, paths, webs, dams, and chemical environments” 
(Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman 2000). 
 
 
 Many phenotypes, therefore, shape their ecology for utilitarian purposes. But these can 
have flow-on effects for genes also. So the selective environment is changed when organisms 
engage in the active modification of their ecological conditions, and subsequently ecological 
engineering has significant feedback effects on the organisms living in that ecological niche 
(Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman 2000). For instance, dam building by beavers not only 
enables the spread of dam-building genes, but their engineering projects also have 
consequences for those who inhabit the same ecosystem (Naiman et al 1988; Laland and 
Sterelny 2006). For example Earthworms are more adapted to live in freshwater conditions 
than soil conditions (Lee 1985; Satchell 1983; Turner 2000; [see Laland & Sterelny 2006 for 
discussion]), and because the earthworm’s kidneys are better adapted to freshwater 
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conditions, their activities change the structure and chemistry of the soil for an adaptive 
purpose. The earthworm has not developed any physiological characteristics to adapt to its 
environment. Instead, the earthworm alters its environment to overcome its biological 
limitations (Laland and Sterelny 2006). Niche construction (NC) recognizes that organisms 
alter their environments for downstream generations also (e.g. other earthworms inherit the 
modified environment of the previous generation), and so organisms not only inherit genes, 
but they also inherit engineered ecologies.  
 
NC considers multiple levels of organization – genes, organisms and environments - in the 
same way that the extended phenotype model views modified environments as being 
important to the way that genes are expressed. While the primary unit of selection is the gene 
within niche construction models, organisms shape their environment and further change the 
selective environment (Sterelny 2001). NC, subsequently, highlights the role that ecological 
engineering plays in the transmission of genes. But NC is also serious about the role that 
ecological inheritance plays. While genes are considered the primary inheritance mechanism 
within NC, environments allow for the expression of these genetic resources. In other words, 
engineered environments can qualify as ‘scaffolding’ or support for phenotypes and their 
genes: 
 
“For genes to have stable phenotypic effects, they must be inserted into a 
structured and predictable developmental environment. Even if replication is 
of high fidelity, it is of no use to just make a new set of genes: the parental 
generation must build an environment in which those genes are used in the 
right way. The more complex the developmental pathways, the more the 
genereading environment is as important as signal quantity and fidelity” 
(Sterelny 2011:810; emphasis added). 
 
 
Our hominin ancestry is distinguishable as an ecological engineering legacy. For example 
- historically - humans have constructed tools, destroyed and recreated their environments, 
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developed resource acquisition strategies in groups, built shelters and managed their 
conditions by regulating their ecology. Indeed, the survival and qualitative range of human 
lifeways can be attributed to a history of niche construction activities.  
 
One of the more noticeable products of human niche construction activities is our 
technological history, which has been defined by our ability to innovate tools and strategies 
for adaptive means. Through cultural transmission – channels of communication - humans 
have been able to pass on these informational resources cross-generationally (Sterelny 2007; 
Tomasello 1999). While our great ape relatives (e.g. chimpanzees), are capable of 
constructing new tools and developing adaptive strategies, they are also incapable of passing 
robust knowledge resources cross-generationally. While there is some mimicking behavior 
between elders and juveniles, these learned skills are often never innovated upon, and 
typically always never shared throughout the population. Thus innovation never emerges 
cross-generationally (Tomasello et al 1993). Human niche construction is defined by our 
capacity to not only develop tools but also engineer environments that augment the fidelity of 
information transmission. In the same way that niche construction activities facilitate gene-
reading environments for organisms, human niche construction facilitates the shape the flow 
of cultural information.  
 
4.3 Epistemic Niche Construction.  
 
Engineering activities directly or indirectly influences the informational character of the 
environment, and subsequently the experiences of the next generation. Laland and Odling-
Smee et al (2000) describe ecological inheritance in terms of multiple evolutionary processes 
in operation. There is no causal arrow from culture to minds. Instead, agents play a 
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substantial role in the way in the way in which environments are shaped and inherited. 
Epistemic niche environments constrain the selective cultural environment ensuring that 
cultural variants remain more stable over time (Laland and Odling-Smee 2000).  
 
Cultural transmission - as a form of non-biological inheritance - is peculiar to human niche 
environments. Unlike genes, cultural transmission operates under a variety of inheritance 
modes that are unique to human social environments. Culturally learned tools and strategies 
have influenced the way in which people transmit traditions. We outsource our cognitive 
ability to engineered properties in our environment. In other words, we lean on culturally 
evolved properties to boost the fidelity of cultural transmission. For example, the invention of 
text has noticeably influenced the way in which information is stored and retrieved. The 
advent of literacy and external symbolic devices has significantly boosted the fidelity of 
information transmission.  
 
In addition, we learn in a social environment whereby experts educate novices for a 
variety of adaptive skills. Both our parents and peers influence the breadth and scope of our 
cognitive ability as juveniles. Agents are exposed to and shaped by the developmental 
learning environments they are raised in. The vertical transmission of cultural variants (i.e. 
from parent to offspring) is a particularly robust mode of cultural inheritance. However, 
human agents also benefit from the horizontal (from peer to peer) and oblique (teacher to 
student) modes of transmission also (Boyd and Richerson 1985). The channel of information 
flow is, therefore, not limited to a single mode of inheritance, but distributed across a variety 
of channels. Children learn not only from their parents, but also from their peers who are able 
to pass on their expertise through basic interactions. Often, the passing on of a complex skill 
involves interactions that are carefully coordinated between teacher and student.  
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Epistemic niche construction (ENC) claims that our engineered cultural environments 
support complex cognitive development and function. Structured environments scaffold 
cognitive expertise (Sterelny 2003). The term ‘scaffolding’ refers to how students learn 
through instructional support (Bruner 1960, 1984). Scaffolding describes how learning 
interactions are bolstered by a teacher’s capacity to provide support to a student, while they 
slowly remove their influence as the student eventually gains their autonomy. This method of 
learning is unique amongst humans: we are cooperative and invest time in nurturing skill 
development (Sterelny 2003, 2006). We should view scaffolding, then, as being a component 
of hybrid learning activities. Cognitive development is dependent upon a structured 
interaction between brains and environment (Laland and Odling-Smee 2000; Laland and 
Odling-Smee et al 2000; Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman 2001; Sterelny 2006).  
 
Societies cultivate apprenticeships, guilds and other educational supports for learning 
useful skills, and these intensified methods for learning enhance the fidelity of transmission: 
“Thus human niche construction, partly dependent on socially transmitted 
memes, not only partly shapes the selective environment of genes, but also the 
selection environment of memes. Human material culture, in the form of tools, 
artifacts, and homes, may literally be transmitted from one generation to the 
next, as one aspect of the ecological inheritance of our species (Laland and 
Odling-Smee 2000:132). 
 
 
While it is helpful to consider genetic inheritance as an analogy for cultural inheritance, 
the two modes should not be misinterpreted as functionally comparable. Genetic transmission 
is a high-fidelity mode of inheritance, while cultural transmission does not engage any unit of 
selection (see Chapter 1 and Sperber [1996]). Like Sperber, Sterelny (2003) argues that we 
cannot make strong comparisons between genetic and cultural transmission, as intra-
individual cultural transmission is not high fidelity. However, Sterelny (2003) thinks there is 
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something important to the ENC’s concept that cultural information occupies multiple 
channels of inheritance. Instead of focusing on the unit of selection, we should look at the 
environments in which genes are expressed (Sterelny 2000). Thus, the genetic analogy still 
applies to culture, and like genes, cultural transmission does not operate independently of 
other more crucial developmental resources.  
 
Sterelny states that structured learning environments are necessary to support the fidelity 
of cultural transmission cross-generationally. Preconditions for a robust social learning 
environment (apart from extensive cooperation), depends upon “the intrinsic accuracy of 
cognitive learning mechanisms” and “the control of the developmental environment” 
(Sterelny 2011:810). The fidelity of information depends critically on the mode in which it is 
transmitted. Cooperative social learning has enabled the accumulation of external cognitive 
resources within human cultures. This ‘cognitive capital’ has allowed our species to occupy a 
variety of habitats and exploit a diverse range of natural resources (Sterelny 2006; 2011). We 
are adaptable to a variety of ecological conditions because we have the capacity to share and 
pass on valuable information with others.  
 
Unlike a memetic theory of cultural transmission (see Dawkins 1976), Sterelny and others 
argue that cultural learning is a hybrid process involving features that are basic to human 
cognitive architecture and external environmental properties (Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Donald 1991, 2001; Clark 1998; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Griffiths and Gray 1994; 
Hutchins 1995a; Peter Godfrey-Smith 1998). So while some internal cognitive features are 
innately bound and predictable, we are developmentally plastic in many respects, as we are 
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able to process a wide range informational inputs, while generating a variety of responses to 
these environmental cues (Sterelny 2003).27 
 
According to ENC, environments are structured in a way to support learning development 
and information management. Without a structured learning environment whereby 
communication is organized, the cross-generational transmission of informational resources 
can become unstable. According to Sterelny the ‘bandwidth’ (or volume), and ‘fidelity’ of 
cultural information that is passed on is highly dependent upon the coordination of learning 
interactions (Sterelny 2008, 2011). For example, teacher-student interactions are important to 
the examination of cultural transmission, and apprenticeship style learning characteristically 
involves structured interactions that are developed specifically for coordinating the fidelity of 
communication.  
 
The material on ENC and apprenticeship learning below will be relevant to my own study 
on Māori oral tradition since it supports this dissertation’s claim that religious transmission 
involves costs. The tools and strategies that are developed for the purposes of managing and 
transmitting religious knowledge imply the complexity and volume of information. Cultures 
invest in the innovation of information management tools because the perception of value is 
equal to a culture’s commitment to preserving religious knowledge. The dependency and 
investment in the tools and strategies for supporting transmission underscores the difficulty 
of managing religious information.  
 
                                                
27 In regards to social intelligence, for instance, Sterelny (2003) and others (Dunbar 1998) claim that while 
we come equipped with innate cognitive systems that are sensitive to developmental cues, these systems are 
enhanced by environmental inputs (Sterelny 2003; Sterelny 2006c:229). Social intelligence is enhanced within a 
social environment, and expertise in this domain requires exposure and conditioning to social complexity.  
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Sterelny (2011, 2012) has recently focused his attention on the teacher-student dynamic of 
cultural transmission (oblique transmission modes). Sterelny claims that the coordinated 
learning strategies between teacher and student, and the structured interactions developed by 
humans for pedagogical purposes has had a considerable impact on the way in which our 
cultural environments have been engineered. Without the cooperative sharing of information 
regional diversity – that is, the occupation of diverse niche environments by human 
populations - would not be likely. Humans are quite adept at inhabiting a variety of 
(sometimes-inhospitable) ecological conditions, and Sterelny states that social learning - and 
the cooperative sharing of information - is a crucial prerequisite for this outcome. While 
many species are adapted to stereotyped environments, the sharing of knowledge within 
human cultures has allowed for population expansion and migration.  
 
According to Sterelny, the oblique transfer of information (i.e. from teacher to student) has 
been critical to this development: 
 
“Apprentice learning offers a helpful conceptual model of the synergy 
between organized learning environment and individual cognitive adaptation. 
Apprentice learning is a very powerful mode of social learning, making 
possible the reliable re-acquisition of complex and difficult skills. It is learning 
by doing. But it is learning by doing in an environment seeded with 
informational resources... Moreover, there are many opportunities to learn by 
observing highly skilled practitioners. Often advice is available from both 
experts and peers, for learning is often social and collaborative. Apprentice 
learning depends on individual cognitive adaptations for social learning but it 
depends as well on adaptively structured learning environments.” (Sterelny 
2011:810) 
 
The apprenticeship model – discussed below in relation to ENC - does not necessarily 
disregard the influence of innately bound cognitive systems on transmission, but it does 
underscore the social-environmental importance associated with learning development:  
“Many important cognitive capacities are like literacy: they exist only in 
environments in which they are supported. So, individual cognitive capacities 
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informational labour can be divided: in cooperative environments, agents serve 
as memory and expertise stores for one another, and so individual capacity— 
innate or acquired—does not sharply constrain cultural complexity” (Sterelny 
2011:813). 
 
Information needs to be of high fidelity and stable in order to be preserved. As complexity 
and volume (bandwidth) increases, so does the need for cultures to develop the reliable 
means to store and retrieve information (Sterelny 2011). The ENC model suggests that 
stability and fidelity is partly dependent upon environmentally contingent features. Children 
are raised in an environment whereby the “reliable transmission of skill can begin as a side-
effect of adult activity” (Sterelny 2011:810). Learning can be structured in an “incremental” 
fashion and is the result of the various stages in a person’s maturity (Sterelny 2011:810). 
Juveniles tend to copy - or ape - adult activity without any explicit teaching, while observing 
the conventions that are unique to their surroundings.  
 
Children are also encouraged by adults to playfully engage in activities that indirectly 
support skill development. These activities can also be buffered careful monitored by adults 
with some direction (Sterelny 2011). However, when explicit teaching methods are 
employed, Sterelny states that coordinated apprentice learning can “support high fidelity, 
high bandwidth knowledge flow” (Sterelny 2011:810). An apprenticeship interaction 
involves the coordination of attention and task between teacher and student. Students may be 
provided with explicit instructions in addition to the dissected performance of a specific task. 
Students and teachers monitor progress and evaluate the progression of their skills through 
active engagement, with corrective measures being implemented directly through ‘learning-
by-doing’ (Sterelny 2011).  
 
This is, in part, the nature of scaffolded interactions between teacher and student: 
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“Apprentice learning is a good model of the ways learning environments 
are organized to make possible the transmission of a high volume of 
information with high fidelity. These learning environments can evolve 
gradually, beginning with juvenile interest in parental activities, and parental 
tolerance of their inquisitive exploration. From that platform, there can evolve 
both increasingly sophisticated individual adaptations for social learning, and 
increasing adult support of learning. This form of learning is sufficiently 
powerful to explain the observed phenomena—the maintenance of complex, 
demanding skills in populations without literacy or formal educational 
institutions” (Sterelny 2011:816; emphasis added). 
 
Explicit methods of teaching are achieved between expert and student, and I argue that 
these interactions are influenced by both methods (tools and strategies for learning) and 
cultural norms and conventions. Teaching strategies support the fidelity of information, while 
religious norms and conventions regulate often how this information is shared and perceived. 
Indeed, religious norms are constitutive features of a culture’s epistemic structure. Scaffolded 
learning is relevant to both adaptive strategies and the retention of religious knowledge, and 
the next section will examine this dynamic more closely by looking at traditional Māori 
pedagogical methods against the background of ENC. 
 
4.4 Māori Pedagogy and the Sacred. 
 
 
In her paper “Māori Human Development Learning Theory” (1997), Arapera Royal 
Tangaere examines the similarities between the methods of teaching within the traditional 
oral Māori curriculum, and the fundamental methods of apprenticeship style learning, 
discussed above. She states that traditional Māori pedagogy involved a more holistic structure 
of learning, by incorporating both myth and utilitarian knowledge into a working whole. For 
example, knowledge about the local ecology or geography could be embedded in mythic 
narratives. Knowledge about seasonal changes and local resources was packaged, or 
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interwoven with stories of the ancestors. This is even more noticeable with the learning of 
whakapapa (Roberts 2012), and oral maps (Wilson 1990).  
 
Royal Tangaere (1997) looks at how the coordinated learning employed between teacher 
and apprentice can better clarify how traditional methods of learning amongst Māori were 
developed. She likens pedagogy within a traditional context to the symbolic designs of the 
poutama - the staircase design patterns used in traditional Māori weaving and latticework (or 
tukutuku [see Fig 5). Royal Tangaere associates the staircase pattern with steps that 
symbolically represent Tāne’s ascent to the heavens to gain the baskets of knowledge. This, 
she states, is an analogous model to the teaching and learning methods within her own life (as 
well as traditional Māori methods). Like the theory of scaffolding, a stable platform must be 
built at one level before proceeding to the next step in expertise: 
“The poutama tells me that learning is a process which involved a period of 
time for the task or activity to be understood. This represented by the step’s 
plateau in the poutama. During this period the process of titiro, whakarongo, 
kōrero (repeating, practising, sorting, analysing, experimenting, and reviewing) 
is carried out until the task or activity is understood. Once this is accomplished, 
then the learner ascends, like Tāne, to the next step” (Royal Tangaere 
1997:11). 
 
 
Fig. 5: Tukutuku panels, wooden carving and kowhaiwhai, [ca 1930s]. Digital Image taken from the New 
Zealand National Library, October 2012 (http://mp.natlib.govt.nz/detail/?id=25741) 
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Royal Tangaere underscores the clearer connections between traditional Māori pedagogy 
and Vygotsky’s (1978) zone of proximal development and underlying function of cognitive 
scaffolding (Royal Tangaere 1997:11). The theory attempts to describe what a learner is 
capable of without active assistance from others. Learners gain their skills through exposure 
to either active teaching, or indirectly through non-structured interactions (e.g. basic 
observation). Once these skills are internalised, then further advancement can be realised 
through additional conditioning. Environmental processes scaffold learning and development 
while teachers actively engaging with students in order to support skill development (see 
Bruner 1984).   
 
Expertise is the result of monitored proficiency, with teachers playing an active role in the 
coordination of skill with their students. Royal Tangaere states that this structured interaction 
underlies what is called the Tuakana-Teina relationship, and it is a key dynamic for teaching 
within a traditional Māori context. The Tuakana (an older, more experienced person) usually 
takes a Teina (a less experienced person) under their guard, while guiding them in their 
development towards maturity. Royal Tangaere states that this pedagogical arrangement 
originates from two principles: “‘whanaugatanga’ and ‘ako’ (to learn, and teach)” (Royal 
Tangaere 1997:12; see also Pere 1982), and the pairing of an elder with a juvenile is akin to 
an apprenticeship bond between teacher and student.  
 
Within traditional Māori pedagogy, the sharing of knowledge was carefully regulated by 
cultural norms (Bowdon 1979; Marsden 2003; Metge 1984; Pere 1982). As we shall see in 
the examples below, specific tikanga (rules and customs) governed the transmission of 
knowledge within a traditional Māori context. Elders were typically discriminating in their 
choices for students, with some knowledge considered too tapu (sacred) to be made available 
to the laity. Like other social structures comprised of a hierarchical system, the distribution of 
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knowledge within Māori society was organized in a way to allow for the protection of 
knowledge amongst a select few in the tribe (Best 1922; Best 1924:142-143; Bowdon 1979; 
Marsden 2003):  
“It was the basic tenet of Māoridom that the inner corpus of sacred 
knowledge was not to be shared with the Tūtūā – the common herd – lest such 
knowledge be abused and misused. Such sacred lore was not lightly taught and 
was shared only with selected candidates who after a long apprenticeship and 
testing were deemed fit to hold such knowledge” (Marsden 2003:57). 
 
There is debate over whether there existed any specific schools of learning within tribal 
systems (see Hanson 1989; Hemara 2000:17-23). The concept of a ‘whare wānanga’ - an 
exclusive house of learning - is still a point of contention amongst scholars (Simpson 1997). 
To what extent any school of learning was uniformly widespread is still unsure. But there 
seems to be some consensus amongst scholars that a system of formal learning methods was 
at least efficacious enough to be an intergenerationally relevant feature of transmission 
(Hemara 2000; Thornton 2004). 
 
These methods of learning focused on the transmission of sacred knowledge, as well as 
the nurturing of memory and oral skill. Joan Metge (1984) argues that knowledge was 
defined by the teaching methods employed within the tribal structure. So while some 
members of a tribe learned through regular contact with cultural practices, others were 
required to observe apprenticeship training for the purposes of preserving sacred knowledge 
(Metge 1984; citation from Benavides 2009). The preservation of sacred knowledge, 
therefore, remained in the hands of a smaller number of high-ranking individuals (Bowdon 
1979). As a part of this education, storytelling served a function as a method for teaching 
since these sacred narratives aided in memory retention while obscuring certain details from 
the laity. Mythic narratives served a function as tools for codifying knowledge:  
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“On the one hand legend and myth provided a mechanism to aid ease of 
recall. On the other hand, they were selected as camouflage to hide inner 
meanings from the uninitiated. This thereby preserved abuse and misuse” 
(Marsden 2003:63). 
 
An example of this codification is provided by Marsden (2003), who suggests that the 
story of Tāne’s descent from the heavens - with the three baskets of knowledge - provides a 
clue to the pedagogical structure of early Māori society (see Chapter 3 also). Within the 
myth, Tāne traveled to the heavens and brought back to earth 3 baskets of knowledge:  Te 
kete tuā-uri, Te kete aro-nui and Te kete tua-ātea (Marsden 2003:57): 
“He descended to the seventh heaven where his brothers had completed the 
Whare Wānanga (House of Learning or Wisdom). After the welcome, he had 
to undergo more purification rites to remove the intense sacredness of Io. 
Having completed the purification rites, Tāne entered the Whare Wanange 
named Wharekura and deposited the three Baskets of Knowledge named 
Tuaruri, Aronui and Tua-ātea above the taumata – the sear of authority where 
the seers and sages sat – then deposited the stones Hukatai and Rehutai, one on 
either side of the rear ridge pole” (Marsden 2003:57). 
 
Marsden argues that such stories were indecipherable without some reference to the 
mythical corpus. The preservation and memory of these resources were strongly dependent 
upon the customs of teaching. Subsequently, the pupils of a ‘wānanga’ were subject to a 
rigorous initiation prior to membership:  
“Prior to entry into the Wānanga, selected and screened candidates or pupils 
(tauira) were required to go through certain initiation and purification rites 
which also included dedication to a particular tutelary deity such as Tangaroa, 
Tāne and Rongo in accordance with the major specialisation that he wished to 
pursue. His first action when he entered the Wānanga house was to proceed to 
the rear ridge pole, pick up and place Hukatai (sea foam) – the white stone – in 
his mouth and symbolically swallow it, after which he replaced it. This was a 
reminder that all knowledge and therefore to be nurtured and treasured. Only 
then could they be fed with the sacred food of the baskets of knowledge” 
(Marsden 2003:58). 
 
 Students of the wānanga were not considered adepts until they had undergone some form 
of hardship, by testing their commitment to the Wānanga: 
“On approaching graduation, the students were required to undergo some 
searching tests. Those dedicated to Tāne were, for instance, ordered to go to 
the forest without any food supplies, sometimes for several weeks and were 
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expected to fend for themselves, living off the bounty provided by Tāne. It was 
a period of meditation and/or fasting in which they were not only expected to 
practice their bush craft but also to learn to commune with the spirit of their 
tutelary deity and return with some original knowledge. Their graduation 
depended upon their passing the rigorous tests and examinations imposed by 
the sages” (Marsden 2003:58). 
 
The students themselves should be able to prove both their commitment and ability to 
remember and preserve the mythic corpus. Benavides (2009) states that this perception of 
knowledge by traditional Māori clearly distinguishes it from the Western epistemic paradigm, 
since was knowledge was conceived as a static entity that could not be altered through a 
wider dissemination:  
“In strong contrast with the Western frame, regarding the status of the 
experts, despite the respect directed towards them, their knowledge is not 
exempt from scrutiny, any item of knowledge may -or should- be questioned 
and challenged, and of course replaced if it is seen as necessary by the 
academic community. In a traditional Māori context however, the tapu is seen 
as protecting traditional knowledge -already sanctioned, revised and accepted 
through other means and channels- from any kind of scrutiny, obeying to a 
very different logic in regard to the possible results of such initiative... One 
characteristic aspect of Tāne's quest for the baskets reinforces the notion of the 
protected status of Māori knowledge and that is the image of the basket in 
itself, which transmits the idea of a fixed and finite body of knowledge.” 
(Benavides 2009:36-37 [emphasis added]). 
 
As Benavides states here, the three baskets of knowledge acquired by Tāne has a special 
significance within the Māori framework of knowledge. Te kete tuā-uri, Te kete aro-nui and 
Te kete tua-ātea all represent various types of knowledge with Tuā-uri representing the 
“patterns of energy behind this world of sense perception” (Marsden 2003:60). While Te Aro-
nui represents knowledge within the natural world (all things that can be obtained through 
sense perception), Te Ao Tua-ātea represents the infinite realm beyond space, time and matter 
(Marsden 2003). The epistemic domain is subsequently influenced by this conception of 
knowledge as being held in containers corresponding to different qualities of knowledge. The 
conception of knowledge as being something bounded suggests that it was perceived as a 
‘physical’ thing. Tribal knowledge – once passed on – was observed as taonga (treasure) to 
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be protected and those who had this knowledge passed onto them were expected to 
subsequently transmit the same mātauranga intact (Royal 2005). 
 
 
As discussed above, the fidelity of transmission from teacher to student was better 
coordinated through specific pedagogical techniques that underscored mnemonic retention 
and eloquence. Mātauranga Māori (traditional knowledge of the Māori) was believed to be 
knowledge that had been passed down since the first Polynesian arrivals to Aotearoa, and had 
since been adapted to the new islands (Royal 2005:134). Traditional Māori social structure 
was based on a kinship network, and so knowledge of whakapapa (genealogy) was an 
intrinsically valuable resource, connecting tribes and individuals to their own history and 
identity. Whakapapa - as discussed in Chapter 3 – functioned as an epistemic device, and a 
means by which the universe and social order could be ordered.  
 
Rangimarie Rose Pere (1982) claims that higher ranking individuals within a tribe were 
legitimated by familial descent and those in who could trace their descent from senior lines 
were typically in possession of a wider range of historical and genealogical knowledge:  
“The serious responsibility of passing on this knowledge was that of the 
senior most persons of each ‘whanau’. People from the ‘rangatira’ class had a 
lot more information transmitted to them about the genealogies and the life 
experiences of ancestors within descent lines, because they were included in, 
and involved with the higher schools of esoteric learning. The more 
knowledgeable people would not only know their own direct descent lines, but 
also the names of spouses and siblings within collateral lines, including links 
they had with other tribal areas. Obviously a depth of knowledge about 
whakapapa and related issues gave an individual advantage within the group” 
(Pere 1982:10).  
 
The tribal structure meant that the Pākeke (elders) were the custodians of the tribal history. 
Indeed, this custom is still a core part of knowledge sharing today. Knowledge was (and still 
is) intrinsic to the social structure within traditional Māori culture. But there are also deep 
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political conditions – such as the sacred legitimating of hierarchy- within the tribal structure 
that ensure the regulation of information channels. The political scope of knowledge sharing 
can be fundamentally reduced to tribal and familial connections, but these structures are also 
governed by the norms associated with information control. As Nēpia Mahuika (2012) states, 
there are social boundaries inherent with the sharing of knowledge by elders: 
“Genealogical lines open and close access to various individuals and 
families, and are based largely on kin groups, or hapu and marae connections. 
Similarly, the age gap between the interviewer and interviewee can also have a 
significant bearing on the outcome of the interview. Pressing an older relative 
for more information or probing for deeper recollections can quickly become 
intrusive and be regarded as disrespectful. The correct navigation of these 
intergenerational relationships is based on fundamental codes of conduct such 
as manaakitanga, in which respect and hospitality is paramount” (Mahuika 
2012:36).  
 
The ‘codes of conduct’, which were so critical to the transmission and regulation of 
knowledge within traditional Māori society, also impact on the opportunity to access 
knowledge resources. Though the content of knowledge was observed as sacred, so were the 
customs associated with learning, and accessibility to knowledge though oral means is 
subject. Knowledge is therefore shared within the bounds of the culture’s customs. These 
conventions have a practical and spiritual significance for Māori also: since the customs 
involving information sharing are strict, it follows that tribal knowledge can be better 
preserved by making information expensive to access. The sacred observations associated 
with the transmission of knowledge serves a function for maintaining its protected status.  
 
Following this section on Māori pedagogy, the next section will look specifically at the 
skills for memory and transmission that were nurtured within traditional Māori culture. 
Knowledge sharing within a traditional context involves the capacity to retain and reliably 
pass on information to the next generation. Skills in both memory retention and oral 
communication would have been key to the enhancing the fidelity of transmission. I argue 
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that mnemonic ability and oral eloquence within a traditional Māori context were critical to 
the success of being able to preserve sacred knowledge across generations. I will then return 
to how this is relevant to ENC and the apprentice model, discussed in the first half of this 
chapter. I argue that the recruitment external cultural properties and processes are more 
relevant to the transmission of sacred knowledge than domain specific cognitive engines. 
Both memory and eloquence are cognitive tools that are structured into the niche 
environment and support transmission within a religious context.  
 
4.5 Māori Orality: eloquence and memory.  
 
 
In her thesis “‘Kōrero Tuku Iho’: Reconfiguring Oral History and Oral Tradition”, Nēpia 
Mahuika (2012) takes an extensive look into her own tribal practices involving oral memory 
and transmission. The interviews that Mahuika conducts with members of her own tribe, 
Ngāti Porou, are revealing as her subjects share their own views on orality in a modern 
context alongside their understanding of traditional oral practices. What is salient from her 
study is that there are embedded prejudices still associated with the sharing of traditional 
knowledge. These principles, which could be viewed as a product of intergenerational 
politics, also stem from embedded cultural beliefs in the sacred status of knowledge sharing 
(Mahuika 2012). As one of her interviewees Te Uira Manihera from Tainui states here: 
“The handing down of knowledge by old people is a very difficult thing. 
They have a look at their children and perhaps their oldest son. If he is mature 
enough or interested enough in his Māori, he might become the repository. But 
a lot of people say no. They would sooner take a knowledge of their oral 
traditions with them than pass them on to the present generation. They believe 
that if it goes to another person outside the family, in a short time it will have 
dissolved, absorbed by all the other people who have access to it. There is also 
a fear that by giving things out they could be commercialised. If this happens, 
they lose their sacredness, their fertility. They just become common” (Mahuika 
2012: 38). 
 
Again, the belief that mauri (life force) is thought to be weakened when shared with those 
outside of the tribal structure is a common epistemic thread that links the perception of 
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information sharing mediums. Even those who are able to communicate knowledge within 
the tribe are careful to pass on sacred knowledge to responsible parties. These interviews 
show that there is a general cautionary attitude associated with the transmission of knowledge 
within Māori culture even today.  
 
In her own research, Mahuika had to guarantee that elders oversaw the interviews she 
conducted in order to ensure that protocol was upheld (Mahuika 2012:44). She states that 
within the tribal structure of the Ngāti Porou special individuals were “charged with the 
responsibility” of retaining and preserving tribal knowledge (Mahuika 2012:278). This shows 
that the memorizing oral traditions was managed through specialization, with the elders or 
religious leaders being guardians of a group’s history: 
“What they remember as individuals is significant to the collective memory 
of the tribe as a whole because they are charged with the responsibility to hold 
our histories and traditions together” (Mahuika 2012:278). 
 
Mahuika states throughout her thesis that practices associated with ‘collective memory’ 
are central to an understanding of the retention of oral history in Ngāti Porou. Memory 
techniques were traditionally employed when elders passed on knowledge to others within 
the tribe (see passage by Anaru Kupenga at the beginning of this chapter [Mahuika 
2012:279]). The practiced retention of oral knowledge was therefore incorporated into 
pedagogical methods and purposefully designed to engage memory and speech ability, so that 
students were expected to be ‘correct’ in their rehearsal and performance of oral skills.  
 
Similarly, Mervyn Evan McLean (1961) talks of how traditional Māori chants or waiata 
(songs) were learned and rehearsed accurately so as to preserve the structure and sacred 
content of the songs. Tradition was maintained through a disciplined practice of the songs’ 
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performance. There was no room for error or improvisation when performing and mistakes 
were typically corrected to standard: 
“The chants of the Māori have survived until now entirely through oral 
tradition. Associated with this oral tradition is an extreme concern for the 
accurate transmission of the chants. This concern showed itself in recording 
sessions by a notable reluctance to record without practice, except when the 
song was well known, and by an outright refusal to record when any 
uncertainty existed in text or in tune. Sometimes a group of singers would 
practise a song for a long time-perhaps twenty minutes-and then abandon it in 
favour of another after mistakes had been discovered which could not be put 
right” (McLean 1961:59).  
 
 
McLean (1961) goes on to discuss the critical attention to detail that was given by 
performers of these chants who treated their lapses in memory as “an omen of death or 
disaster” (McLean 1961:59). Inaccurate performances were monitored and assessed by others 
(particularly the by the leaders of the group). As a result, a great deal of preparation went into 
the performance with those not only learning the words and melody to the song, but the 
history and context of the chant: 
“Concern for the accurate transmission of the songs can be seen also in the 
long discussion of the historical background of each song which typically 
preceded recording and in the detailed announcements which were invariably 
made concerning the songs by singer or leader immediately before recording. 
These discussions would sometimes occupy up to three-quarters of an hour 
before it was felt that the details to be announced by the leader were beyond 
dispute. Once singing began, the aim was always to sing both words and music 
as near to the original as possible. Since much of the responsibility for this lies 
with the leader, the training traditionally undergone by the leader was very 
severe” (McLean 1961:59).  
 
 
Indeed, as Margaret Orbell (1990) states, performers of traditional Māori waiata were 
required to rehearse thoroughly and commit to memory the repertoire of songs. As a result 
waiata incorporated a variety of themes and conventions that functioned as formulaic and 
structural properties within the songs (Orbell 1990). The use of rhythm, rhyme and structure 
were not uncommon devices used in traditional oratory performances, and these devices are 
commonly seen (particularly by researchers on Pacific oral traditions), as methods for aiding 
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the performer in remembering and communicating (Ong 1982). But they also assist in the 
pedagogical methods employed between teacher and student for memorization. As Mahuika 
(2012) states here:  
 
“The rhythmic and mnemonic ‘patterns’ were not specifically addressed by 
the interviewees, nevertheless, they did note the process of remembering as a 
repetitious activity that mimicked the tone, phrases and orality of their teachers 
and mentors. Tia Neha recalls that the oral dimensions of songs and stories 
were ‘modelled’ and practiced for hours every week over a select period of 
time” (Mahuika 2012:298). 
 
Mahuika argues that oral learning is not only comprised of structures intrinsic to the ‘text’ 
which is passed on, but that there are structured social interactions established between 
teachers or mentors, and their students. The social dimension of orality is often overlooked in 
oral-formulaic approaches to oral traditions. Repetition and accuracy appears to be critical to 
the teaching style incorporated into traditional Māori teaching methods, and being able to 
memorize and speak ‘properly’ were skill-sets that were taught within an apprenticeship 
designed to nurture young orators.  
 
Similarly, Poia Rewi (2010) recent book Whaikōrero: The World of Māori Oratory (2010) 
discusses the importance placed upon learning and performing oratory correctly. Both speech 
and memory skills were highly regarded in a traditional context, and those who carried 
themselves publicly as a proficient orator were (and are) held in high regards by the tribe. 
Since orators were the practitioners and protectors of knowledge transmission for the tribe, 
memory and communication skills were considered critical to the nurturing of students: 
“Having a good memory was one of the criteria by which students were 
accepted to attend traditional whare wānanga. Limiting external stimuli and 
keeping students isolated were thought to be conducive to developing 
mnemonic abilities” (Rewi 2010:23). 
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We find evidence for pedagogical methods employed for the purpose of oratory skill 
among some of the earliest literature on Māori education, and Best (1923) and Smith (1913) 
took a special interest in whare wānanga (i.e. schools for learning). As stated, there is still 
debate over what form these schools took (and whether they actually existed) (Rewi 2010:23-
24), nevertheless the evidence suggests that the preservation of knowledge was underpinned 
by techniques that were aimed at enhancing both oratory and memory skill (Mahuka 2012; 
Rewi 2010). One of the purposes for refining these skills was for the accurate and faithful 
cross-generational transmission of knowledge: 
“The objective of whare wānanga was the preservation of ‘all desirable 
knowledge’ pertaining to religious belief of the upper echelon, cosmogony and 
other traditional lore, and to hand this down to succeeding generations as 
accurately as possible. In opposition to the Western view of Māori as a culture 
devoid of literacy and literary artifacts, Māori scholars in the past were trained 
in oral history and had a ‘highly developed mnemonic capacity’ that 
‘astounded counterparts from other traditions’. The whare wānanga was clearly 
an important institution for the oral perpetuation of knowledge” (Rewi 
2010:24; see also Best 1923:6’). 
 
Methods for developing memory and oral style have been a recurrent feature within 
ethnographic literature oral cultures and so it is no surprise that we find similar methods 
enhancing memory and orality within the Māori oral tradition. Orators are instruments for the 
transmission of tapu knowledge to the extent that only those individuals with maturity and 
skill would have been chosen to perform oratory (and these individuals would have been 
chosen either at birth, or at a very young age if a talent was recognized). Rewi states that 
students would undergo an apprenticeship following their induction into a mentoring 
immersion: 
“We need to be aware of the fact that in former times not all people were 
privileged to receive traditional teachings... They [elders] preferred to identify 
talent, or potential, and then to mentor such individuals on a one-to-one basis” 
(Rewi 2010:29). 
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It is clear from Rewi’s research on the topic of Māori orality that there are practices and 
techniques unique to a traditional learning style that have subsequently been passed on and 
considered not only a relevant connection to the past, but an active form of performance in 
the present.  
 
I argue that while memory and eloquence has contributed to the aesthetic of oral 
performance, expertise in the verbal arts additionally scaffolds the fidelity of cultural 
transmission. Apprenticeships for oratory were highly structured immersions in the craft and 
art of memory and eloquence. But the methods of delivery were also taught alongside the 
content. Thus, we see a systematic and well-established approach to skill development for 
oratory within a traditional Māori context (Rewi 2010: 30-31).  
 
Similarly, Mahuika (2012) also states that one of the purposes for teaching oratory skills 
in a wānanga was to preserve tribal knowledge. Rewi cites Best’s (1923) observation that the 
acquisition of memory techniques was critical for the preservation of tapu knowledge: 
“...memory was central to the success of the student who attended the 
wānanga of old whose tutors view these institutions as sanctuaries in which 
Māori could aspire to conserve knowledge in its purest form... Instant recall 
was an asset for both the scholar and orator, and the mnemonic capacity of 
students was acknowledged and respected” (Rewi 2010:24). 
 
A certain capacity for memorization would have been essential for orality, but the formal 
presentation of an oral performance was highly regarded, also (Mahuika 2012:169). Mita 
Carter (2005) states that while mnemonic retention of whakapapa (genealogy) are important 
for orators, it is the delivery of the speech that is assessed by members of the tribe. In the 
recitation of whakapapa: “attention was given not to the substance of the whakapapa but to 
the intonation of the recital” (Carter 2005:43). This suggests that certain standards of 
eloquence were required before an orator could be taken seriously: 
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“The practice of recitation was a central part of Māori life... and thus the 
children learnt not only conversational speech but also to admire and memorise 
the higher forms of speech, which contained references to mythology, 
genealogy and tradition, and which were enriched with figures of speech and 
appropriate chants (Carter 2005:43).  
 
Carter states that the learning methods for orality emphasized an orthodox approach to 
training in both preserving knowledge and speech. For example, Carter outlines a particular 
method where practicing orators would have to place a stone in their mouth called a “waha 
kōhatu” when rehearsing. This technique acted as both “an aid to memory,” and a preventive 
measure for “stammering” (Carter 2005:43).28  
 
Whaikōrero is traditionally considered a developmentally advanced skill, regulated by 
norms and standards of conduct (Rewi 2010). Rewi states that only those with mana (some 
with prestige or high social standing) would have been allowed to deliver whaikōrero, and 
their oratory abilities are still a learned skill for this purpose. The command of language, and 
ability to memorize genealogy and tribal relations was (and is currently) critical for 
maintaining a speaker’s status, and their esteem as an orator. Gaining this status is one thing, 
but poor oratory skills can always potentially diminish “the mana of the group he represents” 
(Rewi 2010:56).  
 
The orthodoxy of memory and speech is a critical necessity during oral performances 
undertaken on a marae (sacred community space), and since these spaces were created for 
public communication, special attention was (and is) given to the recitation of whakapapa 
and public speaking. Modern marae are structured in a way to convey information alongside 
oratories through the rich symbolic resources – e.g. such as carving, gesture, liturgy, and 
                                                
28 Many thanks to Mahuika (2012) for reference to this, and Mita Carter’s article: “The Preservation of the 
Māori Oral Tradition” (2005) (Mahuika 2012:169-170).  
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ritual - that are present. It is therefore important to put the study of orality and memory into a 
performance context, since a variety of tools are active in the transmission of information on 
a modern marae. Subsequently, a comprehensive understanding of the oral performance itself 
cannot be found in the words alone. Indeed Mahuika (2012) talks of how marae functions as 
a symbolic technology that is used coactively alongside speech to support the transmission of 
knowledge: 
“Oral history and traditions in these spaces were heard and experienced, its 
form transmitted in living contexts, where the performance weaved together 
the ceremonial cries of welcome to visitors (karanga), the art of formal 
speeches (whaikōrero), and the singing of ancient songs (mōteatea). Here the 
form is aural and physical, seen in body movement, traditional gestures, and 
facial expressions, where intonation, rhythm and silence are displayed and 
seen. The wealth of oral transmission here is layered and living, but perhaps 
the most significant aspect of the marae is its aesthetics, its fully carved 
meeting houses, walls adorned with carvings, photographs, intricate patterns, 
weavings, and other visual stimulants” (Mahuika 2012:130). 
 
Carvings and other symbolic artifacts were commonly used as “physical aids” in 
conjunction with the verbal arts (Mahuika 2012:132). Symbolic structures such as whakairo 
(carvings) were, and are, viewed as ‘oral sources’ and deemed “‘living’ entities that carry the 
mauri (life force) of the ancestors they represent” (Mahuika 2012:132). Roberts and Wills 
(1998) also state that visual cues were utilized in the cueing of memory, while the word 
whaikorero, or Māori carving translates as: “to make knowledge visible” (Roberts and Wills 
1998:53). In addition, knowledge was stored in “patterns of cloaks (taniko), in facial 
decorations (moko), and string games (whai)” (Roberts and Wills 1998:53). It is therefore 
difficult to take orality out of the physical context into which it was (and is now) taught and 
performed  (Best 1922; King 1978; Hemara 2000; Haami 2004). 
 
The examples above demonstrate the complexity of managing and transmitting knowledge 
databases through oral means. The ENC model underscores the importance of social learning 
  
  167 
in developing cognitive expertise. I have chosen to focus on two points from ENC here: 1) 
that informational complexity determines the breadth and mode of learning strategies that are 
used to augment the fidelity of the information being transmitted socially; and also: 2) how 
information can be regulated through cultural/social conventions. The above examples show 
that skills in both memory and eloquence are scaffolded by learning strategies for the 
purposes of facilitating the preservation and communication of the information being passed 
on. The authors’ here show that traditional Māori oral practices are the result of highly 
structured interactions and that the tools for learning skills for oratory are embedded in the 
conventions and norms. So methods by which fidelity and stability are maintained can be 
found through the pedagogical strategies that have been developed for oral transmission 
purposes.  
 
It can be claimed, then, that the ENC model maps well onto some of the ethnographic 
research conducted by the authors on traditional Māori pedagogy and orality. Niche 
environments are engineered to scaffold the transmission of religious knowledge. In turn, 
sacred conventions regulate the flow of information. However, the critical direction for this 
thesis is how religious enculturation (that is, the cross-generational transmission of sacred 
knowledge) involves a certain level of cognitive investment. The sophisticated methods by 
which sacred knowledge is preserved and transmitted within Māori oral tradition implies both 
the perceived value of explicit religious concepts (i.e. cosmogonical knowledge or theology), 
and the complexity associated with this class of knowledge.  
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4.6 Discussion. 
 
Both learning and performance are embedded within a cultural network whereby the 
resources for information transmission are widely distributed in a structured environment. 
Furthermore, a wide range of cultural properties within the epistemic niche support the 
cognitive skills associated with both orality and memory. The study of oral traditions can be 
better understood from a psychological viewpoint when we take into account how 
information is managed through certain skill-sets and cultural conventions. The fidelity and 
stability of knowledge transmission is, therefore, determined by culturally innovated 
techniques for communication. The ENC model is a means by which to describe how 
cognitive ability and information flow is shaped by environmental factors working alongside 
psychological constraints. I argue that this is an important contribution to the CSR, and 
understanding the characteristics associated with religious transmission. Locally contingent 
factors, such as pedagogy and taboos are just as important to describing the religious mind as 
domain-specific features of our cognitive architecture.  
 
The descriptive material discussed here on traditional methods of learning within Māori 
culture describes how cultural conventions shape the flow of information. Cultural norms, 
based on of tapu (sacred) observances, have had an extensive impact on the way in which 
knowledge is shared. From the descriptive literature, we can deduce the high level of 
investment involved in the transmission of sacred knowledge through oral means. A religious 
education can resemble something like an apprenticeship – associated with the transference 
of complex skill-based expertise - and less like a cognitively optimal pattern of transmission. 
In addition, while we may be able to predict some of the basic underlying traits associated a 
sacred observance, many pedagogical strategies associated with a religious education appear 
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to be context bound. The costs involved in this enterprise runs counter to a model that 
presumes that the frequency of representations is causally related to intuitive cognitive 
systems. Instead, the frequency of beliefs and practices seem to be largely dependent upon 
active engagement with a structured learning environment. This describes why religious 
beliefs and practices are peculiar to the cultural niche in which agents inhabit. Instead of 
religious motivations emerging from domain-specific cognitive systems alone, there are also 
multiple connections that we can identify in conjunction with both the motivational salience 
of theologically correct beliefs and practices (i.e. explicit representations), and the structured 
methods of cultural transmission. The breadth and variation of religious activity within 
cultures suggests that memory systems are also active, and these internal systems need to 
exploit external cognitive resources for support (Clark 1998; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Day 
2004a, 2005; Hutchins 1995a; Whitehouse 2004).  
 
In addition, cognitive ecological models offer a picture of human cognition that is more in 
line with the ethnographic literature on human cultural behavior. This chapter therefore 
makes three general points about the cognitive anthropology of religious learning: 1) In order 
to support the reliability of information transfer, individuals engage in the structured 
coordination of learning religious knowledge. The pedagogical environment is therefore 
crucial to the fidelity of transmission; 2) Sacred conventions regulate the flow of information 
suggesting that the informational character of the environment is shaped by religious norms; 
3) Epistemic niche construction suggests that knowledge is context-bound. The informational 
character of a niche is comprised of variables that are locally contingent.  
 
However, there is glaring concern that maybe obvious to some readers with this premise 
on the outset. For instance, if the problem of fidelity and stability of cultural representations 
  
  170 
is maintained through learning methods, it is easy to see how functional skills - e.g. such as 
hunting skills, foraging and navigation - are a consequence the practices discussed above. 
However, religious knowledge appears to serve no adaptive-utilitarian benefits for 
individuals or groups. The purpose of the stability of religious transmission - in an adaptive 
sense - is unclear in the case of religious transmission. Subsequently, unless the underlying 
mechanisms of religious activity can be identified as being causally relevant within an ENC 
model, then it will be problematic to demonstrate a connection between the fidelity of 
transmission and the prevalence of religious knowledge.  
 
However, I do not expect that this kind of criticism will be a problem for this thesis. My 
goal is to demonstrate how our cognitive architecture is coactive with the cultural resources 
that support religious transmission. My job, therefore, is to show how the complexity of 
information is managed through external cognitive resources and how this matters to the 
structure of the cultural niche. The presentation of the ENC model is intended to provide an 
alternative to SiM. A cognitive ecological model demonstrates that any explanation for the 
spread of religious representations is going to entail a complex, multi-causal description that 
falls outside the scope of cognitive optimality, and these costs and investments are 
demonstrated well by the ethnographic and historical material on religious traditions 
(Whitehouse 2004).  
 
Despite the cosmogonical features connected to the interpretation of the beliefs and 
practices of traditional Māori, this chapter has focused on the cognitive dimensions of 
learning and development. In this chapter it was argued that cognitive processes depended 
upon non-biological resources for learning: we learn and are raised in a niche that is 
structured to support cognitive development and expertise. The cultural tools embedded 
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within the niche environment therefore, scaffold learning and cognition. This is both a 
cooperative and technological feature of human lifeways. We share information and have 
innovated cultural tools for transmitting information more faithfully.  
 
The next chapter will explore the concept of material engagement further and provide 
more detail on how memory and the physical environment are relevant to this examination on 
structured learning (see Malafouris 2004). Instead of providing a causal explanation for 
religious activity, the next chapter will look at how external cultural properties are recruited 
for cognition for the purposes of developing conceptual structures in relation to myths and 
maps. Subsequently, Chapter 5 will return to my own examination of oral maps as a means 
for organizing information in relation to oral narratives. Returning to the use of geography, 
spatial imagery and memory within a Pacific context, the next chapter will provide a more 
detailed approach to examining the problem of stability and fidelity within the CSR by 
looking at how physical structures, in conjunction with mental processes, help to support 
transmission. It will further examine the connection properties between mental processes and 
macro-spatial knowledge from the point-of-view of a distributed cognition and conceptual 
blending. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1 Introduction.  
 
This chapter takes a closer look at the use of traditional Māori oral maps in conjunction 
with other cognitive ecological perspectives on human cognition. Cartographer Jan Kelly 
(1999) states that oral Māori maps were traditionally known as 'nga tapuwae o nga matua 
tupuna' ('the footsteps of the ancestors'); or 'nga waewae tapu' ('the sacred footsteps'); or 'nga 
hoehoe tapu' ('the sacred paddlesteps') (Kelly 1999:16). Kelly states that oral maps (and 
navigation) functioned by recounting the place names of geographical locations in sequential 
order. She states that a distinction should be made between the ways in which Māori perceive 
representations of geography and the ways in which Europeans – at the time – utilised formal 
cartographic principles for navigation. Instead of maps being a purely visual-symbolic 
language (as European maps are), Māori recounted maps orally as pathways or routes that 
were sequentially labelled with place names. These place names were historically (and 
mythically) significant to the people, and served a multivalent function: as navigational 
markers and historical libraries for which stories and myths could be used to cue information 
about the landscape.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, Māori incorporated place names into mythical stories in which a 
narrative would follow the deeds of ancestors or supernatural beings along a specific route. 
Place names on the route followed a logical sequence across the landscape and subsequently 
acted as a map. Narratives that included the sequencing of place names served a function for 
organizing information about the landscape also (Wilson 1990; see Chapter 3). It is argued 
here in this chapter that sacred knowledge was intertwined with knowledge of the landscape 
because Māori cosmogony was tied to valuable information about the terrain. Though we 
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may be compelled to think of these features of the traditional Māori epistemic world as 
distinguishable from one another, it is urged that researchers consider how myth, history, 
kinship and the land were once perceived of as mutually associated. Physical markers – such 
as landmarks – were (and are) regarded as a testament to a living history for a people, and 
further active reminders of an ancestral history.  
 
The last chapter focused on the fidelity of learning, and how transmission was augmented 
by traditional cultural practices. This approach highlighted the social dimensions of oral 
learning. The authors discussed in this chapter who endorse a similar externalist model of 
cognition and learning. Authors like Edwin Hutchins (1995a), Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (Clark and Chalmers 1998) and Merlin Donald (1991) suggest a moderated 
alternative to a cognitivist approach by focusing on how external objects support mental 
processes. These authors argue that there are fundamental connections between external 
cultural objects and human cognitive ability. These externalist models of mind have been 
outlined previously within distributed cognition models (Hutchins 1995a, 1995b; Sutton 
2010) and extended mind models (Clark 1998; Clark and Chalmers 1998).  
 
Framed within a general cognitive ecological approach, like ENC, external-distributed 
models of mind generally claim that culturally evolved features of our environment can 
explain both the breadth and depth human cognitive expertise. Similarly to the ENC model, it 
is argued that agents have shaped their environments, and that these engineered environments 
have a critical impact on human minds and behaviour. Material culture has subsequently 
evolved alongside hominin cognitive development. Like the ENC model, extended-
distributed cognitive models view the mind has being cognitively plastic (locally adaptable), 
and subsequently sensitive to proximate developmental conditions. So instead of focusing on 
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just the biological features of our intelligence, these models view cognition as an emergent 
property, generated by the interaction between both biological (internal) and non-biological 
(external) cognitive properties. The literature on external-distributed models has embraced 
the idea that cognitive evolution and proximate cognitive development is the product of co-
evolved processes (constituted by organism-environment interactions).  
 
According to an extended mind approach, for instance, features of our world should be 
conceived as constituting our intelligence (Clark 1997, 1998; Clark and Chalmers 1998). On 
Andy Clark's view, our cognitive abilities are extended and active with material things in our 
environments. Text-based media, for example, pen and paper, are recruited as information 
storage and retrieval devices that further broaden the scope of our memory resources. It is 
more apparent to see how physical artifacts, such as maps, can be classified as cognitive 
devices since they expand the range of capabilities available to brain-bound processes (such 
as the memorization of the landscape). However, as shall be argued further here, while 
informational complexity naturally emerges out of the use of external symbolic devices (e.g. 
such as maps) it should not necessarily follow that oral traditions were somehow lacking in 
cognitive resources for memory with similar value.   
 
This chapter will therefore discuss how non-biological cognitive strategies and tools have 
been utilised within oral cultures for managing and organizing knowledge. In particular, this 
chapter focuses on the use of oral maps and navigation, and how geographic properties are 
recruited for cognitive purposes for supporting oral transmission. Maps were traditionally 
transmitted orally within traditional Māori culture, and physical markers – such as 
geographical locations – were commonly present within myths as narrative devices. 
Likewise, myths were employed to recall the macro-spatial knowledge and the ecological 
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conditions specific to regions on the landscape. It will be argued that valuable informational 
resources were preserved by exploiting variety of cognitive inputs (i.e. such as physical 
landmarks), and once combined these input spaces become powerful cognitive tools for 
conceptual reasoning and memory (Hutchins 2005).  
 
Before examining the specifics of oral maps, however, the next sections will take a brief 
tour through some of the relevant material on extended-distributed cognition models (EM). It 
is important that any EM model is able to elaborate on the on the causally relevant details 
associated with mind-environment interactions. As we shall see, the focus on physical 
cognitive properties by EM is complicated by the lack of enduring material culture by pre-
contact Māori in the archaeological record. If external things augment intelligence, it should 
follow that that environments are commensurate with cognitive expertise. I will argue that 
this could be problematic for studying pre-literate cultures that noticeably lacked access to 
extensive symbolic resources. Subsequently, we must be careful in the application of EM 
since certain inferences can be skewed towards a textually biased conception of intelligence. 
This bias assumes that the optimal method for managing informational complexity is through 
external symbolic artifacts. The early sections of this chapter will therefore be spent 
clarifying the parameters on an applicable cognitive ecological approach for our case study. I 
will argue that we need to focus on the dynamics involved in mind-environment interactions 
within oral cultures, and so the simple premise that material culture augments cognitive skill 
is insufficient for the case study.  
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5.2 First and Second Wave Extended Mind Models. 
 
Edwin Hutchins’ book Cognition in the Wild (1995a) sets out by describing the work 
that is conducted upon a pre-GPS naval vessel and its navigation. He observes how the 
devices and individuals onboard the boat are ‘distributed’ in such a way to facilitate both 
navigation and the operation of the vessel. A nautical chart is an external representational 
device used for navigating a real-world environment. Meanwhile the duties aboard the 
ship are distributed amongst the naval ranks, with various skills being assigned to 
individuals dedicated to a specific task. Both tools and specialisation are distributed in 
such a way to ensure the vessel’s operation. Generally, Hutchins uses this example to 
describe how external artifacts are recruited for tasks outside the basic brain, and the way 
in which these cognitive tools enhance our intelligence by expanding the range of skills 
applied to complex tasks. According to Hutchins, material culture and individual 
expertise constitute a cognitive distribution of labour, since the burden of managing a 
variety of complex activities can be unloaded onto artifacts or people. A distributed 
cognition model describes how our minds are supported by both the social (agents) and 
technological (tools and strategies) cultural properties.  
 
While extended mind models (developed more noticeably by Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers [Clark and Chalmers 1998]), are similar to Hutchins’ model there are some 
noticeable and subtle differences in their conceptual approaches to brain-environment 
boundaries. Clark’s extended mind model claims that environments share the same 
functional qualities as brains, whereas Hutchins argues that tools, strategies and social 
agents merely support cognitive processes. Nevertheless, both these approaches are 
relevant criticisms against representationalist models of cognition. For instance, 
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cognitivist (or internalist) models (see Chapter 1) argue that the majority of cognitive 
processes are stereotyped events that can be causally related to specialized internal 
systems, while Hutchins and Clark argue that humans inhabit environmental ‘smart 
structures’ replete with informational resources (Tribble 2005).  
 
Similarly, Merlin Donald (1991, 2001) has argued that the evolutionary impact of 
information storage through the use of external symbols has led to the widening of the human 
external memory field (Donald 1991: 354). Donald's own focus of research has been how the 
co-evolution between external communicative mediums (e.g. such as symbolic artifacts) and 
hominin cognition has further led to a greater capacity to store and retrieve information in our 
environment. Donald is clear in stating that the evolution of human cognition has evolved 
alongside technological developments in our ancestral history: 
“I am referring to a class of manufactured objects that are sometimes called 
'symbolic technologies'. These are specifically designed to represent, 
communicate and store knowledge. Such objects introduce a completely new 
element into human cognition: external, that is, non-biological, memory store 
(as in an encyclopaedia, for example). Non-biological memory media enable us 
to record and display complex ideas in highly accessible format that are easy to 
revise and refine” (Donald 2010:71). 
 
According to Donald human representational ability and memory has been broadened with 
the development of symbolic material culture and the use of external media devices. Donald 
therefore splits human memory capabilities into two categories: 1) engrams: neurologically 
based memory storage (i.e. internal systems); 2) exograms: non-neurologically based 
memory store (i.e. external properties) (see Donald 2010 for discussion; also Donald 1991, 
1995, 1998): 
“Memory records stored outside the nervous system (for example, clay 
tablets, papyri, printed books, government archives or electronic data banks) 
can called 'exograms'” (Donald 2010:71). 
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The use of external symbols allowed individuals to offload the computational burden of 
memorisation, in correspondence with the active manipulation of external representations 
(e.g. through the manufacturing of external symbols). External symbolic resources cannot 
only be fixed and accessible, but they are also sensitive to engineering activities. So 
exograms are both fixed and mutable. According to Donald, then, the use of external media 
devices has been a potent factor in the development of human informational complexity.  
 
In light of Donald’s thesis, John Sutton (2010) has stated that our mental flexibility is 
strongly related to our capacity to outsource mental processes in conjunction with 
environmental properties. We are both cognitively flexible and sensitive to external 
cultural things in the world. Regarding the distributed-extended cognition model, Sutton 
states: 
“In certain circumstances, things – artifacts, media, or technologies – can 
have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the 
embodied brains with which they couple. The realm of the mental can spread 
across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and 
brains.” (Sutton 2010:189) 
 
However, it Sutton claims that it is important to make a distinction between what he 
(2010) calls ‘first’ and ‘second ‘waves of extended mind models (again Sutton abbreviates 
‘Extended Mind’ or ‘Distributed Cognition’ to ‘EM’ in his paper) (Sutton 2010). Sutton 
argues that there are salient conceptual differences between these two waves of EM model. 
The lack of distinction has led to mistaken assumptions over the methodological value of 
EM. On the one hand, Clark's (1998) extended mind model states that there is no ontological 
differentiation between the inside and outside world: internal cognitive processes are 
assumed to be equal with external cultural properties. If a grocery list is a memory tool, like 
Clark states, then it is not just an exogram, but an engram also: 
“If ‘exograms’ act as engrams do, then for explanatory purposes they can be 
treated as engrams, the difference in their location being entirely superficial: 
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thus breaking down classical and individualist distinctions between brain, 
body, and world, we see that the object can be (part of) the subject, and that, as 
we’ve noted, things can have a cognitive life” (Sutton 2010:196). 
 
Clark’s (1998; 2001a) extended mind hypothesis states that the development of human 
intelligence can be explained alongside a historical understanding of humans and their 
interaction with cultural things. Human intelligence has co-evolved with material-cultural 
properties. Cognition on Clark's view is seen to be a “continuous with processes in the 
environment” (Clark and Chalmers 1998:10). Critics have claimed that Clark’s claim for 
'parity' between brains and environment is exaggerated (Sutton 2010). However, Clark claims 
that since brains utilise non-neurological things in the outside world – tools for thinking - 
then no one feature of the cognitive process should be treated as distinguishable: 
“The Parity Principle stresses the functional isomorphism of inner and outer 
processes and states... It’s this Parity Principle which gives EM its immediate 
metaphysical bite, enthusing sympathizers and infuriating critics. Parity is, in 
part, EM in critical mode, rejecting boundaries between brain, body, and 
world, undermining the easy assumption that the cognitive is inner and the 
non-cognitive is outer” (Sutton 2010:198-199).  
 
Sutton points out that the ‘Parity Principle’ remains problematic for an EM approach, 
precisely because of its theoretical ambition, and claim to ‘isomorphism’ (Sutton 2010). 
Sutton argues that when the affective differences of physical artifacts have not been clearly 
defined by an EM examination then it will always be difficult to measure their influence.29 
Sutton says that the research by both psychologists and anthropologists often clearly 
recognise that different values that can be inferred by examining the interaction between 
symbolic artifacts and minds. Subsequently, Sutton argues, that it is methodologically 
awkward to assume strong parity between agent-environment interactions: 
                                                
29 Thus Sutton says it’s important to differentiate one system from another (i.e. agent and artifact), lest we 
underplay the importance of heterogeneity in our classifications and content of these properties and processes. 
For example, working memory (engrams) is quite different to external memory stores (exograms) because 
internal memory is non-static by nature. Working memory operates with representations that are fluid and 
changing, while a grocery list, for example, is a fixed externalized representation (Sutton 2010:202). In short, 
there are differences between agents and environments and these must be assumed. What is important, however, 
is the interaction of these things and the emergent properties that are unique to a particular interface. 
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“The Parity Principle, in short, fails directly to suggest study of 
idiosyncratic or peculiar features of particular external symbol systems, or of 
particular ways of interfacing with them” (Sutton 2010:205). 
 
To be clear, then, Sutton is not discounting any EM model, only that idea of Parity 
typically leads to misunderstood assumptions from critics about the efficacy of EM. 
However, Sutton claims that Hutchins’ distributed cognition model makes no strong claim 
for parity since it recognizes external properties as being merely 'supportive’ of cognition. 
Sutton argues, then, that a distributed cognitive model can be more methodologically 
valuable in its application. For instance, Hutchins claims that instead of external artifacts 
being commensurate with minds, a distributed model assumes external tools and strategies 
as only complimentary to cognitive processes. External things are not necessarily viewed 
as a feature of our cognitive machinery per se (as implied by Parity), but the result of a 
scaffolded interaction with the environment.  
 
Sutton calls this the ‘Complementarity Principle’, as being defined as the 2nd wave of 
EM models. The 2nd wave of EM, according to Sutton, is theoretically moderate since its 
underlying conceptual basis recognises the effective differences between brains and 
external cognitive scaffolding. On this view, the Complementarity Principle distinguishes 
cognitive artifacts as things outside of the mind and not necessarily properties of the mind 
itself: 
“…In extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not 
mimic or replicate the formats, dynamics, or functions of inner states and 
processes. Rather, different components of the overall (enduring or temporary) 
system can play quite different roles and have different properties while 
coupling in collective and complementary contributions to flexible thinking 
and acting. So ‘exograms’ can be radically unlike engrams even while co-opted 
for the same purposes, and these differences will often be the focus of 
complementarity-oriented explanations in the EM framework” (Sutton 
2010:41). 
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Sutton also discusses Evelyn Tribble's (2005) recent historical research from her paper 
“Distributing Cognition in the Globe” (2005) as a good example of this 2nd wave EM (i.e. 
Complementarity) (Sutton 2010:208-212). Tribble looks at how actors at the Globe 
theatre were able to learn the multiple plays – in some cases upwards of 70 roles – and 
perform them under time constraints without any extensive rehearsal. Tribble's approach 
intersects Yates' (1966) and Carruthers' (1990, 1998) historical examination on the use of 
mnemotechnic strategies, and the tools used for orality and memory (see Chapter 2). 
Tribble investigates the techniques for memorization by the players. Instead of the actors 
merely learning their lines verbatim, Tribble states that mnemonic strategies were built 
into the theatre, and play’s text to allow for the active recall of their lines during 
performance. These mnemonics included the rhyming structures of the plays themselves 
(the tempo and rhythm of the prose), the design of the theatre, and the immersive 
apprenticeships that emphasized memory retention. 
 
Tribble also points to an early theatrical practice that remains puzzling for historians: in 
particular, the use of large folio sized pieces of paper called ‘plots’. These plots contained 
sparse information about the entrances, music cues, and casting of the play, and were 
always hung up in various spots behind the stage. These plots functioned “as a two-
dimensional map of the play designed to be grafted onto the three-dimensional space of 
the stage” by the actors (Tribble 2005:146). Without the use of a script, the players could 
use these plots as rough heuristic tools for memorizing the shape and organisation of the 
play. According to Tribble, the tools for learning the play were therefore embedded in the 
environment and active within the performance itself. Again, Tribble’s examination 
demonstrates an interdisciplinary approach that draws together historical resources, as 
well as mnemotechnics and a distributed cognitive model. As Tribble’s example shows, a 
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distributed cognition model assumes that our brains are both unstable and highly 
responsive to external media devices. Our cognitive hardware – while being content-rich – 
is nevertheless dependent upon external properties to support complex cognitive activities.  
 
The Complementarity Principle argues that the interface between agents and external 
devices is dynamic: so while material artifacts play a supportive role in augmenting 
intelligence, they are not constitutive of our cognition: 
“It’s just because isolated items aren’t stored atomically in the brain that our 
relatively vulnerable biological memories are supplemented by more stable 
external scaffolding. Brains like ours need media, objects, and other people to 
function fully as minds.”(Sutton 2010:213). 
 
Sutton states that Donald’s engram-exogram distinction can also be categorized as 
Complementarity, since Donald characterizes the affective content of both internal and 
eternal memory resources as evolutionarily connected, while distinct. Minds and the 
technological development of external symbolic resources have developmentally significant 
in the organization and transmission of knowledge.  
 
Similarly, I argue that the Complementarity principle is more helpful for an 
interdisciplinary examination. However, Donald’s engram-exogram distinction, in particular, 
assumes that the salient impact on external memory storage has emerged through a strong 
coactive relationship between external symbolic innovation and internal cognition. Exograms 
are characteristically viewed as engineered external media devices used for information 
storage and retrieval, and it is an uncontroversial claim that the evolution of external media 
devices have allowed for more intensified information storage and retrieval. Donald's concept 
of exograms offers a method of for classifying cognitive-material engagement within an 
evolutionary framework. However, material engagement typically neglects to emphasize the 
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importance of other socially based pedagogical techniques, such as oral modes for 
transmission.  
 
I argue, then, that some consideration needs to be given to research on methods for 
information management within pre-literate cultures. The engram-exogram distinction in 
regards to artificial memory is less obvious for my case study on traditional Māori culture. 
My examination is made unstable by the lack archaeological data on Pacific cultures and 
external material culture.  We cannot pretend to know a culture without its artifacts, but it 
would also be reasonable to claim that since oral traditions have utilised non-material tools 
for memory and transmission that the definition for exograms could be expanded to include 
other strategies. Though Donald does state that mnemonic techniques within oral societies 
were crucial for the preservation of knowledge, it is nevertheless implied that complex 
information networks are unlikely without the invention of external symbolic storage: 
“In societies that maintain a true oral tradition, uncontaminated by exposure 
to modern literate cultures, there are few, if any, exographic media available 
for recording the accumulated collective knowledge of the group; and those 
media that are available are very limited. The collective memory of such 
societies must be confined largely to the brains of its members. Memories are 
transmitted and held in highly stylized and repeatedly rehearsed stories, along 
with shared ritual mimetic practices. Major items, such as knowledge of 
medicinal herbs and poisons, or important myths, are typically memorized by 
trained specialists, such as bards or shamans. Such systems are rigid and 
difficult to change. Training in mnemonics and oratory, one of the primary 
aims of education in the political oral culture of ancient Greece, and still 
practised into the twentieth century in the West, conveyed only a slight 
advantage to those who underwent such training. Without exographic storage, 
much of the cognitive energy of the group was tied up simply in maintaining 
traditions and structures.” (Donald 2010: 76-77; emphasis added). 
 
The assertion that exographic storage in the form of symbolic artifacts has alleviated 
cognitive burden is uncontroversial. However, engagement with external media (e.g. text) 
requires that a culture additionally develop methods for passing on literacy skills. Put simply, 
a reading-writing environment must also produce readers and writers. So while material 
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exograms can reduce the cognitive burden of preserving informational resources, it does not 
necessarily lead to a cognitive economy of scale. Informational storage has no utility without 
capable access to those resources. Informational complexity may not be the issue here, then, 
just the informational character of the environment, and Donald concedes to this notion here: 
“It is, of course, a truism that the cultural buck stops ultimately at the 
threshold of personal consciousness. People must be able to acquire the 
appropriate skills to use their exographic technologies effectively, and to 
interact with them. Learning these skills consumes most of the early years of 
development, and an exographic device that exceeds the capacity of its users 
will not succeed. Designers of new symbolic technologies must take this fact 
into account in order for the technology to be effective” (Donald 2010:77). 
 
Donald is right in stating that cultures offload the burden of cognition onto symbolic 
devices. However, the definition of 'exogram' may need to be complicated further to include 
some of the oral techniques for memory discussed earlier. It may be the case then that 
exograms could be defined as the means by which memory is amplified by culturally evolved 
tools and strategies.  
 
However, this definition of exograms is probably far too broad for my own analysis, and 
does not offer much methodological focus. Though symbolic artifacts are important to an 
understanding of representational ability, this chapter contends that artifact modes of 
information transmission need to be further addressed. In other words, the levels of 
sophistication associated with a culture's methods for information transmission does not need 
to stand in comparison with symbolic literacy. Cultural norms often determine the values 
associated with a particular technology, and while external symbolic tools are efficient 
methods for information storage, they should not necessarily be the only standard by which 
other modes of transmission should be measured. 
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To sum up this section, it is claimed that a clearer definition of EM is plausible and 
Sutton’s distinction between Parity and the Complementarity Principle is helpful in detailing 
the broader methodological implications. Sutton states that the 2nd wave EM 
(Complementarity), conveyed more clearly by Hutchins’ distributed cognition model 
(Hutchins 1995a; 1995b), provides a more focused definition of a cognitive ecological model. 
In addition, this section provided a brief examination of the engram-exogram definition of 
memory. Donald (1991) has argued that the coevolution between symbolic technologies and 
minds has ensured a wider range of information storage and retrieval. This idea underpins the 
importance of cognitive innovation and artificial memory through external symbolic artifacts. 
However, it also neglects the distribution of knowledge that is transmitted through other tools 
and strategies, as defined by orally transmitted mnemonic devices. While social organization 
is important to learning interactions within oral traditions, the next section of the chapter will 
look at how non-symbolic material anchors – such oral maps - can be recruited as cognitive 
inputs for organizing knowledge. So while particular social environments facilitate 
knowledge sharing, informational resources can also be managed through material properties 
other than engineered symbolic technologies. The next section expands on the 
Complementarity Principle further by arguing that landscape, myth and other physical 
properties can be examined as a means by which memory and symbolic thinking are 
supported.  
 
5.3 Conceptual Blending and Knowledge Stability. 
 
This thesis argues that the transmission of religious representations is a hybrid process 
incorporating innate features of our cognitive hardware and external cultural properties. 
Societies have engineered their environments in order to shape the modes of cultural 
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inheritance. These channels can either improve fidelity or impose regulatory constraints on 
information flow (and these are not necessarily always in conflict). Without the use of 
extensive symbolic resources, oral cultures would have relied other means to preserve their 
oral corpus. As Harwood (1976) points out in her paper on the Trobriands (see Chapter 2), 
one of the problems for the study of oral traditions – both in ethnographic and cognitive 
investigations - is accounting for the stability of myth. Information can become destabilized 
through intra-individual transmission and even small errors can lead to long-term cumulative 
changes, which further impacts on social institutions. Harwood argues that oral cultures will 
normally develop tools and strategies to ensure the organization of knowledge despite the 
lack of extensive symbolic technologies. She states that the structure of the Trobriand 
epistemic world was reinforced through a merger between myth and as geographic locations, 
claiming that place names and physical markers were integrated into myths. Since social 
institutions depend upon the stable transmission of myths, narratives should have “stabilizing 
mechanisms” built into them (Harwood 1976:790). One of these stabilizing mechanisms, 
Harwood states, is the use of landmarks and spatial imagery in mythic narratives. 
 
Hutchins (2005) presents a similar concern to Harwood’s problem of stability in his paper 
“Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends” (2005). Hutchins argues that representational 
stability can be managed by integrating physical structures (as representational tools) with 
online conceptual inputs (Fauconnier and Turner 2002). He states that the ability to utilize 
physical properties for blending with other cultural concepts ensures a material anchor for our 
representational systems. The physical property need not be a symbolic artifact necessarily. 
Indeed, concepts can be blended with other, non-symbolic physical objects for the purposes 
of establishing uniquely blended concepts.  
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This cognitive ability would have preceded language ability for hominins and having been 
utilized for information management purposes, our capacity for conceptual blending with 
non-symbolic physical properties would have ensured the stabilization of knowledge 
resources (Hutchins 2005). According to Hutchins, co-opting physical structures, in order to 
support thinking, allowed for greater cognitive flexibility for complex representational 
thinking and memory.  
 
Hutchins states that the foundation for his class of conceptual blending requires two basic 
inputs: one conceptual, and one material (or physical) in order to create a third uniquely 
blended concept (see Fig 6 below). The conceptual blend is the outcome of blending two 
separate inputs to create a third space (Hutchins 2005:1556). According to Hutchins, 
coordinated minds require the coordinated connection to structures outside the mind. He 
argues, then, that physical structures are critical components in this capacity to anchor mental 
processes (alongside other cognitive inputs), since their materiality provides conceptual 
stability:  
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Fig. 6 “A conceptual blend with a material anchor” (Hutchins 2005:1557). 
 
Hutchins (2005) claims that physical structures can be used and function as stabilizing 
mechanisms for complex representational thinking, since our online representational systems 
are may become overly burdened and unstable when complexity increases. This necessitates 
the 'anchoring' of some 'conceptual elements' onto physical things in the world in order to 
ensure stability (Hutchins 2005:1562): 
“The ‘holding in place’ is accomplished by mapping the conceptual 
elements onto a relatively stable material structure. This is how a material 
medium becomes an anchor for a conceptual blend” (Hutchins 2005:1562).  
 
Hutchins points out that the relationship between material structures and concepts can 
typically be found in both language and text-based media. However, this approach to 
conceptual blending is not the same class of representational ability expounded by Hutchins 
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here. Symbolic systems are based on an established structure of signs and referents in relation 
to semiotic content. This semiotic content is not intrinsic to the symbols, but arbitrary, so the 
association between signs and meanings can shift. Instead, Hutchins is more interested in the 
way in which various structures interact with each other to support conceptual thinking. An 
examination of structural interactions does not involve meaning per se; it is not so much the 
semiotic content of words that are important to Hutchins' application of conceptual blends, 
but the way in which external representational properties are organized through physical 
structures. So for instance, while a paragraph or sentence conveys meaning, it is the way in 
which words are arranged on the page – their organization - that enhances coordination.  
 
Hutchins, therefore, wants to steer clear of any text-based notions of external cognitive 
models that favor the idea of symbols being crucial to complex representational interfacing. It 
is the physical organization of external devices that interests Hutchins, as it is the 
coordination between online and offline cognitive resources that benefits from these 
structures: 
“Thus, it may make more sense to say that the temporal or spatial 
organization of a spoken or written sentence can be a material anchor for some 
portion of the grammatical conceptual structure, than it does to say that a word 
is a material anchor for the concept it represents. This is because in the case of 
sentence structure, more complex aspects of the material organization are 
involved. No doubt the fact that spoken language has material form was 
important in the development of language, as the material forms provided 
anchors for concepts and conceptual relations” (Hutchins 2005:1573; emphasis 
added). 
 
Hutchins states that we often reason under culturally informed constraints, and cultural 
conventions inform our conceptual reasoning (Hutchins 2005:1557-1558). This may explain 
why we are better at making inferences derived from “culturally coherent” premises, than 
purely logical ones (Hutchins 2005:1558). But it could also explain why we are able to make 
coherent inferences based on concepts that are only common to a culturally defined frame of 
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reference. For example, Hutchins illustrates our general tendency to distinguish between line 
concepts. We can normally distinguish the difference between people lining up in a queue at 
a cinema, and soldiers standing in a line formation. Both of these concepts follow the same 
structure, while each formation is contextually differentiated. The cinema queue follows a 
physical trajector concept of linear order (i.e. front to back of line), and it also follows our 
conventional knowledge of individuals seeking a service (e.g. queuing at the cinema). The 
concept of soldiers in formation, however, is conceived quite differently - adhering to a 
distinct functional quality: 
“Consider a line of people queuing for theatre tickets. This cultural practice 
creates a spatial memory for the order of arrival of clients. The participants use 
their own bodies and the locations of their bodies in space to encode order 
relations” (Hutchins 2005:1559; emphasis added). 
 
The physical structure of bodies in space - adhering to a particular pattern – functions as a 
cognitive input for the conceptual blend. Instead of viewing conceptual blending as the 
product of integrating mental representations as inputs (i.e. internal online processing), 
Hutchins says that physical structures (e.g. such as queues and lines) should be counted as 
inputs as well. Understanding the structure of a queue does not require the additional 
complexity of deploying an algorithm for 'queue-like' profiles. Both of these conceptual 
blends – the cinema queue and line of soldiers – are coherent as concepts within a particular 
context. They are learned concepts, and since the queue exists in real time as a physical 
property functions as a material cognitive input.  
 
Hutchins suggests, then, that physical structures are implicitly used to stabilize conceptual 
thinking. He argues that conceptual blending demonstrates how human cognition has the 
capacity to incorporate a variety of connection resources to achieve this mental stability:  
“Conceptual structure must be represented in a way that allows some parts 
of the representation to be manipulated, while other parts remain stable. The 
complexity of the manipulations of structure can be increased if the stability of 
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the representations can be increased. The stability of the representations is a 
necessary feature of the reasoning process, but it is often taken for granted” 
(Hutchins 2005:1557). 
 
In addition, he adds: 
 
“Cultural models are not only ideas that reside inside minds, they are often 
also embodied in material artifacts... The theory of conceptual blending and 
mental spaces deals with abstract models of the kinds we usually think of as 
mental models. The organization of the models supports various inferences. 
The key thing here is the way in which two or more spaces are blended 
together. Various elements of the input spaces are selectively mapped to the 
blended space. In the blended space, new inferences are possible” (Hutchins: 
2005:1558-1559). 
 
 
The motivation for Hutchins’ examination echoes the claim made by Harwood (1976; see 
Chapter 2), that cognitive stability within the Trobriand oral culture (e.g. in relation to the 
preservation and transmission of myths) was outsourced to non-symbolic physical structures 
such as geographic locations. Subsequently, comparisons can be drawn here between 
conceptual blending and Harwood’s claim for integrating knowledge, myth and landscape. 
Hutchins looks particularly at Harwood's comparative approach to his study of Trobriand 
myth and the method of loci (Hutchins 2005:1563). Since the myths were often associated 
with various landmarks, storytellers needed to only follow the sequence of place names and 
locations to cue sections of the narrative. However, Hutchins argues that the method of loci 
system of memorization – in conjunction with actual physical locations on a map - represents 
a strong case for oral traditions like the Trobriand people organizing knowledge through 
conceptual blending: 
“The method of loci sets up a simple trajectory of attention across a set of 
features or landmarks of the environment. One may establish a flow through 
the environment that brings attention to the landmarks in a particular order. 
This is a layered blend” (Hutchins 2005:1563).  
 
Hutchins claims that the method of loci system has a slightly more complex structure, and 
is therefore classified as a compound blend. These structures are comprised of a variety of 
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input spaces layered upon one another. Below in Fig 7 is an image customized according to 
how a compound blend for a loci method of mapping might work: 
 
Fig. 7: “The compound blend that underlies the use of the method of loci” (Hutchins 2005:1564). 
 
Firstly, the method of loci contains input spaces involving landmarks and the trajectory of 
the sequence. The relationship between the landmarks as a sequence is an “emergent property 
of this blend” (Hutchins 2005:1564). Secondly, the items placed within this sequence are then 
incorporated as an input space upon which the landmarks are mapped: 
“The method of loci makes opportunistic use of space. The spatial relations 
of the landmarks do not contribute any semantic content to the problem. But 
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the landmarks themselves do provide memory cues, and the sequential relations 
among the landmarks, that were created by mapping a particular shape of 
motion onto them, is inherited by the set of items to be remembered” (Hutchins 
2005:1564). 
 
According to Hutchins the method of loci uses a variety of blends to coordinate working 
memory with macropsatial properties, and Hutchins even cites some of his own research 
amongst the Trobriand people to support this (Hutchins 2005:1563-1564). For instance, he 
notes that in the Trobriand myth of Baroweni, Baroweni's mother travels a particular route 
from village to village following a sequential logic (Hutchins 1987). Hutchins says that the 
story itself serves a function in that listeners learn about certain significant geographical 
locations, while “the narrators seem to use a variant of the method of loci to control the order 
of events in the narrative” (Hutchins 2005:1563). The use of organized space within the 
narratives, therefore, provides a kind of cognitive checklist for the storyteller. This compound 
blend – that Hutchins claims has an analogous loci structure - is constituted by a logical 
pattern of events within the narrative, coinciding with specific locations on a map.  
 
Temporality within a narrative is also linked closely with spatial imagery since events 
within a story can be traced using the order of locations in which the narrative follows. The 
sequential flow of a narrative is therefore dependent upon the spatial imagery and locations 
provided by the story. This is what Hutchins means by a compound blend: conceptual and 
material inputs are layered up within multiple spaces.  
 
5.4 Māori Oral Maps and Distributed Cognition. 
 
Conceptual blending provides the background for this next section on traditional Māori 
oral maps. Similarly to Harwood and Hutchins, a comparative examination can be made in 
relation to the ordering of landmarks through linguistic devices within myths (i.e. place 
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naming) and how these devices function as a means for organizing knowledge. The 
cartographic practices used by Māori were not atypical of oral traditions that often 
incorporated myth and place names into mapping their geography.  As Harwood (1976) states 
(see Chapter 2), the Trobriand people organized their landscape into logical pathways 
through the use of names and storytelling. Similarly, as Renee Louis (2005) states here, 
Hawaiians used names and pathways in narratives that were ‘performed’ during storytelling: 
“Hawaiians have an oral tradition and hence did not encode their knowledge 
in archival graphic forms. They privilege process over product, incorporating 
their understanding of their island setting into their mo`ōlelo (stories), oli 
(chant), ‘ōlelo no’eau (proverbs), hula (dance), mele (song) and their 
mo`okū’auhau (genealogy)... In the Hawaiian tradition, this knowledge was 
incorporated into various cultural acts in which mnemonic symbols such as 
place names are of central importance.” (Louis 2005:94; emphasis added). 
 
Louis argues that the differences between Western and traditional Hawaiian cartographic 
practices demonstrates a distinction between the cultural tools that were utilized for recording 
information about the landscape. The standard for colonizing Europeans was (and is) the use 
of graphic conventions (i.e. physical maps), while the indigenous Hawaiian culture, 
according to Louis, had previously integrated their oral maps into a range of different 
mediums – such as storytelling - and expressed the conceptual organization of the landscape 
through oral performance (Louis 2005:94).  
 
Similarly, in her paper “Māori Maps” Jan Kelly (1999) looks at some of the differences 
associated with the concept of maps during early European encounters with Māori. She states 
that the historical evidence shows that Māori were highly competent at constructing visual 
representations of the local geography, and tribal members were often asked by colonial 
settlers to draw rudimentary visual maps. Kelly recounts a stories whereby settlers had asked 
ask local Māori navigators to sketch basic topological images by using lines in the sand, or 
with charcoal on wood. These sketches acted as coherent and logical representations of the 
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landscape and readable maps for Europeans. However, the important point that Kelly wants 
to make in her paper is that Māori were able to convey a representational characterization of 
their local geography – in the form of a basic image of a map - to a foreign culture without 
ever having any education in map-making, or knowledge of the other culture's cartographic 
tools. However, unlike the European understanding of maps as a graphic representation, 
Māori did not view these types of sketches as a primary method of mapping their landscape 
(Kelly 1999). Instead, maps were transmitted mainly in oral form through storytelling and the 
recitation of whakapapa (genealogy).  
 
Kelly states that the European tenets of cartography, which emphasized certain accepted 
conventions, were never a main concern for Māori who employed other navigational methods 
without the use of physical maps. European maps, for example, relied on the encoding of a 
symbolic language specific to a graphic representation and predetermined standards of 
measurement. Kelly states that this should not necessarily lead to a general classification of 
map-making conventions. Instead Māori predominantly organized the landscape through 
place-names and storytelling. These strategies performed three key functions: 1) it organized 
the local geography through the labeling and pathways; 2) while physical locations provided 
a concrete anchor for memory; and 3) further, place names and landmarks were integrated 
into a larger cosmogony constituting a historical frame-of-reference to pool data from: 
“Not having a written medium, the Māori named the landscape features as a 
way of describing the landscape and committed such descriptions to memory. 
The events or characteristics associated with each place anchor it and give it a 
durable reference, as well as floating access to a huge range of oral 
information” (Kelly 1999:21; emphasis added). 
 
 
Kelly states that boundaries and routes were not subject to standards of measurement such 
as miles or yards, as in the European conception of mapping. Instead Māori used landmarks, 
stories and names to organize the landscape into areas of historical and mythical significance. 
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Stories were attached to various locations, or objects on the landscape (e.g. hills, rivers, rocks 
and trees etc) that were deemed significant within their mythical corpus. Stories embedded a 
history into the landscape and geographical space was therefore organized through narrative 
and naming: 
“Sometimes trees were planted or stones placed to reinforce and define a 
known limit. And as the genealogies were recited and waiata chanted the oral 
pegs were hammered into the land. As the pegs were struck the stories were 
fixed through generations” (Kelly 1999:15). 
 
As an example of this, Kelly says that oral pegging through myth were often necessary 
means by which land ownership claims could be made through familial and tribal descent 
during the Māori Land Court hearings. Transcripts from the proceedings describe how 
boundaries were delineated through the use of place names and stories (Kelly 1999). Oral 
pegs, she says, were anchor points within stories to describe how the people organized the 
land into logical units within the mythic corpus. Kelly also states that pathways – from point 
to point - were important to remembering the local geography and those who could sketch a 
map often drew upon the major bodies of water, followed by the paths and routes that joined 
these points of significance together. Instead of maps being visually integrated, Māori 
remembered their maps as a series of pathways joined by various landmarks of significance. 
Indeed routes were comprised of a sequence of named locations along a specific route.  
 
Kelly quotes a marae elder, Rakiihia Tau, who states that maps were not remembered as a 
visually complete object necessarily, but as a series of sequentially defined pathways with 
linked place names. These were not 'lines' per se but routes joined together via naming: 
“[Rakiihia Tau] writes that paths were identified by a series of place names 
that not only confirmed the path but could be used to measure the distance 
traveled in a day and to find one’s way at night. He illustrates this with part of 
a modern map on which paths are sketched not with a line but as a sequence of 
named points, although rivers and the coastal edge are shown as lines. The 
named places along each path were memorized in chants, he says, to assist the 
novice when first traveling the trails of old. After a day’s journey, one would 
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know not only one’s whereabouts, but also the history of the surroundings” 
(Kelly 1999:16). 
 
Chapter 3 looked at this method of incorporating geographical information into the use of 
place names and myth. From the textual evidence we can surmise that these stories were well 
preserved through oral means, but the myths had a functional basis also. These stories both 
conveyed important historical information as well as geographical data for the purposes of 
remembering the landscape. Commonly, these oral maps – in the form of a story - traced the 
route of an ancestor or mythical character whose travels led to their naming places along the 
route. These names were traditionally incorporated into the narrative and often represented 
deeds undertaken at those points.  
 
However, as stated in Chapters 2 and 3, place names also cued information about the 
geographic locations themselves. For example, in the lullaby 'He Oriori Mo Wharau Rangi' 
(outlined in Chapter 3), during the pursuit of Wairaka by Hau, Hau he manages to cross a 
large river: 
'Ka whiti i te awa,  
Ka nui ia, ko WHANGANUI;  
Tiehua te wai, ko WHANGAEHU;'  
 
'He then crossed the river  
Which won him great renown, and it was  
WHANGANUI;  
He splashed through cloudy waters, hence  
WHANGAEHU;' (Wilson1990: 63-66). 
 
The names used in the story covey information about both the deeds undertaken by the 
character Hau at those locations as well as crucial information about the geography at that 
point on the map. These features of the lullaby are organized in a sequential fashion so as to 
demarcate points along a pathway. We also see the same recurrent structure within a story 
emerging in “He Whakarapopotonga I Nga Korero Mo Poutini” (Wilson1990: 78-85). In a 
  
  198 
section taken from the story below, both the main characters Poutini and Tamaāhua stop at 
various points along the map, while the story reveals crucial information about the landscape 
and the optimal route to be taken by travelers: 
“Pēnei tonu te mahi a ngā tokotoru nei. Ko Poutini rāua ko Waitaiki ki mua 
ko Tamaāhua me tana tekateka ki muri whai haere atu ai. Tae atu ki 
ONETĀHUA, tae atu ki WHANGAMOA I Whakatū, ki RANITOTO ka huri ki te 
tonga aru haere atu i te tahatika ka tae atu ai ki PĀHUA (kāore i tawhiti atu i 
Punakaiki). Haere tonu, pahemo ake a Māwheranui, a Taramakau, a 
ARAHURA, tae at-u ai ki Mahitahi. I ngā rā o mua haere ai ngā tūpuna mā 
runga waka mai i konei ki TAKIWAI. I a Tamaāhua e whakawhiti ana i te 
puaha o te awa o Arahura ka rongo iho ia i te āhua mahana o te wai o tēnei 
awa. Tēna tana tekateka e tāwhiri mai ra i aia heoi tāna he whai kau atu, ka 
ahu rāua ki te tonga.  
 
Mai i Mahitahi ka tere a Tamaāhua mā runga waka ki Takiwai — ko te 
puaha tēnei o Piopiotahi. Ka tirotiro ia kāore he aha i rēira ēngari ko tana 
tekateka kua huri te mata kite ara I arumia mai ra e rāua. Kua tino pāwera a 
Tamaāhua i āia e whai haere atu ana i tana tekateka. Tae atu ki Arahura - ko 
te awa tēnei i rangona ra e ia te mahana o te wai - kua mōhio tonu ia kua tino 
pangia tana hoa wahine e te aitūa. Heoi, ka whakarite i āia mō te parekura - 
he tauā ra hoki ia” 
 
“The chase went on - fires and tekateka at every pause. To RANGITOTO or 
D’Urville Island, to WHANGAMOA in the hills above Whakatū (Nelson) and 
to ONETĀHUA or Farewell Spit. Then down the western coast of the South 
Island to PĀHUA near Punakaiki and on past Māwheranui, past Taramakau 
and ARAHURA, right to Mahitahi where the tūpuna when traveling south left 
the land and took to the sea using canoes. As he crossed the mouth of the 
Arahura River, Tamaāhua noticed the water was not as cold as the water of 
other rivers he had been crossing, but he was too hot in pursuit to waste time - 
the tekateka was drawing him southwards.  
 
By canoe he paddled south from Mahitahi to TAKIWAI at the mouth of 
Piopiotahi, Milford Sound. Here he found the tekateka hovering in the air and 
pointing back along the route he had just come. Frustrated and angry, he 
headed north again following the tekateka. It paused, waiting for him, at the 
mouth of the Arahura River, where he had noted the water was warmer on his 
journey south. By incantations he knew that his beloved Waitaiki was in 
distress up the Arahura River valley. He prepared himself, as a warrior, for 
battle” (Wilson 1990:79-84) 
 
This small section of the story includes some crucial information about the geographical 
features of the region as well as the experiential aspects of the landscape. More importantly, 
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however, is that the place names are ordered in a sequential fashion within the narrative as 
pathways.  
 
As Kelly states above, Māori maps were mainly structured and comprised of pathways 
remembered through various oral methods such as chants, songs or storytelling. However, the 
cognitive dimensions associated with the transference of oral maps to visual representations 
presents the most interest to Kelly (and this section), and a cognitive ecological model – 
specifically conceptual blending – may provide a means for examining traditional Māori oral 
maps further. Conceptual blending between explicit representations, innate conceptual 
structures and physical properties supports working memory because physical inputs function 
as material anchors for fixing representations associated with other conceptual spaces. I argue 
here that this is decidedly relevant to our case study since physical points and spatially 
conceived representations function as mental anchors for working memory, while the 
pathways between the points are structured as trajectors on a map. 
 
Comparisons can be made between Hutchins' model, Rubin's work on spatial imagery and 
the case studies examined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Imagery, Rubin argues, is an effective 
memory aid when used in conjunction with spatial cognition. Within oral traditions, stories 
and myths often include characters that would move from one scene to the next within the 
narrative, while the spatial context informed the temporal content of the story. Hutchins states 
that a common feature of the method of loci is the use of a 'trajector' along a group of 
landmarks. This trajector operates as the sequencing layer for a compound blend. According 
to this view, the ordering of landmarks along a pathway is not an already assumed pattern, 
but must be stabilized by anchoring the sequence to a group of physical locations (e.g. like a 
queue of people whose bodies in space act as the physical markers for culturally defined 
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pattern). In the case of oral maps, place names and the stories associated with the locations on 
a map are anchored to the trajector, and subsequently the physical markers (i.e. the 
geographical location).  
 
For instance, in the story “He Whakarapopotonga I Nga Korero Mo Poutini” physical 
markers in the form of geographical locations are utilized within the narrative to structure the 
sequence of place names. But the trajector is also arranged within the narrative so as to 
organize the sequence of events associated with the characters of the story. We cannot only 
plot a route on the map, but these physical markers help structure the logic of the narrative 
also. In addition to this layer, place naming is also employed within the sequence. In the story 
“He Whakarapopotonga I Nga Korero Mo Poutini” (see Chapter 3), place names within the 
story further denote areas on a map that were valued stone quarries. These place names 
constitute a narrative sequence and provide stable reminders of not only the geographic 
locations of the quarries, but also the type of resources found at these locations (see Table 3): 
Place Names Stone 
1) Tūhua  obsidian 
2) Tahanga  basalt 
3) Whangamatā  obsidian 
4) Rangitoto argillite 
5) Whangamoa  argillite 
6) Onetāhua  argillite 
7) Pāhua  flint 
9) Takiwai  bowenite 
8); 10) Arahura  pounamu 
 
 
Table 3: Place names - Māori and English translations in order of narrative sequence from “He 
Whakarapopotonga I Nga Korero Mo Poutini” (Wilson1990:78-85). 
 
The capacity to cognitively arrange our environments into logical systems suggests that 
macro-spatial knowledge is a heuristic trait that is recruited in conjunction declarative 
memory (Allen 1982). Hutchins contends, then, that the organization of concepts in this way 
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provides greater stability in the communication and comprehension of representations, and 
one way to think about landscape and place names is to consider the relationship it has to 
language. The landscape is typically categorized linguistically into segmented spaces 
constituted as a map.  
 
Similarly, Burenhult and Levinson (2008) have discussed the problem of labeling the 
landscape by arguing for a cognitive-linguistic approach to how place names are applied 
cross-culturally. They state, that: “Landscape features, for the most part, do not come pre-
segmented by nature” and are organized through linguistic devices and labels (Burenhult and 
Levinson 2008:138). According to their view, the naming of the area or geographical feature 
largely influences the ontological status of landmarks. Indeed, the question remains if there is 
a universal ontology underlying the linguistic principles associated with place names 
(Burenhult and Levinson 2008). It appears from the research that place names seem to be 
largely the product of culturally specific templates. However, despite the contextual nature of 
place names, cultures divide their world’s up linguistically through the use of specific labels 
and categories: 
 
“Just like the body, parts and categories rely on a segmentation of what is, 
from a topological point of view, largely a continuous surface – the division into 
parts is to a great extent imposed by our categories (Burenhult and Levinson 
2008:136). 
 
Therefore, linguistics plays a causal role in influencing the perception of geographical 
chunking. It is curious that the ontological perception of a landmark is therefore reliant on a 
variety of cognitive inputs - both perceptually and culturally. Language and places mutually 
reinforce the concepts that are part of a cultural context. According to this view, there is no 
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universal logic, cross-culturally, to the naming of geographical areas and features according 
to (Burenhult and Levinson 2008).30  
 
Burenhult and Levinson (2008) argue then that cultural templates provide mental maps as 
a foundation for the categorization of the landscape. As stated above, our memory systems 
seem to be well suited for applying “non-spatial memoranda to a spatial scheme” (Burenhult 
and Levinson 2008:139; Yates (1966), cited from Burenhult and Levinson 2008). Cultural 
schemas are often applied to spatial imagery in stories and myths, and these combinations are 
especially salient to memory: 
“Specifically, cultural themes or linguistic patterns are imposed on the 
environment to create, co-ordinate, subcategorize, or contrast landscape 
categories” (Burenhult and Levinson 2008:144). 
 
Subsequently, there is little reason to assume that all cultures adhere to the same basic 
conceptual modeling when linguistically organizing the landscape. Through place names 
these physical structures help support the semantic content of working memory. In other 
words, names embody meaning as well as information about the geographic regions. But the 
landscape is syntactical also, since the linguistic organization of the landscape provides a 
logical structure for mapping. Mythic narratives within the traditional Māori case, for 
instance, are comprised of a rich blend of both material anchors (i.e. physical landmarks) and 
linguistic devices (i.e. place names). And it could be argued, as I do here, that these are 
stabilizing mechanisms for the organization of knowledge.  
 
 
 
                                                
30 For instance, Burenhult and Levinson state that you may be able to assume a “taxonomic (kind-of) relations 
between landscape terms, so that e.g., a brook could be a small kind of stream, which could be a small kind of 
river” (Burenhult and Levinson 2008:137). It would be reasonable to follow this logic, that we automatically 
categorize areas and features into ‘kind-of’ relations, like we do with species. But this is not the case at all, it 
seems. Again ontological categories differ cross-culturally in the naming of places. 
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5.5 Discussion. 
 
Distributed cognitive models describe the outsourcing of cognitive resources onto external 
physical properties for scaffolding mental processes. Subsequently, there is a hybrid 
relationship between minds and the environment. However, it has been important to be 
specific about the kind of connection properties that is present these interactions. The 
suggestion that the use external tools as a cognitive resource is relevant and this has deep 
roots in human evolutionary history, however it is critical to highlight how material structures 
are connected to specific features of our cognition. Hutchins (2005) has stated that 
individuals engage physical structures as cognitive inputs for conceptual thinking. Material 
anchors further stabilize representational capacities while alleviating the cognitive burden of 
conceptual reasoning.  
 
I have argued that there is a strong relationship between the blending of cognitive inputs 
and the structure of traditional Māori oral maps. Oral cultures organized their landscape 
through the use of place names and storytelling, while physical structures, such as landmarks, 
provided epistemic stability for these blended structures – and this is most notable in the case 
of oral maps. Oral maps, it is argued, are compound blends that are structurally analogous to 
the artificial memory systems like the method of loci. Within oral maps, geographical 
locations are layered alongside a sequence trajector within the narrative structure of a story. 
The sequential ordering of routes, for instance, is both the product of basic structures and 
culturally specific epistemic systems. But cultures also utilize linguistic devices for 
organizing the landscape and knowledge into workable units (Burenhult and Levinson 2008).  
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What Hutchins’ distributed cognition model demonstrates is that there are robust input 
connections between physical structures, conceptual content and working memory. Route 
knowledge, for instance, is structured through the use of multiple cognitive inputs - including 
actual physical places. Geographical landmarks are named and organized in sequential order 
along pathways and provide a logical structure for both mythic narratives and the mental 
represented coordination of the landscape. Route knowledge within oral cultures, according 
to Hutchins, is stabilized by the use of landmarks for organizing sequential patterns. These 
sequential patterns are helpful for mnemonic purposes, but they were also incorporated into 
myths for working memory.  
 
This model is reflected in Kelly’s treatment on the use Māori oral maps and the peg-type 
mnemonics that were integrated into storytelling. One of the ways in which traditional Māori 
engaged with their landscape was through place names and myths. The meaning behind the 
place name offers ways to access the cultural knowledge of a tribe (while reinforcing both 
cosmogonical conceptions of the world and identity). As stated, place names were often used 
in myths to recount travels made by a particular mythic character or ancestor. The recounting 
of place names within a story organized the myth into a logical narrative, but it also traced 
the place names along a physical geography of the landscape. Indeed, place names seemed to 
serve a multivalent function within traditional stories, and the intergenerational transmission 
of oral maps is crucial since maps embody valuable informational resources about the 
ecology and navigation. I have argued that the conceptual blending of landmarks, place 
names and myths play a key role in the mnemonic retention (and stability) of informational 
resources.  
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Hutchins demonstrates that the use of physical geography as a system for organizing 
knowledge has a common cognitive underpinning related to working memory, conceptual 
reasoning and language. Put simply, the use of landmarks as memory devices with myths is 
no accident and demonstrates some regularities of a particular cognitive profile. The 
sequential ordering of place names and landmarks within Māori oral traditions has been 
recognized historically and this chapter set out to highlight the cognitive dimensions 
associated with these conventions. Subsequently, it was argued that: a) a distributed cognition 
model could suitably describe how non-symbolically engineered physical structures are 
relevant for symbolic thinking; b) that conceptual blending is substantive for working 
memory and that the sequential ordering of place names and landmarks within traditional 
Māori narratives are relevant to this background; c) representational stability can be managed 
within oral modes of transmission.  
 
The profile associated with distributed cognitive models shows that in the absence of 
symbolic resources the mind recruits features of its environment for conceptual, mnemonic 
and communicative purposes. But more crucially I wanted to demonstrate in Chapters 4 and 5 
minds are coactive with environmental features, and so a comprehensive theory or religious 
transmission should take these complexities into account. Cognitive regularities are indeed a 
causally relevant feature and that is why some comparisons can be drawn between the 
presence of common structures (e.g. memory constraints and macro-spatial imagery) and a 
particular cognitive profile unique to human evolutionary history. Nevertheless, the rules 
governing these commonalities do not necessarily override the locally contingent details 
associated with cultural practices.  
 
 
  
  206 
CHAPTER SIX  
 
 
6.1 Conclusion. 
 
 
The core claim of this thesis has been that many aspects of religious enculturation 
resemble something like the transmission of complex skill-based abilities. Like any craft, 
structured learning interactions are relevant to the methods for religious transmission. For 
instance, I have argued that specific tools and strategies targeting memory retention and 
speech communication further reinforced information fidelity for teaching and learning. 
Generally, a cognitive ecological approach stresses how information-rich environments are 
structured in a way to support learning and development (and this extends to religious and 
aesthetic domains also). More specifically, however, I have argued that culturally evolved 
methods for information management (either social or technological capabilities) have 
facilitated the stable transmission of mythic knowledge within traditional Māori oral culture 
over time. The methods of transmission are by no means discrete, but instead, like any form 
of cognitive capital, are embedded within a larger epistemic framework. Pedagogical systems 
are structured to enhance the fidelity of both adaptive knowledge (e.g. foraging strategies, for 
instance), and also the conceptual knowledge structures associated with myth.  
 
This thesis intended to underscore some of the research limitations of cognitive optimality 
as it pertains to religious transmission. Subsequently, I had intended to show how features of 
the cultural environment function as cognitive resources for managing the volume and 
complexity of religious information. The presence and use of culturally developed strategies 
within religious oral traditions implies the complexity of managing and organizing religious 
knowledge without external information storage devices (i.e. literacy and text). Due to the 
cognitive demands associated with information management, learning tools and strategies 
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enable a more robust engagement between actors and religious traditions. The costs and 
investments related to the transmission of religious knowledge – through structured learning 
and the use of cognitive resources - denote the difficulties associated with managing 
informational resources with oral traditions. The literature on traditional Māori pedagogy 
describes some of the demands associated with the passing on of sacred knowledge, and the 
means by which memory limitations were overcome through learned methods of transmission 
(Benavides 2009). Thus, the integration of orally communicated stories, place names and 
landmarks were a common means by which mythic, historical and geographical information 
could be conveyed within traditional Māori practices (and similar practices have been cited as 
being common in both Melanesian and Polynesian cultures also [see Harwood 1976; Kahn 
1990; Campbell 2006]).  
 
The invested costs in preserving in transmitting a mythic corpus suggests that agents are 
motivated – not just by minimally counterintuitive representations – but by a commitment to 
the preservation and stable transmission of a complex religious epistemic network. Therefore, 
I have argued that the fidelity of oral transmission has depended on learned methods for 
enhancing memory and communication. This thesis has chosen, then, to focus on 3 aspects of 
memory and transmission: 
1) The regulation of information through sacred conventions; 
2) Memory and eloquence in orality; 
3) The use of macrospatial mnemonic techniques (i.e. oral maps). 
 
The regulation (i.e. coordination) of information through sacred conventions: One of the 
motivations of this thesis has been to draw parallels between the management and regulation 
of knowledge, in conjunction with the cultural conventions that shape the network 
distribution of information. I argue that feedback relationships between structured 
environments and individuals play a large role in sustaining these customs. Individuals are 
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raised in environments that shape cultural preferences and experiences, and these perceptions 
impact on cultural structures. Food taboos, for example, are peculiar to a cultural niche and 
can have a noticeable effect on a culture’s economy. Taboos are often implicitly logical 
within a culture’s religious doctrine. Tapu (sacred) knowledge is not only potent because of 
its perceived content (i.e. its sacredness), but also by how sacred knowledge is manifested, 
and made real through ritual. Sacred rules establish how knowledge is shared and the mode 
by which it is transmitted.  
 
I also discussed how the transmission of sacred knowledge is supported by the teaching 
methods that nurture memory and orality, and how religious customs can shape the social 
dynamic between teachers and students. Social learning through close apprenticeship 
underscores the importance of scoffolding for learning expertise (Sterelny 2011, 2012). But 
pupils are also monitored within an environment regulated by sacred customs. The accurate 
retention of sacred knowledge is critical for the stable transmission, and the systemization of 
learning interactions within traditional Māori pedagogy were strongly shaped by these 
epistemic attitudes to learning (McLean 1961; Bowdon 1979; Pere 1982; Metge 1984; 
Marsden 2003; Rewi 2010; Mahuika 2012).  
 
Memory and eloquence in orality: Throughout this thesis I have also focused on how 
mnemonic skills have played a crucial role in the stability of orally transmitted religious 
traditions, and so it was necessary to highlight how skills for memory can be enhanced 
through structured learning (see also Gade 2004). Since religious norms emphasized the 
preservation of scared knowledge, memory retention and skills associated with oral 
communication would have been critical for enhancing fidelity. Similarly, I have argued that 
oral traditions recruited memory techniques into their mythic corpus partly for the purposes 
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of stabilizing the transmission of informational resources. Traditional Māori customs 
surrounding the sharing of information often emphasized the accurate retention and 
communication of tribal knowledge (McLean 1961; Metge 1984; Mahuika 2012), and I 
discussed the importance of learning sacred myths ‘correctly’ (e.g. for public 
communication). Memory and eloquence play a critical role in the transmission of 
information within Māori oral tradition, and developmental environments have been critical 
for nurturing oratory skills.  
 
The use of macrospatial mnemonic techniques (i.e. oral maps): Finally, I claimed that 
some traditional Māori oral traditions were able to manage information through the 
incorporation of landmarks into their mythic narratives. Chapter 3 discussed how historical, 
familial and geographical information was preserved through whakapapa, and Roberts (2012) 
has argued that whakapapa functioned as a cognitive map for managing these informational 
resources. Epistemic devices, like whakapapa, reinforced a particular cosmogony, but they 
also acted as oral library systems. Likewise, the common use of landmarks and place names 
within oral traditions points to the mnemonic efficacy of macrospatial structures as 
organizing devices (Rubin 1995). The use of place names has been shown to help structure 
narratives for better recall (Harwood 1976; Rubin 1995; Yates 1966). Spatial imagery also 
seems to be effective as a system of cueing information (as shown with the discussions on the 
method of loci [Rubin 1995]), and themes associated with landscape are prominent in 
traditional Māori myth.  
 
But there is a practical and epistemic dimension to the common use of landmarks within 
traditional narratives. Place names and the sequential order of these names help support the 
memorization of knowledge connected with these geographical locations. So while 
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landmarks and place names help retain the structuring of narratives (and better recall), real 
world geographical knowledge is also embedded in these stories in recollected through 
storytelling. In addition, landmarks and place names provide epistemic markers by which 
historical information could be tracked. Traditional Māori views perceived knowledge in 
actual places, and the content of these knowledge markers are activated through the use of 
narrative.  
 
Importantly, I have also examined three key areas of research for a cognitive ecological 
analysis – epistemic niche construction, distributed cognition and mnemotechnics – and 
further attempted to demonstrate some of the comparative features of these approaches. In 
regards to memory and orality, all three models underscore the significance of mental tools 
and strategies for organizing knowledge resources. The organization of cognitive resources 
for the purposes of large-scale information management within oral cultures is 
preconditioned by: the cooperative sharing of knowledge (which also involves the costs 
associated with the access and opportunity to informational resources), and a highly 
structured cognitive niche (Sterelny 2003, 2011, 2012). I have claimed that both social and 
technological resources have been critical for the organization of sacred and mythic 
knowledge within traditional Māori culture.  
 
I have claimed that there is a noticeable relationship between optimal features of memory, 
conceptual reasoning and the methods by which oral knowledge is remembered and 
communicated. For example, I have investigated how knowledge is identified with physical 
locations within traditional Māori myth, in addition to the thematically consistent features of 
storytelling. Oral maps are ways of blending these various modalities into a stable form 
epistemic template (similar to whakapapa [Roberts 2012]). Oral maps are constituted by a 
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variety of blended inputs, while geographical locations provide a stabilizing mechanism for 
other conceptual structures such as narrative structure, sequential ordering of names on the 
map, and information about the landscape.  
 
As shown with the descriptive material on Māori oral tradition (Chapters 3-5), structured 
pedagogical environments have been critical to the intergenerational transmission of oral 
knowledge. However, I have also examined how the preservation and transmission of 
religious traditions within oral cultures was strongly influenced by the customs and norms 
specific to a cultural milieu. These conventions traditionally incorporated specific rules for 
sharing knowledge. Sacred conventions, I argue, are causally related to a culture’s epistemic 
framework. Subsequently, while there are some universal features that conform to predictable 
structures (i.e. such as memory constraints), the practices, experiences, and mediums 
associated with knowledge transmission can often vary across cultures. These variables are 
frequently sensitive to socio-ecological conditions (e.g.. such as demographics, the 
availability of technological resources and social norms), and from this standpoint, I have 
argued that cognitive ecological models assume both the variation and diversity of these 
structures, since these models typically explore the range of cognitively optimal connections 
within a specific cultural setting. Such optimality is often contingent upon the learned 
strategies and tools relative to these niches.  
 
However, one of the many criticisms, or mistaken claims, that could be directed at this 
dissertation is that it is been yet another coordinated attack on EP (and it’s various siblings). 
And while much of the earlier sections of my thesis may have resembled a setup for an 
argument against cognitivism, in large part I have only claimed that a cognitive ecological 
examination has something to offer the CSR. Subsequently, I have mainly set out to critique 
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some of the claims made by the SiM (particularly the optimality thesis), while being careful 
avoid direct criticisms towards EP (and other research branches from this field).  
 
It was important to this dissertation that I critique the cognitive optimality thesis, and the 
other claims made by SiM: that cultural stability is generated by internal cognitive 
regularities only. For instance, SiM claims that domain specific systems regulate adaptive 
(internal) informational resources, and the byproducts of these processing features are also 
causally relevant to the frequency and content of religious representations. From this premise, 
SiM claims that the constraints operating on religious transmission will inevitably carry low 
cognitive demands, since we are cognitively predisposed to non-adaptive religious activity 
(Barrett 2000; McCauley 2000; Boyer 1994a, 1994b). My chief concern with these types of 
claims is that while some innate cognitive features govern religious transmission, the SiM 
overlooks the demands associated with information management and fidelity. SiM undersells 
the importance that engineered cultural environments have in supporting religious 
transmission. So while I have presented EP as a target for criticism - from the point of view 
of cognitive externalism - I do not think the project is entirely flawed. Only that SiM 
oversells the claim for optimality.   
 
Another misreading could be that this thesis is intended to frame cognitive ecological 
approaches as some methodological cousin to the ethnographical and historical scholarship. 
On the contrary, by evaluating the gap between psychology and ethnography, by way of a 
cognitive ecological approach, demonstrated the benefit of an interdisciplinary approach for 
the CSR. However, I would like to further the claim that a cognitive ecological approach – 
while being more helpful to this integration – has yet to capably prove itself as a robust 
contribution to the interpretive project. Indeed, cognitive ecological models often 
  
  213 
parasitically profit from the literature generated by participatory accounts and historical 
research. Qualitative reports can also tell us something critical about the relative values and 
attitudes derived from religious customs; how religious knowledge is transmitted; and the 
cognitive tools and strategies used for organizing religious knowledge (i.e. for memory and 
transmission). I have offered some lines of inquiry into the future efficacy of the CSR, but I 
would also urge that historians, anthropologists, and theological scholars, be relatively open 
to a similar dialogue with the cognitive sciences. 
 
In relation to cognitive ecological models, I have argued that while there are some 
universal features of our cognitive architecture that correlate with predictable patterns of 
religious behaviour (i.e. such as memory constraints), the tools and strategies employed for 
supporting knowledge transmission varies depending on locally contingent factors. The 
relationship between expertise and external cognitive resources can often be described as 
locally optimal since the channels of transmission are dependent upon the informational 
character of the cultural environment. And while I have drawn some attention to cross-
cultural similarities - such as the use of comparative mnemonic tools and strategies - the 
cognitive ecological models discussed in this thesis assume both the diversity and variation of 
cultural milieus. 
 
Despite these bulkier claims, this dissertation has also made some modest attempt to 
extend the scholarship on historical mnemotechnics by focusing on Māori pedagogy, myth 
and narrative. The research material by authors on Māori oral tradition highlights the 
complexities in learning and communicating certain features of mythic knowledge and the 
methods by which memory was enhanced (Metge 1984; Marsden 2003). I have integrated 
these claims to support how mnemonic devices within Māori myth could be viewed as 
features for enhancing the fidelity of information transmission. But stronger comparisons can 
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be drawn between Yates’ (1966) work on artificial memory and my own case study. The 
method of loci has featured heavily within this examination, and I predict that the traditional 
Māori case study is still ripe for a comparative mnemotechnical approach.  
 
I close by briefly summarizing the chapters in this dissertation and some of the challenges 
to future research. Firstly, Chapter 1 offered a brief overview of cognitivism for the 
purposes of representing the background research history within the CSR. It is argued by 
SiM that there is an optimal basin of attraction for religious transmission that is influenced 
by innate cognitive resources. This optimality predicts that innate cognitive systems 
determine the shape and character of religious activity. From the point of view of an 
epidemiological transmission model, information processing constraints and motivations 
determine the frequency and content of religious representations (see Sperber 1996, Boyer 
2001). It is claimed by SiM that features of our cognition are violated by minimally 
counterintuitive concepts. According to SiM, religious representations are therefore both: 1) 
counter to functional ontological percepts, while being: b) grounded in some natural 
ontological percepts. This optimal relationship between natural ontologies and supernatural 
concepts makes religious ideas both natural and motivationally salient.  
 
Later in the chapter I provided an overview of Harvey Whitehouse’s (2004) modes theory 
as a counter to SiM. Whitehouse argues that the cognitive optimality thesis is insufficient to 
explain the breadth and depth of religious ritual expression across cultures. Instead, he claims 
that a cognitive account of religious transmission must also examine the burden of memory in 
stabilizing, preserving and communicating ritual knowledge. Whitehouse’s modes theory 
attempts to model the interface between memory and ritual. He argues that particular ritual 
structures work in conjunction with the regularities of memory constraints, and these 
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structures are both contingent upon socio-ecological conditions and causally linked to the 
stability of the diffusion of religious ritual. Particular ritual actions activate both semantic and 
episodic memory systems, making the content of religious ritual more salient (or 
memorable). The shape of any one cultural milieu (e.g. such as demographics) will therefore 
determine the mode of religious transmission, whereby certain rituals function as a means to 
imprint on memory.  
 
This echoes my own concern with SiM and the cognitive optimality thesis. Whitehouse 
claims that a culture’s diverse elements - locally contingent differences - are causally relevant 
to a description of religious expression. Subsequently, in order to advance a comprehensive 
description of religious activity, the CSR should also incorporate locally contingent 
influences into its analysis (i.e. and this includes ecological conditions such as population, 
economy and political life). While this thesis has not elaborated on the specifics of ritual 
modes, it has aligned itself with Whitehouse’s motivation to underscore the limitations of 
internal cognitive optimality. I have claimed that the volume (depth and complexity) of 
religious information necessitates culturally developed tools and skill-based strategies for 
managing religious information and its transmission. Similarly to Whitehouse, I propose that 
there are relevant invested costs involved in the transmission of religious knowledge. These 
invested costs imply that the commitments and motivational salience of cognitively 
demanding religious concepts are significant for a psychological analysis of religious 
activity. 
 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of some selected historical and anthropological material 
on the study of memory and mnemonics. This chapter focused on the historical research into 
mnemonic methods utilized by oral cultures. Yates (1966) and Carruthers (1990) have 
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previously examined the Classical, Medieval and Renaissance methods for oratory and 
memory by looking at how mnemonic strategies – such as the method of loci - were used for 
the preservation and communication of knowledge sources. In this chapter I introduced some 
background on the method of loci and how spatial imagery, as an example, has previously 
been a common method for cueing information for oratory purposes (Yates 1966). The 
method of loci is characterized within the study of mnemotechnics as an artificial memory 
strategy for information storage and retrieval. This historical analysis on mnemotechnics 
would be meaningful to the later chapters on Pacific oral traditions, and I would argue later 
that place names and landmarks (i.e. macrospatial imagery) have been commonly recruited as 
supportive connections for working memory.   
 
Mnemotechnical approaches have been previously applied to both Melanesian and 
Polynesian oral cultures, and later in Chapter 2 I provided an overview of Harwood’s (1976) 
study of Trobriand oral tradition and their use of macrospatial mnemonics (Harwood 1976; 
Kahn 1990; Campbell 2000). According to Harwood, and from a structural point of view, 
myths support social institutions while providing a cognitive orientation within a culture’s 
epistemic framework. Harwood argues that the causal relationship between myths and social 
structures within oral cultures require further examination since myths are prone to 
transmission instability. Without the use of administrative systems – such as text - she argues 
that oral cultures relied on other stabilizing mechanisms in order to preserve a mythic corpus. 
Harwood argues, then, that the incorporation of method of loci-type mnemonic tools was 
critical to the organization of knowledge resources. Physical markers on the landscape 
provided a means for coordinating mythic information, according to Harwood, and narratives 
were structured in accordance with significant landmarks for mnemonic purposes.  
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Following on from Harwood’s analysis, and later in Chapter 2, I briefly examined some of 
the experimental evidence for the use of macrospatial knowledge and memory. David C. 
Rubin’s (1995) psychological analysis of oral traditions suggests that there is an optimal 
relationship between working memory and macrospatial imagery (over lists or verbatim). 
Rubin claims that the psychological evidence regarding an individual’s capacity to memorize 
and recall information provides support for the historical and ethnographic data on oral 
traditions and myth, and the experimental evidence correlates well with Yates’ (1966), and 
Harwood’s (1976) study of mnemonic devices and landscape. I argue that the common use of 
landmarks and place names in myths are coherent with a cognitive study of religious memory 
and transmission. Harwood and Rubin’s research would be relevant to the cognitive 
ecological models examined in chapters 4 and 5 since these models emphasize how physical 
and conceptual structures enhance cognitive abilities.   
 
Chapter 3 expanded on the previous chapter by focusing specifically on traditional Māori 
myth, epistemology and oral maps. This chapter was split into two sections, reflecting the 
application of the cognitive ecological models that would be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. In 
the first half of Chapter 3 I examined the epistemic features of traditional Māori 
epistemology and the attitudes towards knowledge sharing. I discussed some of the key 
differences between European and Māori conceptions of knowledge, and the cultural 
bearings of text as an information distribution medium. Since knowledge was perceived 
within a traditional Māori context as a protected resource, having a life force of its own, the 
practices and mediums associated with the open access of information contravened an 
embedded epistemic perception: that the indiscriminate spread of knowledge would greatly 
reduce its tapu (sacredness). It was argued that these epistemic prejudices had a significant 
impact on the customs associated with knowledge transmission (King 1978). As in all 
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cultures, the medium (or mode) by which information is disseminated and the perception of 
knowledge sharing will typically have cultural attitudes attached to them, and these 
perceptions are often informed by religious norms. 
 
This simple overview on Māori epistemology would later provide support the chapters on 
pedagogy and memory. It was important to show how traditional Māori attitudes towards 
knowledge inform the way in which learning was structured for the purposes 
intergenerational transmission. The attitudes associated with knowledge sharing also 
demonstrated the significance placed upon memory and the methods by which sacred 
knowledge was communicated publicly.  
 
Kinship and place significantly shaped the way in which knowledge was organized within 
traditional Māori culture, and later in Chapter 3 I looked at Mere Roberts’ (2010) claim that 
whakapapa (genealogy) served as a database for this purpose. Roberts argues, that the 
memorization of both myth and kin was intertwined with whakapapa, providing a ‘cognitive 
map’ by which this information could be stored and retrieved. By tracing a line of descent 
alongside a mythic narrative, whakapapa also functioned as an interactive library system for 
the purposes of storing and retrieving a variety of knowledge resources (including ecological, 
economic and political information) (Roberts 2010).  
 
Next, I proposed the importance of assessing the epistemic value of landscape, place 
names and myths within Māori oral tradition. I argued that learned methods for retaining 
information – such as cognitive maps - functioned as supportive mechanisms for working 
memory. Anne Salmond (1982) has observed that within Māori oral tradition, landmarks 
were places where knowledge could be stored. Geographical locations were not just physical 
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places, but epistemic properties also - they are storage places for sacred knowledge, and 
accessible through mythic narratives. This area of research on traditional Māori epistemology 
would also have value in my own examination of physical geography and memory. I argued 
that physical and linguistic structures - such as landmarks and place names – aid in the 
organization of information by providing cognitive inputs in the absence of other symbolic 
structures.  
 
In the same chapter, my own evaluation of the Māori Oral History Atlas (Wilson 1990) 
elaborates further on the traditional Māori perception that information could be stored on the 
landscape through the retelling of mythic narratives. With the recitation of narratives, place 
names could be recollected in sequential order while further providing cues to geographical 
locations and their significance. These myths were not only a way to recall places with a 
mythical significance, but also a means to provide navigational support for travelers. 
According to a Māori Oral History Atlas (1990) mythic narratives are viewed as ‘oral maps’, 
since they embody critical information about the landscape and a sequential order of places. 
This is most notable in the myth of He Whakarāpopotonga I Ngā Kōrero Mo Poutini’ 
(‘Poutini: A Guardian Taniwha’), whereby the characters moved from one location to 
another. Each location correlated with a stone quarry and the name of the resource that could 
be acquired there. The story of Poutini provided both an oral map for navigating these places 
of significance, as well as valuable geological information.  
 
While SiM overlooks the costs involved in the organization and transmission of a sacred 
knowledge, I have chosen to highlight the burden of memory in the preservation and 
communication of a mythical corpus through the use of external cognitive properties (for a 
functional examination of this, see also Bulbulia et al [2012]). The use of landmarks and 
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myth as orienting devices would become more relevant to my own study in my own 
evaluation of two cognitive ecological models: epistemic niche construction and distributed 
cognition. In these chapters (4 and 5) I examined both the social dimensions of learning (i.e. 
structured pedagogical environments), and the use of mnemonic devices (i.e. macrospatial 
memory) for the transmission of mythic knowledge.  
 
Chapter 4 examined the first of two cognitive ecological models: epistemic niche 
construction (ENC). ENC provides a materialist explanation for the evolutionary significance 
of environmental engineering, while underlining the importance of cultural environments as 
supportive systems for cognitive expertise. I supported the claim here that human cultural 
learning is founded upon the capacity to construct, reproduce and interact with structured 
informational environments that scaffold cognitive abilities. Further, the cross-generational 
transmission of these structured cognitive niches has been a crucial mechanism in 
information inheritance. Importantly, the fidelity of information transmission is augmented 
by the active engagement with social learning strategies and tools.  
 
Internal content-rich cognitive systems are not the only causal mechanisms for the 
transmission of religious knowledge. In its place, structured learning environments play a key 
role in the development of our cognitive ability and the fidelity of transmission. In particular, 
I looked at the interplay between structured teacher-student interactions (i.e. apprenticeship 
arrangements [Sterelny 2011]). Following on from Sterelny’s work on ENC and coordinated 
apprenticeship learning, I further claimed that the development of focused teacher-student 
interaction enhances the stability and fidelity of religious transmission.  
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The content and the mode by which information is passed on are subject to locally 
contingent factors, such as socioecological conditions. The contention made by authors such 
as Harwood (1976), Salmond (1982) and Roberts (2010) is that myths shape epistemic 
perceptions and interactions, as well as the informational organization of social structures. 
For instance, sacred conventions are distinguishable as culturally prescribed structures that 
can impose rules on information sharing, and in Chapter 4 I described how traditional Māori 
norms and customs (i.e. the observance of tapu [sacred], as well as the adherence to tikanga 
[rules and customs]) shaped how individuals interacted with their epistemic environment.  
 
Scholars of early Māori pedagogy have often underscored how sacred norms influence the 
structure and flow of informational resources (Metge 1984; Roberts 2010; Roberts & Wills 
1998; Royal 2003; Royal 2005; Salmond 1982). I have argued that memory and orality can 
be viewed as skill-sets nurtured for the purposes of boosting the fidelity of transmission. 
Subsequently, the supervision of a student’s skills in this area by tribal elders was a critical 
component in the learning strategies employed within a traditional Māori context. Because 
the accurate transmission of sacred knowledge depended upon strong mnemonic and 
communication abilities, both the strengthening of memory and the refinement of oral skills 
were considered prestigious expertise.  
 
Chapter 5 expands further on this idea that environments are structured as a way to 
support cognition. Here I argued for the hybrid nature of learning development and cognitive 
scaffolding. I supported the claim made by external-distributed cognition models that the 
flexibility of human cognition allows for the recruitment external properties for working 
memory (Hutchins 1995). I argued that the use of physical properties and place names in 
mythic narratives buffers the costs of information management, with oral maps being 
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employed as organizational templates for knowledge. Physical structures - such as landmarks 
- act as cognitive inputs and ensure the tractability of conceptual reasoning (Fauconnier and 
Turner’s 2002; Hutchins 2005). Hutchins use of conceptual blends describes how knowledge 
is stabilized through the incorporation of physical properties as cognitive inputs. Conceptual 
complexity and working memory are better stabilized through physical properties since these 
material anchors provide a fixed relation to the conceptual structures.  
 
Hutchins argues that the capacity for conceptual blending can better describe how artificial 
memory strategies, such as the method of loci, correlate with other mnemonic templates used 
in oral cultures for organizing knowledge (Yates 1966; Harwood 1976; Hutchins 2005; see 
Chapter 2). Spatial imagery appears to be efficacious in the structuring of sequential cues 
within mythic narratives and provides a representational network blending a variety of modal 
domains across external and internal cognitive systems.  
 
Cognitive ecological models and descriptive evidence should be mutually relevant in their 
responses to the problems of: a) the unstable nature of transmitting complex bodies of sacred 
knowledge, and: b) how stability and fidelity was maintained through culturally evolved 
strategies and tools. Subsequently, I have argued four related claims that point to the 
cognitive demands of managing sacred knowledge within oral traditions: 
 
(1) There are limitations to modular/cognitivist theories of religious behaviour since 
these models do not take into account the complexity and costs of transmission. 
Predictions derived from the cognitive optimality thesis are limited to a broader 
cognitive profile, emphasizing the motivations associated with just intuitive mental 
processes. I was skeptical that these motivations can explain the commitment to the 
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preservation of complex theological knowledge (such as mythical information and 
blended concepts). In contrast to SiM, a historical treatment of information 
management within Māori oral culture implies complexity, not optimality. While 
modular approaches to the cognitive study of religion state that transmission is 
cognitively optimal, the invested costs in both pedagogy and memory demonstrates that 
the transmission of religious traditions implies informational demands. The costs 
involved in transmitting a complex theology/cosmology are not sufficiently explained 
by the cognitive optimality thesis. 
 
(2) Ecological features matter to the transmission of religious knowledge, and both 
the niche construction model and distributed cognition models (outlined in Chapters 4 
and 5) show how agents are sensitive to their culture milieus through a variety of input 
connections. There is evidence that cognitive regularities do determine some cultural 
patterns, but culturally evolved features of the environment also have a marked impact 
on the methods by which mythical knowledge is retained and transmitted.  
 
(3) A cognitive ecological model will inevitably rely upon both historical and 
ethnographic data on how cultural actors interact with their symbolic/cultural 
environments. Cognitive models should benefit from participatory reports of cultural 
practices since they can better describe how cognition functions in context. Memory 
constraints are overcome through culturally evolved strategies and tools that augment 
the fidelity of transmission, however the subtle differences in these tools and strategies 
demonstrate the complexity and variation of cultural niches. Divergence is therefore 
qualitatively relevant to both ethnographers and the cognitive scientist since cognitive 
resources for religious transmission remain locally contingent.  
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(4) Ecological models better explain the stability and fidelity of transmitting 
religious traditions. Environments are engineered and scaffold the transmission of large 
bodies of information, and while information channels can be controlled through 
cultural conventions (e.g. taboos, hierarchical structures, ritual norms), cultural 
environments are also structured for the purposes of large-scale information 
transmission. This is preconditioned by extensive cooperation (social learning) and 
technological innovation (the tools and strategies of information management and 
transmission).  
 
The value of the externalist thesis is that it frequently incorporates descriptions of the 
proximity and engagement with locally contingent cognitive resources, and this method can 
draw upon the interpretive literature (e.g. such as ethnography). However, instead of 
underscoring the semantic content of cultural activity, cognitive ecological models look more 
commonly at the functional relationship between minds and environment. Nevertheless, a 
cognitive ecological approach relies greatly upon the data generated by historical and 
anthropological research for its own analysis, and in order to better describe the 
embeddedness of cognition, researchers require data on how mental processes are distributed 
across practices that are specific to a cultural milieu. As shown in this thesis, the 
incorporation of descriptive (ethnographic and historical) material has been essential in my 
attempt to advance on my own externalist methodology within the CSR. Future research in 
this area will certainly require further comparative studies on oral traditions. 
 
Any cognitive model of religion should therefore account for the cognitive demands 
associated with transmission, but it should also be able to account for the ecologically 
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contingent means by which religious traditions are preserved and passed on. My own 
application of ecological models to the descriptive material on oral traditions should be 
valuable in understanding the cognitive and evolutionary significance of material 
engagement. While my more moderate aim was to provide a balanced perspective for 
cognitive approaches to the study of religion, it is also hoped that this thesis offers a 
meaningful and self-reflective contribution to the scholarship within the CSR. Though my 
experience with the criticisms directed at the CSR suggests that the project is misunderstood, 
I predict that future research and interdisciplinary approaches will put the future of the CSR 
in (some) good stead - especially with the more established scholarship within religious 
studies. Nevertheless, I also urge that it is important for the CSR to be consistently evaluative 
in its own theoretical and methodological assumptions. 
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Appendix 1: Māori Glossary of Terms (general). 
 
ako = learning, to teach, study, instruction 
atua = god 
hapū = larger kinship group or tribal community. 
karanga = a formal call, or ceremonial call.  
kete = basket 
kete aronui = basket of love, sympathy, compassion 
kete tuatea = basket of evil, of all things evil 
kete tuauri = basket of ritual chants 
kūmara = sweet potato 
mana = power or prestige 
manaakitanga = hospitality 
marae = formal meeting area or courtyard, related to hospitality. 
mātauranga Māori = Māori knowledge, ancestral knowledge 
mauri = aura, life force 
moko = facial tattoos and decorations 
mōteatea = traditional lament, or sung poetry.  
Ngāti Porou = Māori tribal community, East Coast of North Island 
noa = common or without tapu. 
oranga = necessity for life, health and welfare. 
pākehā = A New Zealand person of predominantly European descent 
pākeke = older, mature person, elders 
Papa-tū-ā-nuku = wife to Rangi-nui and original mother and atua.  
pounamu = greenstone 
poutama = the stepped pattern in tukutuku (latticework) 
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rakau papatupuna (rakau whakapapa) = staff used as a mnemonic aid for remembering and 
recitating of whakapapa 
rakau whakapapa (rakau papatupuna) = staff used as a mnemonic aid for remembering and 
recitating of whakapapa 
Rangi-nui = husband to Papa-tū-ā-nuku and god of the sky. Original father and atua.  
Tāne-mahuta = atua (god) of the forest, trees and birds. Son of Rangi-nui and Papa-tū-ā-
nuku.  
Tāne-te-wananga = Tāne as the bringer of knowledge and occult lore.  
taniko  = patterns on cloaks 
taonga = cultural wealth,  treasure, valuable object  
tapu = sacredness 
tauira = student, pupil, apprentice 
teina = junior line of descent, younger person 
tika = to be correct, true, accurate 
tikanga = rules, custom, proper method 
tuakana = an older, more experienced person  
tukutuku = latticework decorations 
tūtūā = commoners, laity 
waha kōhatu = stone in mouth 
waiata = to sing, or song. 
wānanaga = school, forum, place of learning  
whai - string games 
whaikōrero = formal speech, oratory.  
whakairo = to carve, or carving. 
whakapapa = genealogy, family tree or to place layers on top of one another. 
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whānau = extended family. 
whare wānanga = house of learning. 
whare whakairo = carved house, or talking house. 
wharenui = meeting house, big house 
whenua = land 
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Appendix 2: Māori Place Names Glossary. 
Aotearoa = traditionally the name for the North Island of New Zealand. Today, 
contemporary use as Māori term for New Zealand as country. 
Arahura = Arahura (stone: pounamu/greenstone) 
Hōkio = The hearing of a buzzing sound 
Manawatū = Stumbling 
Ō Hau = River) of Hau 
Onetāhua = Farewell Spit (stone: argillite) 
Otaki = The holding out of a staff 
Pāhua = Pāhua (stone: flint) 
Rangitikei = River crossed by striding 
Rangitoto = D’Urville Island (stone: argiflite) 
Tahanga = Tahanga (stone: basalt) 
Takiwai = Piopiotahi (Milford Sound) (stone: bowenite) 
Tamaāhua = (Hill of) Tamaāhua 
Te Pae a Whaitiri = Lifting of the clouds on high 
Te Tai Poutini = The tides of Poutini 
Tūhua = (Hill of) Tūhua 
Tūhua = Mayor Island (stone: obsidian) 
Turakina River = Crossing on a felled tree 
Waikanae = Water of staring in amazement 
Waimeha = Water lost in the sands 
Wairarapa = Water of a flashing 
Waitaiki = (Stream of) Waitaiki 
Whangaehu = River of cloudy water glance 
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Whangamatā = Whangamatā (stone: obsidian) 
Whangamoa = Hills above Nelson (stone: argillite) 
Whanganui = Great river 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  231 
Bibliography:  
 
Ad Herennium: [Cicero], Ad C. Herennium de Ratione Dicendi (Rhetorica ad 
Herennium), trans. Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1954). 
 
Allen, G. L. (1982). The organization of route knowledge. New directions for child  
development: Children’s conceptions of spatial relationships, 15, 31-39.   
 
Atran, S. (1993). Cognitive foundations of natural history: Towards an anthropology of 
science, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Atran, S. (1998). "Folk biology and the anthropology of science: Cognitive universals and 
cultural particulars." Behavioural and Brain Sciences 21(4): 547-569. 
 
Axelrod, R. and W. D. Hamilton (1981). "The evolution of cooperation." Science 
211(4489): 1390. 
 
Baillargeon, R. (1994). "How do infants learn about the physical world?" Current 
Directions in Psychological Science 3(5): 133-140. 
 
Baillargeon, R., L. Kotovsky, et al. (1995). "The acquisition of physical knowledge in 
infancy." A.J. Premack, D. Premack, D. Sperber (Eds.), Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary 
debate, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 79–116. 
 
Barkow, J. H., L. Cosmides, et al. (1995). The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology 
and the generation of culture, Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Baron Cohen, S. (1989). "The autistic child's theory of mind: A case of specific 
developmental delay." Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 30(2): 285-297. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1988). "Social and pragmatic deficits in autism: cognitive or affective?" 
Journal of autism and developmental disorders 18(3): 379-402. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind, Wiley 
Online Library. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. E., H. E. Tager-Flusberg, et al. (2000). Understanding other minds: 
Perspectives from developmental cognitive neuroscience, Oxford University Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S., A. M. Leslie, et al. (1985). "Does the autistic child have a." Cognition 
21(1): 37-46. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S., S. Wheelwright, et al. (1997). "Is there a link between engineering and 
autism?" Autism-London - 1: 101-109. 
 
Barrett, H. C. and R. Kurzban (2006). "Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate." 
Psychological review 113(3): 628. 
 
Barrett, J. L. (1998). "Cognitive constraints on Hindu concepts of the divine." Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion: 608-619. 
  
  232 
 
Barrett, J. L. (1999). "Theological correctness: Cognitive constraint and the study of 
religion." Method &# 38; Theory in the Study of Religion 11(4): 325-339. 
 
Barrett, J. L. (2000). "Exploring the natural foundations of religion." Trends in cognitive 
sciences 4(1): 29-34. 
 
Barrett, J. L. (2007). "Cognitive Science of Religion: What Is It and Why Is It?" Religion 
Compass 1(6): 768-786. 
 
Barrett, J. L. and F. C. Keil (1996). "Conceptualizing a nonnatural entity: 
Anthropomorphism in God concepts." Cognitive Psychology 31(3): 219-247. 
 
Bellezza, E S. (1981). Mnemonic devices: Classification, characteristics, and criteria. 
Review of Educational Research, 51, 247-275. 
 
Benavides, S. P. (2009). The usage of traditional Māori  narratives as cognitive models 
and educational tools. A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts in Social Anthropology at Massey University, Albany Campus, New 
Zealand. 
 
Berlin, B. (1971). Speculations on the growth of ethnobotanical nomenclature, Cambridge 
Univ. Press. 
 
Berlin, B. (1992). Ethnobiological classification: Principles of categorization of plants and 
animals in traditional societies, Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ. 
 
Best, E (1923). The Māori School of Learning. Dominion Museum Monograph No 6. 
Wellington:  Government Printer (Reprinted 1986). 
 
Best, E. (1921). "Polynesian Mnemonics." The New Zealand journal of science and 
technology 4: 67. 
 
Best, E. (1922). "Some aspects of Māori  myth and religion: Dominion Mus." Mon. no. I, 
Wellington. 
 
Best, E. (1924). Māori Religion and Mythology Part I, AR Shearer. Government Printer. 
 
Best, E. (1972). Tuhoe: The children of the mist (2nd ed., Vol. 1). Wellington, NZ: A. H. 
& A. W. Reed Ltd. 
 
Bowden, R. (1979). "Tapu and Mana: ritual authority and political power in traditional 
Māori society." The Journal of Pacific History 14(1): 50-61. 
 
Bower, G. H. (1970). "Imagery as a relational organizer in associative learning." Journal 
of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour 9(5): 529-533. 
 
Boyd, R. and P. Richerson (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: Univ, 
Chicago Press. 
 
  
  233 
Boyer, P. (1992). "Explaining religious ideas: elements of a cognitive approach." Numen: 
27-57. 
 
Boyer, P. (1994a). Cognitive constraints on cultural representations: Natural ontologies 
and religious ideas. In: Mapping the mind: Domain-specificity in cognition and culture, ed. L. 
A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Boyer, P. (1994b). The naturalness of religious ideas: A cognitive theory of religion, Univ 
of California Pr on Demand. 
 
Boyer, P. (1998). "Cognitive tracks of cultural inheritance: How evolved intuitive 
ontology governs cultural transmission." American Anthropologist 100(4): 876-889. 
 
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained. Basic Books. 
 
Boyer, P. and C. Ramble (2001). "Cognitive templates for religious concepts: Cross-
cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations." Cognitive science 25(4): 
535-564. 
 
Boyer, P. and H. C. Barrett (2005). "Domain specificity and intuitive ontology." The 
handbook of evolutionary psychology: 96–118. 
 
Boyer, P. and S. Walker (2000). "Intuitive ontology and cultural input in the acquisition of 
religious concepts." Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and religious thinking in 
children: 130–156. 
 
Bruner, J. (1984). "Vygotsky's zone of proximal development: The hidden agenda." New 
Directions for Child and Adolescent Development 1984(23): 93-97. 
 
J. Bulbulia. J., (2009). Charismatic signalling. Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature, 
Culture, 3(4):518-551.DOI:10.1558/jsrnc.v3i4.518 
 
Bulbulia. J., (2004). Religious costs as adaptations that signal altruistic intention. 
Evolution and Cognition, 10(1):19-38 
 
Bulbulia, J., Frean, M., and Reddish, P., (2012). Ecological Signalling. In G. Dawes & J. 
McClaurin, editors, A New Science of Religion, 100-110. Routledge Studies in Religion 23. 
Routledge, New York. 
 
Burenhult, N., & Levinson, S. C. (2008). Language and landscape: A cross-linguistic 
perspective. Language Sciences, 30(2/3), 135-150.  
 
Byrne, R. W. and A. Whiten (1988). Machiavellian intelligence: Social expertise and the 
evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes, and humans, Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Campbell, M. (2006). "Memory and monumentality in the Rarotongan landscape." 
Antiquity 80(307): 102-117. 
 
Carruthers, M. (1990). The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
  234 
 
Carruthers, Mary (1998). The Craft of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Chomsky, N. (1955). The logical structure of linguistic theory, Plenum press. 
 
Chomsky, N. (1988). Language and problems of knowledge: The Managua lectures, the 
MIT Press  
 
Cicero, M. T. (1942). De Oratore, II. Trans, H. Rackham and E. W. Sutton. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again, The MIT 
Press. 
 
Clark, A. (1998). Where Brain, Body and World Collide Daedalus: Journal of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Special Issue on The Brain) Vol 127 (2) p. 257-
280. 
 
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. Analysis 58: 7-19. 
 
Cole, M. and Y. Engeström (1993). "A cultural-historical approach to distributed 
cognition." Distributed cognitions: Psychological and educational considerations: 1-46. 
 
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (1987). "From Evolution to Behaviour: Evolutionary 
psychology as the missing link". 
 
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (1989). "Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of 
Culture, part II:: Case study: A computational theory of social exchange." Ethology and 
sociobiology 10(1-3): 51-97. 
 
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (1994). "Origins of domain specificity: The evolution of 
functional organization." Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture: 85–
116. 
 
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (2000). "Consider the source: The evolution of adaptations for 
decoupling and metarepresentation." Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective: 
53–115. 
 
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (2005). "Neurocognitive adaptations designed for social 
exchange." The handbook of evolutionary psychology: 584–627. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford, England: Oxford Paperbacks. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype, Oxford University Press. 
 
Day, M. (2004a). The Ins and Outs of Religious Cognition, Method and Theory in the 
Study of Religion. Vol. 16, 3: 241-255. 
 
Day, M. (2004b). Religion, Off-Line Cognition and the Extended Mind, Journal of 
Cognition and Culture. Vol. 4, 1:101-121. 
  
  235 
 
Day, M. (2005). Rethinking Naturalness: The Modes of Religiosity and Religion in the 
Round, In Harvey Whitehouse and Robert N. McCauley, eds., Mind and Religion: 
Psychological and Cognitive Foundations of Religion, 207-232. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta 
Mira Press. 
 
Day, M., (2009). Constructing religion without the social: Durkheim, Latour, and 
extended cognition. Zygon 44(3): 719-737. 
 
De Smedt, J., & De Cruz, H. (2010). Toward an integrative approach of cognitive 
neuroscientific and evolutionary psychological studies of art. Evolutionary Psychology, 8, 
695–719. 
 
Dennett, D. (2000). Making Tools for Thinking, in D. Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations 
(Oxford U.P.). 
 
Dennett, D. C. (1984). "Cognitive wheels: The frame problem of AI." Minds, machines 
and evolution: 129–151. 
 
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture 
and cognition, Harvard Univ Pr. 
 
Donald, M. (1995). The neurobiology of human consciousness: an evolutionary approach. 
Neuropsychologia, 33:1087-1102.  
 
Donald, M. (1998). "Material culture and cognition: concluding thoughts." Cognition and 
Material Culture: the Archeology of Symbolic Storage. Cambridge, McDonald Institute. 
 
Donald, M. (2001). A mind so rare: The evolution of human consciousness, WW Norton 
& Company. 
 
Donald, M. (2010). "The Flexographic Revolution: Neuropsychological Sequelae." The 
cognitive life of things: recasting the boundaries of the mind: 71-79. 
 
Duchaine, B., L. Cosmides, et al. (2001). "Evolutionary psychology and the brain." 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11(2): 225-230. 
 
Dunbar, R. (1998). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language, Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Durkheim, Emile (1963) [1915]. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Joseph Swain, 
trans. London: Allen and Unwin. 
 
Fauconnier, G., and M. Turner (2002). The Way We Think. Basic Books, New York. 
 
Finnegan, R. H. (1992). Oral traditions and the verbal arts : a guide to research practices. 
London ; New York, Routledge. 
 
Finnegan, R. H. (1995). South Pacific oral traditions, Indiana University Press. 
 
  
  236 
Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind, MIT Press Cambridge, MA. 
 
Fodor, J. A. (2001). The Mind Doesn't Work that Way: The scope and limits of 
computational psychology, The MIT Press. 
 
Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions, WW 
Norton & Co. 
 
Frank, R. H. (1993). "The strategic role of the emotions." Rationality and Society 5(2): 
160. 
 
Gade, A. M., (2004). Perfection Makes Practice: Learning. Emotion and the Recited 
Qur'an in Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 
 
Geertz, C., (1966/1973). “Religion as a Cultural System,” in Anthropological Approaches to 
the Study of Religion, edited by M. Banton, London: Tavistock Publications Ltd. 
1966, pp. 1-46; reprinted in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, by 
Clifford Geertz, New York: Basic Books 1973, pp. 87-125. 
 
Geertz, C., (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Geertz, A. W. (2010a). Brain, body and culture: A biocultural theory of religion. Method 
and Theory in the Study of Religion, 22(4), 304-321. 
 
Geertz, A. W. (2010b). Too much mind and not enough brain, body and culture: On what 
needs to be done in the cognitive science of religion. Historia Religionum. An International 
Journal, 2, 21-37. 
 
Gibson, James J. (1966). The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Boston: Hughton 
Mifflin. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1998). Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature, Cambridge 
Univ Pr. 
 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2000). "Niche construction in biological and philosophical theories." 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 23(01): 153-154. 
 
Gould, S. J. and R. C. Lewontin (1979). "The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme." Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B. Biological Sciences 205(1161): 581. 
 
Grush, Rick (2003). ‘In Defense of Some “Cartesian” Assumptions Concerning the Brain 
and its Operation’. Biology and Philosophy, 18 , 53-93. 
 
Grey, G. (1971/1854). Nga Mahi a Nga Tupuna, 4th edition. Reed: Wellington  
 
Griffiths, P. E. and R. D. Gray (1994). "Developmental systems and evolutionary 
explanation." The Journal of Philosophy 91(6): 277-304. 
 
  
  237 
Griffiths, P. E. and R. D. Gray (1994). "Developmental systems and evolutionary 
explanation." The Journal of Philosophy 91(6): 277-304. 
 
Guthrie, S. (1995). Faces in the clouds: A new theory of religion, Oxford University Press, 
USA. 
 
Haami, B. (2004). Pūtea whakairo : Māori and the written word. Wellington, N.Z., Huia 
Publishers in association with the Ministry for Culture and Heritage. 
 
Hanson, A. (1989). "The Making of the Māori: Culture invention and its logic." American 
Anthropologist 91(4): 890-902. 
 
Havelock, E. A. (1963). Preface to Plato, Harvard University Press. 
 
Havelock, E. A. (1978). The Greek concept of justice: From its shadow in Homer to its 
substance in Plato, Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA. 
 
Heinrich, J. and R. Boyd (2002). "On Modeling Cognition and Culture." Journal of 
Cognition and Culture 2(2): 87. 
 
Hemara, W. (2000). Māori Pedagogies: A View from the Literature, New Zealand Council 
for Educational Research, Education. 
 
Henrich, J., R. Boyd, et al. (2008). "Five misunderstandings about cultural evolution." 
Human Nature 19(2): 119-137. 
 
Hirschfeld, L. A. and S. A. Gelman (1994). "Toward a topography of mind: An 
introduction to domain specificity." Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and 
culture: 3–35. 
 
Hutchins, E. (1991). "The social organization of distributed cognition." In L.B. Resnick, 
J.M. Levine, and S.D. Teasley (Eds.), Perspectives on socially shared cognition 283–307. 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Hutchins, E. (1995a). Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA  
 
Hutchins, E. (1995b). "How a cockpit remembers its speeds." Cognitive science 19(3): 
265-288. 
 
Hutchins, E. (2005). "Material anchors for conceptual blends." Journal of Pragmatics 
37(10): 1555-1577. 
 
Hutchins, E. (2006). "The distributed cognition perspective on human interaction." Roots 
of human sociality: culture, cognition and interaction. In Enfield, N.J. and Stephen C. 
Levinson. Eds. Roots of Human Sociality. Culture, Cognition and Interaction, 375-398 
 
Hutchins, E. (2010). "Cognitive ecology." Topics in Cognitive Science 2: 705–715. 
 
Irons, W (2001). “Religion as a Hard-to-Fake Signal of Commitment.” Ch. 13, in 
Randolph M. Ness, ed. Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. New York, Russell 
  
  238 
Sage Foundations Series on Trust. 
 
Jensen, J. S. (2009). "Religion as the unintended product of brain functions in the 
‘standard cognitive science of religion model’: on Pascal Boyer, Religion explained (2001) 
and Ilkka Pyysiäinen, How religion works (2003)." Contemporary Theories of Religion: a 
critical companion. Routledge, New York: 129–155. 
 
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1986). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of language, 
inference, and consciousness, Harvard University Press. 
 
John-Steiner, V. and H. Mahn (1996). "Sociocultural approaches to learning and 
development: A Vygotskian framework." Educational Psychologist 31(3): 191-206. 
 
Kahn, M. (1990). "Stone-faced ancestors: the spatial anchoring of myth in Wamira, Papua 
New Guinea." Ethnology 29(1): 51-66. 
 
Kaptelinin, V., B. Nardi, et al. (2003). Post-cognitivist HCI: second-wave theories, ACM. 
 
Kelly, J. (1999). "Māori maps." Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic 
Information and Geovisualization 36(2): 1-30. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on 
Cognitive Science, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
King, M. (1978). "Some Māori attitudes to documents." Tihie Mauri Ora: Aspects of 
Māoritanga: 9-18. 
 
Laland, K. and Odling-Smee, J. (2000). "The evolution of the meme." Darwinizing 
culture: The status of memetics as a science: 121-141.  
 
Laland, K. N., and G. Brown (2011). Sense and nonsense: Evolutionary perspectives on 
human behaviour, Oxford University Press. 
 
Laland, K. N., and K. Sterelny (2006). "Perspective: seven reasons (not) to neglect niche 
construction." Evolution 60(9): 1751-1762. 
 
Laland, K. N., J. Odling-Smee, et al. (2000). "Niche construction, biological evolution, 
and cultural change." Behavioural and Brain Sciences 23(01): 131-146. 
 
Laland, K. N., J. Odling‐Smee, et al. (2001). "Cultural niche construction and human 
evolution." Journal of Evolutionary Biology 14(1): 22-33. 
 
Laland, K. N., J. Odling‐Smee, et al. (2008). "EvoDevo and niche construction: building 
bridges." Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution 
310(7): 549-566. 
 
Lawson, E. T. and R. N. McCauley (1990). "Interpretation and Explanation: Problems and 
Promise in the Study of Religion." Religion and Cognition: A Reader: 12-35. 
 
Lawson, E. T. and R. N. McCauley (1993). "Crisis of conscience, riddle of identity: 
  
  239 
Making space for a cognitive approach to religious phenomena." Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 61(2): 201-223. 
 
Lee, K. E. (1985). Earthworms: their ecology and relationships with soils and land use, 
Academic Press Inc. 
 
Leslie, A. M. (1987). "Pretense and representation: The origins of" theory of mind."." 
Psychological review 94(4): 412. 
 
Leslie, A. M. and S. Keeble (1987). "Do six-month-old infants perceive causality?" 
Cognition 25(3): 265-288. 
 
Leslie, A. M. and U. Frith (1988). "Autistic children's understanding of seeing, knowing 
and believing." British Journal of Developmental Psychology 6(4): 315-324. 
 
Lewontin, R. C. (1982). "Organism and environment." Learning, development and culture: 
151-170. 
 
Lewontin, R. C. (1991). Biology as ideology: The doctrine of DNA, Harper Perennial. 
 
Linnekin, J. (1991). "Cultural invention and the dilemma of authenticity." American 
Anthropologist 93(2): 446-449. 
 
Linnekin, J. (1992). "On the theory and politics of cultural construction in the Pacific." 
Oceania 62(4): 249-263. 
 
Louis. R. (2005). Hawaiian place names: mnemonic symbols in Hawaiian performance 
cartography, In J. Kidman, J. Te Rito, W. Penetito (Eds) Proceedings of the Indigenous 
Knowledges Conference  Reconciling Academic Priorities with Indigenous Realities. 
Knowledge Exchange Programme of Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga, pp. 93-102. 
 
Lyotard, J. (1979). "The Postmodern Condition: a report on Knowledge (Minneapolis, 
University of Minneapolis Press)." 
 
Mahuika, N. (2012). 'Kōrero Tuku Iho': Reconfiguring Oral History and Oral Tradition, 
University of Waikato. 
 
Malafouris L (2004). The Cognitive Basis of Material Engagement: Where Brain, Body 
and Culture Conflate, in Rethinking Materiality: The Engagement of Mind with the Material 
World, (eds.) E. DeMarrais, C. Gosden, C. Renfrew, Cambridge: McDonald Institute for 
Archaeological Research: 53-62. 
 
Malinowski, B., (1948). Magic, Science and Religion. Glencoe: Free Press. 
 
McCauley, R. N. (2000). "The naturalness of religion and the unnaturalness of science." 
Explanation and cognition: 61-85. 
 
McLean, M. E. (1961). "Oral transmission in Māori music." Journal of the International 
Folk Music Council 13: 59-62. 
 
  
  240 
Metge, J. (1984). Learning and teaching: He tikanga Māori, Māori and Island Division, 
Department of Education. 
 
Mitira, Tiaki Hikawera (1972). Takitimu. Reed Publishing (NZ) Ltd, Wellington. 
Accessed September 2012 from http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-MitTaki.html  
 
Moon, P. (2003). Tohunga: Hohepa Kereopa, David Ling Pub. 
 
Murphy, D. J. (2009). "Sacred Technologies: The evolution of religious cognitive niche." 
A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in Religious Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. 
 
Naiman, R. J., C. A. Johnston, et al. (1988). "Alteration of North American streams by 
beaver." BioScience 38(11): 753-762. 
 
Nardi, B. A. (1996). "Studying context: A comparison of activity theory, situated action 
models, and distributed cognition." Context and consciousness: Activity theory and human-
computer interaction: 69-102. 
 
Nichols, S. (2001). "Mindreading and the cognitive architecture underlying altruistic 
motivation." Mind & language 16(4): 425-455. 
 
Odling-Smee, F. J., K. N. Laland, et al. (2003). Niche construction: the neglected process 
in evolution, Princeton Univ Pr. 
 
Orbell, M. (1990). “‘My Summit Where I Sit’: Form and Content in Māori Women’s Love 
Songs.” Oral Tradition, 5:185-204. 
 
Oyama, S., P. Griffiths, et al. (2001). Cycles of contingency: developmental systems 
theory and evolution, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Paivio, A. (1969). "Mental imagery in associative learning and memory." Psychological 
Review; Psychological Review 76(3): 241. 
 
Paivio, A. (1971).  Imagery and Verbal Processes. New York. 
 
Paivio, A. (1975). "Imagery and synchronic thinking." Canadian Psychological 
Review/Psychologie Canadienne 16(3): 147. 
 
Parshall, P. (1999). “The Art of Memory and the Passion,” The Art Bulletin, 81:3: 456.  
 
Patterson, John (1992). Exploring Māori Values, The Dunmore Press, New Zealand. 
 
Pere, R. R. (1982). Ako: Concepts and learning in the Māori tradition. Hamilton, N.Z., 
University of Waikato, Dept. of Sociology. 
 
Perner, J., S. R. Leekam, et al. (1987). "Three-year-olds' difficulty with false belief: The 
case for a conceptual deficit." British Journal of Developmental Psychology. 
 
  
  241 
Perrig, W. and W. Kintsch (1985). "Propositional and situational representations of text." 
Journal of Memory and Language 24(5): 503-518. 
 
Pinker, S. (1995). The language instinct, HarperPerennial New York, NY. 
 
Pinker, S. (1999). "How the mind works." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
882(1): 119-127. 
 
Pléh, C. (2003). "Thoughts on the distribution of thoughts: Memes or epidemies." Journal 
of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1(1): 21-51. 
 
Povinelli, D. J., J. E. Reaux, et al. (2000). Folk physics for apes: The chimpanzee's theory 
of how the world works, Oxford University Press, New York. 
 
Powell, R. and S. Clarke (2012). “Religion as an evolutionary byproduct: A Critique of the 
Standard Model”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 63: 457–486 
 
Proffitt, D. R. and D. L. Gilden (1989). "Understanding natural dynamics." Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 15(2): 384. 
 
Putnam, H. (1975). "The Meaning of Meaning”. In: H. Putnam." Philosophical Papers Vol 
2: 215-271. 
 
Pyysiäinen, I. (2001). How Religion Works: Towards a New Cognitive Science of 
Religion. Brill. 
 
Roberts, M. (2012). Mind maps of the Māori. GeoJournal, 77: 741–751. 
 
Roberts, M., & Wills, P. (1998). Understanding Māori epistemology- a scientific 
perspective. In H. Wautischer (Ed.), Tribal Epistemologies: Essays in the philosophy of 
anthropology (pp. 43–77). Avebury: Ashgate. 
 
Roberts, R. M., Haami, B., Benton, R., Satterfield, T., Finucane, M. L., & Henare, M. 
(2004). Whakapapa as a mental construct of Māori, and its implications for genetic 
engineering. The Contemporary Pacific, 16(1), 1–28. 
 
Royal, Charles Te Ahukaramu (ed.) (2003), The Woven Universe: Selected Writings of 
Rev. Māori Marsden, The Estate of Rev. Māori Marsden, New Zealand. 
 
Royal, Charles Te Ahukaramu. (2005). Exploring indigenous knowledge, In J. Kidman, J. 
Te Rito, W. Penetito (Eds) Proceedings of the Indigenous Knowledges Conference  
Reconciling Academic Priorities with Indigenous Realities. Knowledge Exchange 
Programme of Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga, pp. 93-102. 
 
Rubin, D. C. (1978). "A unit analysis of prose memory." Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behaviour 17(5): 599-620. 
 
Rubin, D. C. (1995). Memory in oral traditions: the cognitive psychology of epic, ballads, 
and counting-out rhymes. New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
  
  242 
Salmond, A. (1982). Theoretical Landscapes: On Cross-Cultural Conceptions of 
Knowledge. In Semantic Anthropology. David Parkin, ed. Pp. 65-87. A.S.A. Monograph 22. 
London: Academic Press 
 
Samuels, R. (1998). "Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis." 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(4): 575. 
 
Samuels, R. (2000). "Massively modular minds: evolutionary psychology and cognitive 
architecture. Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, language and meta-cognition. P. 
Carruthers and A. Chamberlain. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 13-46.  
 
Samuels, R. (2005). "The complexity of cognition: Tractability arguments for massive 
modularity." In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, and S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 107–121.  
 
Satchell, J. E. (1983). Earthworm ecology-from Darwin to vermiculture, Chapman and 
Hall. 
 
Schneider, S. (2008). "Yes, it does: a diatribe on Jerry Fodor’s The Mind Doesn’t Work 
that Way." Psyche. 13: 1–15 
 
Scholl, B. J. and A. M. Leslie (1999). "Modularity, development and ‘theory of mind’." 
Mind & language 14(1): 131-153. 
 
Seelenfreund, A. and C. Bollong (1989). "The sourcing of New Zealand archaeological 
obsidian artifacts using energy dispersive XRF spectroscopy." In: Saying So Doesn't Make it 
So, Papers in Honour of B. Foss Leach, New Zealand Archaeological Association Monograph 17: 
168-189. 
 
Simpson, J. (1997). "Io as Supreme Being: Intellectual Colonization of the Māori?" 
History of religions 37(1): 50-85. 
 
Slingerland, E., (2008) What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body & Culture. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Slone, D. J. (2004). Theological incorrectness: why religious people believe what they 
shouldn't, Oxford University Press, USA. 
 
Smith, B. and R. Casati (1994). "Naive physics: An essay in ontology." Philosophical 
psychology 7(2): 225-244. 
 
Smith, J. M. (1984). "Game theory and the evolution of behaviour." Behavioural and 
Brain Sciences 7(01): 95-101. 
 
Smith, S. P. (1913). "Lore of the Whare Wananga, Vol. 1." New Plymouth, Polynesian 
Society, Memoir 3. 
 
Sosis, R.; Kress, H. C.; Boster, J. S. (2007). "Scars for war: evaluating alternative 
signaling explanations for cross-cultural variance in ritual costs". Evolution and Human 
Behaviour 28 (4): 234–247. 
  
  243 
 
Spelke, E. S. (1990). "Principles of object perception." Cognitive science 14(1): 29-56. 
 
Sperber, D. (1985). On anthropological knowledge: three essays. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press 
 
Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach, Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
Sperber, D. and L. Hirschfeld (2004). "The cognitive foundations of cultural stability and 
diversity." Trends in cognitive sciences 8(1): 40-46. 
 
Sperber, D. and L. Hirschfeld (2006). "Culture and modularity." The innate mind: Culture 
and cognition 2: 149–164. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2000). "Development, evolution, and adaptation." Philosophy of Science: 
369-387. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2001). "Niche construction, developmental systems, and the extended 
replicator." Cycles of contingency: Developmental systems and evolution: 333-349. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a hostile world: The evolution of human cognition, Wiley-
Blackwell. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2004). "Externalism, epistemic artifacts and the extended mind." The 
externalist challenge: New studies on cognition and intentionality: 239-254. de Gruyter: 
Berlin and NY. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2006a). "Memes revisited." The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 57(1): 145-165. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2006b). "The evolution and evolvability of culture." Mind & language 21(2): 
137-165. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2006c). "Cognitive load and human decision, or, three ways of rolling the 
rock up hill." The Innate Mind 2: 218-233. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2007). "Social intelligence, human intelligence and niche construction." 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362(1480): 719-730. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2008). "The fate of the third chimpanzee." Jean Nicod Lectures. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2011). "From hominins to humans: how sapiens became behaviourally 
modern." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366(1566): 
809-822. 
 
Sterelny, K. (2012). The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique, MIT 
Pr. 
 
Sterelny, K., K. C. Smith, et al. (1996). "The extended replicator." Biology and 
Philosophy 11(3): 377-403. 
  
  244 
 
Sutton, J. (2010). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: history, the extended mind, and the 
civilizing process. In Menary, R. (Ed.), The Extended Mind (pp. 189-225). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Tangaere, A. (1997). "Māori human development learning theory." Mai I Rangiatea: 
Māori wellbeing and development: 46-59. 
 
Taylor, H. A. and B. Tversky (1992). "Spatial mental models derived from survey and 
route descriptions." Journal of Memory and Language 31(2): 261-292. 
 
Thornton, A. (1985). "Two features of oral style in Māori narrative." The Journal of the 
Polynesian Society 94(2): 149-176. 
 
Thornton, A. (1989). Māori Oral Literature as Seen by a Classicist, University of Otago. 
 
Thornton, A. (2004). The Birth of the Universe. Raupo. 
 
Tomasello, M. (1995). "Joint attention as social cognition." Joint attention: Its origins and 
role in development: 103–130. 
 
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition, Harvard Univ Pr. 
 
Tomasello, M., S. Savage‐Rumbaugh, et al. (1993). "Imitative learning of actions on 
objects by children, chimpanzees, and enculturated chimpanzees." Child Development 64(6): 
1688-1705. 
 
Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides (1992). "The psychological foundations of culture." The 
adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture: 19-136. 
 
Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides (2009). "Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology." 
Philosophy of biology: an anthology 32: 375. 
 
Tribble, E. and J. Sutton ((in press)). "Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for 
Shakespearean Studies." Shakespeare Studies, eds Garrett Sullivan and Julian Yates, 94-103. 
 
Tribble, E. and Keane, N. (2011). Cognitive Ecologies and the History of Remembering: 
Religion, Education and Memory in Early Modern England, Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Tribble, E., (2005). ‘Cognition in the Globe: socially distributed cognition and the 
demands of playing’. Shakespeare Quarterly, 56: 135-155 
 
Trigger, B. G. (1990). A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Trivers, R. L. (1971). "The evolution of reciprocal altruism." Quarterly review of biology: 
35-57. 
 
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving and W. Donaldson 
(Eds.), Organization of Memory (pp. 381-402). New York: Academic Press. 
  
  245 
 
Turnbull, D. (1991). Mapping the world in the mind: an investigation of the unwritten 
knowledge of the Micronesian navigators, Deakin University Geelong. 
 
Turner, J. S. (2000). The extended organism: the physiology of animal-built structures, 
Harvard Univ Pr. 
 
Tulving E. 1972. Episodic and semantic memory. In Organization of Memory, ed. E 
Tulving, W Donaldson, pp. 381–403. New York: Academic. 
 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind and society: The development of higher mental processes, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Whitehouse, H. (2001). Transmissive frequency, ritual, and exegesis. Journal of Cognition 
and Culture, 1, 167–182. 
 
Whitehouse, H. (2004). Modes of religiosity: A cognitive theory of religious transmission, 
Altamira Press 
 
Whitehouse, H. (2007). "Towards an Integration of Ethnography, History, and the 
Cognitive Science of Religion." Religion, Anthropology, and Cognitive Science: 247–280. 
 
Whitehouse, H. (2008). Cognitive evolution and religion; cognition and religious 
evolution. In Bulbulia, R. Sosis, E. Harris, C. Genet, R. Genet, K. & Wyman, J. (Eds), The 
Evolution of Religion: Studies, Theories, and Critiques, pp. 31-41. Collins Foundation Press, 
Santa Margarita, CA. 
 
Whiten, A. (1991). Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development and simulation of 
everyday mindreading, Basil Blackwell Oxford. 
 
Wilson, J. (Ed). (1990). He Korero Purakau mo Nga Taunahanahatanga a Nga Tupuna: 
Place Names of the Ancestors: A Māori Oral History Atlas. N.Z. Geographic Board, 
Wellington. 
 
Wilson, D. S. (2002). Darwin’s Cathedral. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wilson, R. A. (2005). "Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis." 
Cognitive processing 6(4): 227-236. 
 
Yates Frances, A. (1966). The Art of Memory. London, Routledge.   
 
 
 
 
 
